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Justice Powell:
In getting Maher ready for the Printer last MgX night I thought
of a possible improvement in the new note that does not change the
substance at all.

The reference to 380 F.Supp. is a recognition

of Poe's claim by the original District Court which assumed that it
would be met after

of the statute.
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.J~ Last Term in

Murgia,

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.

U.S. ___ (1976), we stated that:

" . . . equal protection analysis requires
strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class."
There is no claim here of a suspect class; rather, it is
urged that the Connecticut regulation impinges impermissibly
upon a fundamental right.

This requires, at the outset,

a precise identification of the right at issue.

The

fundamental right recognized in Roe, as we have shown
above, was freedom to choose abortion rather thmnor mal
childbirth without limitations, absolute or unduly
restr i ctive, imposed by the state.

In view of the nat re

of this right, much of our reasoning ... applicable to
substantive due process applies also to the alleged
denial of equal protection.

Connecticut, by the classifica-

tion here at issue, has not impermissibly restricted or

1-E
interfe red

with a pregnant woman's freedom of choice.

No ·one in that state is subject to the types of state
restrictions on abortions invalidated in our previous
decisions.

ii.
Appellees contend, nevertheless, that their equal
protection argument is supported by the decisions of this
Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, supra and Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County, supra, cases which contain elements of
both substantive due process and equal protection.
In those cases
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III.
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained, against an equal protection challenge,
under the less demanding rational basis standard of review.
The regulation classifies, for the purpose of determining
entitlement to Medcaid benefits, medical expenses incident
to elective abortions differently from such expenses incident
to childbirth.

It is argued that t:he

S::wa.,i.a~

8' t!he st!l!te

ei this distinction constitutes an invidious discrimination

~ violati~ of the equal protection clause.
A

We test the

~

,..

merit of this argument by asking whether the state's
classification rationally furthers a legitimate state
interest.

We think that it does.

Indeed, as we have indicated, Roe itself explicitly

~~
F QeGSA~med
tlie state's ultimate interest in protecting
A

the potential life of the fetus.

The interest was there

recognized on a sliding-scale basis, "grow[ing] in
substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a
point during pregnancy, [the interest] becomes 'compelling'".
Roe, supra, at 162.

Our decision in that case thus

2.
recognized the legitimacy of the state's traditional
interest, one that exists throughout the pregnancy although
it becomes compelling only at viability.

The fact that the

pregnant woman "carries an embryo, and, later, a fetus"
prompted the Court to acknowledge that this "situation is
inherently different from" the "earlier privacy" cases
relied on in Roe.

Id., at 159 (empahsis added).

The

Court went on to say that the "pregnant woman cannot be
isolated in her privacy

[Her] privacy is no longer

sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly."

Id., n. 6.

Indeed, in Skinner

v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 ; (1943) the Court emphasized,
although in a somewhat different context, the importance
of marriage and procreation "to the very existence and
survival of the race."
*Note to Tyler:

Revise and summarize fn. 1-E.

3.

(Taler: I would think we could emphasize further the nature
an importance of the state's interest by reference to what
has been said in some of our cases with respect to marriage,
procreation and the like. It would be well, I think, not
to rely soley on Roe because - in truth - Roe gave scant
attention to the state interest until the stage of viability
is reached.)

Nor can there be any question as to the rational
relationship of this classification - of the means employed
by the state - to its interest in encouraging normal childbirth and ther eby assuring "survival of the [human] race"
in our country.

The medical costs associated with childbirth

are substantial, and ·have increased significantly in recent
years.

As recognized by the District Court in this case,

such costs - including the attendant hospitalization charges are s:ia@l'1 Eis Mct)y greater than those normally associated
with non-therapeutic abortions during the first trimester.
The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth, therefore,
rationally may be deemed an incentive to a woman to c arry
a fetus to term.
to the contrary.

We do not understand appellees to argue

4.'
Although unnecessary to our analysis, we observe that
the means chosen by the state to encourage its policy choice
is the dispensation of welfare benefits.

Our cases HHfxx

uniformly have recognized a wider latitude in the

fteee~~a~y

"line drawing" process where the state must make choices
among competing demands for limited public funds.

In

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), despite recognition
that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve
"the most basic

HERSMX

economic needs of impoverished human

beings", we held that classifications survive equal protection
challenge when justified by a "reasonable basis".

As the

preceding discussion makes clear, the state interest in
encouraging normal childbirth far exceeds this minimal
level. ·k

*Tyler: What do you think about our adding, at this point
a note somewhat along the following lines: "Although there
is no occasion to go so far in this case, it is at least
possible to argue - with reason - that in the context of
a classification such as that involved in this case, the
state interest may be viewed as 'compelling' when balanced
against the comparable interest of the woman who desires
an abortion. In some circumstances (e.g., in countries
with excessive birth rates), there may oe a strong state
interest in encouraging abortions and discouraging
childbirth. Connecticut, not irrationally, wishes to ~
~dt~ childbirth.
So long as it can do this without ~
infringing upon a fundamental right, perhaps its interest
can be characterized as ''compelling"' compared with that of
a woman to have the price of her abortion paid for by the
state.
n...c..., 6..;(.. .....o&4 <.. j.._~ ....._..
t~.~c.J ~

d....f1

J-4,.;t-~ ~~ ~ ~ ~/--4~'1-t>-f ~
~~ ..... 1-o~~.J-a~~
A--1-XC- ~ ~~'

ry
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Beal

RICer B, p. 8
15.

(new footnote 15)

Our dissenting Brothers, in this case and in

Maher v. Roe, posjt, at ____ , express in vivid terms
their

anguish~

over the perceived impact of today's

decisions on indigent

preg~ant

women who prefer

abortion to carrying the fetus to childbirth.

L

)
We

w

think our Brothers misconceive the issues before us,
as well as the role of the judiciary.
In these cases we have held merely that (i) the
provisions of the Social Security Act do not require
a State, as a condition of participation, to include
the funding of elective abortions in its medicaid
program; and (ii) the Equal Protection Clause 8Ls88&
does not require a State that elects to fund expenses
incident to childbirth also to provide funding for
elective abortions.

But we leave entirely free both

the Federal Government and the States, through the
normal processes of democracy, to provide the desired
funding.

The issues present policy decisions of the

widest concern.

They should be resolved by the

repres~ntatives

of the people, not by this Court.

I

-·

75-554-0PINION
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8

mit-participating States to fund nontherapeutic abortions
requires far more convincing proof than respondents have offered. Second, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, the agency charged with the administration of this
comp 1ca e statute, takes the position that Title XIX allows-but does not manda.te-funding for such abortions.
"[\V'] e must be mindful that 'the construction of a statute
by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong .... ' "
New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S.
405, 421 ( 1973), quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969). Here, such indications are completely absent.
We therefore hold that Pennsylvania's refusal to extend
medicaid covera e to nontherapeutic abortions is not inconsistent with Title XIX.
\Ve make clear, however, that the
federal statute leaves a State free to provide such coverage if
it so desires.4j:
13 -="Federal funds are made available only to those States w110se ·medicaid
plans have· been a roved· by the Secretary of 'HEW. 42 U. S.C. § 1396.
~The Court of Appeals cone u e t at
ennsylvania's regulations a so
violated {he equality provisions of Title XIX requiring that an individual's
medical assistance "shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than
the medical assistance made available to any other such individual." 42
U.S. C. ·§1396!1(10)(b). See id ., §1396a(10)(c). According to the
Court of Appeals, the Pennsylvru1ia regulation "forces pregnant women to
use- the least volunt-a.ry method of treatment, while not imposing a similar
requirement on other persons who qualify for aid." F. 2d, at - .
We find the Pennsylvania regulation to be entirely consist-ent with the
equality provisions of Title XIX. Pennsylvania has simply decided that
there is reasonable justification for excluding from medicaid coverage a
· articular medically unnecessa procedure--nontherapeutic abortions.
14 Congress by statute bas expressly proh1 1te
t e use uring sea
year · 1977 of federal medicaid funds for abortions except when the life
of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term.
D ::!p:ntments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation
Act, 1977, § 209, Pub. L. No. 94-439 (1976).

[

~ (J,·~ 8-- Atf~]

JI

1'I

t•

.,\

I

~· ·

I1J Much of the rhetoric of the three dissenting
opinions would be equally applicable if Connecticut
had elected not to fund either abortions or childbirth.
Yet none of the dissents goes so far as to argue that
the Constitution requires such assistance for all indigent
pregnant women.

T'5-1440---C>PINION
MAHER v. ROE

"'-.)

1~

weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In~
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people ill quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri,
Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.). l'lf
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under Title XIX as construed in
Beal v. Doe, ante, Connecticut is free- through normal demoL
cratic processes- to decide that such benefits should be
provided. We hold only that the Constitution does not require a judicially irpposed resolution of these difficult issues.

IV
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's require~
ments of prior written request by the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~
uatiQn Qf a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of

lfp/ss
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Applying this analysis here, we think the District Court
erred in subjecting the Connecticut regulation to strict
judicial scrutiny.
A

The regulation does not discriminate against a
suspect class.

There isRa no claim that an indigent

woman desiring an abortion falls within the fairly limited
r:··

category of disadvantaged classes recognized by our
cases.

Appellees emphasize, rather, that the impact of

the regulation falls upon the indigent.

In a sense,

every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able
te pay for the desired goods or services.

But this Court

has never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect
class for purposes of constitutional consideration.
See Rodriguez, 411

397

u.s.

u.s.,

at

_,.

Dandridge v. Williams,

471 (1970).

,.

.· '
\

lfp/ss
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Thus, if the state had refrained from paying any of such
expenses - whether for childbirth or abortion - appellees
would have asserted no infringement of a constitutional
right.

Nor is there any suggestion that the traditional

freedom - indeed the normal expectation - of a woman to
carry her fetus to childbirth is any less entitled to
state funding than a woman's freedom during the first
trimester, recognized

in~'

to choose an abortion.

5

Rather, appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both, and may not validly evidence a
policy preference by funding only the medical expenses
incident to childbirth.

This is a challenge ¢D the

classification by the Connecticut regulation of abortions
in a different category from childbirth.

The basic frame-

work of analysis under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is well settled:

lfp/ss
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We also have emphasized that where the equal protection
challenge is to the allocation of public funds that the

(Tyler: Here pick up at the top of page 21 and incorporate
the remainder of that paragraph. Then we move to the
paragraph on page 19 beginning with "The decision • . • "

....

~fp/ss
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Putting it differently, so long as a classification is
rational in this respect and not invidious, the judgment
of legislative bodies is accorded wide respect.

See

Lindsey v . Normet, ___ U. S. ___ , ___ , (1971); Jefferson
v . Hackney , 406

u.s.

v . Rodriguez, 411

535; 3ag, Antaniw School District

u.s. ___ , ___

(1973) .

We think the

Connecticut regulation satisfies this familiar standard .

lfp/ss
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4/25/77

The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained under the less demanding test of
that applies in the absence of a

rationality ~

suspect ~

impingement of a fundamental right.

This test requires

that the distinction drawn between childbirth and
nontherapeutic abortion by the regulation be "rationally
related" to a "constitutionally permissible" purpose.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405

u.s.

56, 74 (1972).

We hold that

the Connecticut fmnding scheme satisfies this standard.

lfp/ss
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Putting it differently, so long as

:s

~ classification,(rs

~

rational in this respect and not invidious, the judgmen~ S
~

of legislative bodies ~ accorded wide respect.

See

Lindsey v. Normet, ___ U.S. ___ , ___ , (1971); Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 U.S . 535; San Antonio School District
v . Rodriguez, 411 UoS. ___ , ___ (1973).

We think the

a..l>~
_.f<· ~
~
~ J-4 1' ~~~
Connecticut regulation~ satisfies this i familiarAstandard.
/

/

·'

..
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Maher

Add as a note on page 4.

~

6L.

The District Court's judgment and order,

entered on January 16, 1976,
o n January 26, 1976 ,

stayed.

~apparently
I

Accordingly ,

for the purpose of com-

•

plying with t he jud~men t, the Department of Social Services,.
1

~

revised

~

I

275 of the Connecticut regulation.

1\

n . 2 , supra .

See
r

The revised regulation was made r etroactive

- to June 16, 1976, the date of the judgment.

Despite this

revision , w-Aich allows reimbursement ·fe-r---ftonther:-apentie
abortions, no suggestion of mootness has been made by any
of the parties, and this appeal was taken and submitted on
the theory that Connecticut desires to reinstate the invalidated regulation.

Moreover, there would remain in any event

the denial of reimbursement to Mary Poe, and similarly
situated members of the class, under the pre-revision
regulation.

The State has asserted no Eleventh Amendment

defense to this relief sought by Poe and those whom she
represents.

-

I

tb/lab
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In his dissenting opinion, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN
rejects the distinction between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an
alternative activity and argues that our previous abortion
decisions are inconsistent with today's decision.

But as

stated above, all of those decisions involved laws that
placed substantial state-created obstacles in the pregnant
woman's path to an abortion.

Our recent decision in Carey

v. Population Services International,

u.s.

(1977)

differs only in that it involved state-created
restrictions on access to contraceptives, rather than
abortions.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN simply asserts that the

Connecticut regulation "is an obvious impairment of the
fundamental right established in Roe."

Post, at

The only suggested source for this purportedly "obvious"
conclusion is a quotation from Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106 (1976).

Yet, as MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN was careful

to note at the beginning of his opinion in Singleton, that
case presented "issues [of standing] not going to the
merits of this dispute."

428

u.s.,

at 108.

Significantly, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN makes no effort to
distinguish or explain the much more analogous authority
of Norwood v. Harrison, supra.

lfp/ss
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Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion relies

heavily on t he Court's recent decision in Carey v. Population
Services International , _

u.s . _

\

(197'1,) .

The statute

in that case \ilmposed serious restrictions on the sale and
\

advertising of contraceptives , some of which were .a bsolute'
in critical respects.

Central provisions of New York's

badly drawn law also bore no rational relationship to the
state's professed objectives .

We find Carey wholly inapposite

for the purpose :relied upon .

'·

lfp/ss
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~k.

Footnote - Maher v. Roe

Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion views

Connecticut's decision in substantive due process terms
as an "obvious impairment of the fundamental right established
by~",

_P.ost, at 4, requiring asjjustification a compelling

state interest.

The dissent perceives no distinction between

state interference with the exercise of a protected activity
and state encouragement of an alternative activity.

Moreover,

much of the rhetoric of the three dissenting opintons would
be equally applicable if Connecticut had elected not to
fund either abortions or childbirth.

The "millions of

people" thought by Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent to be
disadvantaged by the Court's opinion (post, at ___) would be
no less affected if financial assistance for both were
simply discontinued by federal and state governments.

Yet

none of the dissenting opinion goes so far as to argue that
the Constitution requires such assistance for all indigent
pregnant women.

lfp/ss
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Footnote - Maher v. Roe

Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting

Connecticut's

·sion in

I
as

bvious impairment of the fundamental ri ht e tablished

by
tate interest.

The dissent perceives no distinction between

state interference with the exercise of a protected activity ;
and state encouragement of an alternative activi
~<fla;;l 
A ~ch of the rhetoric of the three dissenting opinions would

be equally applicable if Connecticut had elected not to
fund either abortions or

childb~th.

J

e "millions of

eople" thought by Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent to be
isadvantaged by the Court's opinion (post, at ___ ) would
o less affected if financial assistance for both were
simply discontinued by federal and state government .

~~--!;;_ . .~

none of th

disseneia~ op ~ goes

so far as to argue that

,I

the Constitution requires such assistance for all indigent
pregnant women.

~

l$~
Mr. Justice Brennan rejects the distinction between
A

direct state interference with a protected activity and
state encouragement of an alternative activity.
opinion

~that

are inconsistent with

His

our previous abortion decisions

~~sion.
., Nut
1\

as

w~:ilate

stated

above, all of those cases involved laws that placed
"obstacles--absolute or otherwise--in

the pregnant woman's

~

path to an abortion."

In J:i4.s effort to bridge this gap,

~~~
~¥-Mr-. Justice~ ~ly asserts that the Connecticut
A
regulation "is an obvious impairment of the fundamental
right established in Roe."

~{~~Yt~it'h~
fft.tr f.o:t~l t
obVIO~

Post, at

;!pparenrty,

ttE languagE! ta. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.s. 106 (1976).

A
•

Yet, as Mr. Justice Blackmun was careful to note at the

( o 'r'\ c...J cA.. ~ ·, OY\. I~
().. ~lA fc1vb'oV\
beginning of his opinion in Singleton, the case presented

r fv\
"issues [of standing] not going to the merits of this
dispute."

428 U.S., at 108.

Significantly, Mr. Justice

Brennan makes no effort to distinguish the much more
analogous authority of Norwood v. Harrison, supra.

lfp/ss
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Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion relies

heavily on the Court's recent decision in Carey v. Population
Services International, ___ U.S. ___ (1977).

The statute

in that case imposed serious restrictions on the sale and
advertising of contraceptives, some of which were absolute
in critical respects.

Central provisions of New York's

badly drawn law also bore no rational relationship to the
state's professed objectives.
for the purpose relied upon.

We find Carey wholly inapposite

Re:

Carey footnote
I would include a reference to Carey in my

main footnote.

Other than pointing out that this case

falls in the same general category as the »HX other
previous abortion decisions, I do not think the case
deserves special attention.

The point for which Brennan

uses the case--knocking down the distinction between
absolute and non-absolute obstacles--is a

~

non-issue.

No. 75-1440
Edward W. Maher, Commissioner
of Social Services of Connecticut, On Appeal from the
United States District
Appellant,
Court for the District
v.
of Connecticut.
Susan Roe et al.
[April -, 1977]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at-, we hold today that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for
childbirth.
I
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those
,t hat are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 Connecti1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part:
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
Mediral Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions
a.rb met:
''1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-

•.

15-1440-0PINION

MAHER v. ROE

cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au.
thorization from its Department of Social Services. Iu
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medica.lly necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of
''11ly necessary. The term " Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
lf'CPSSit~•.

''2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy.. ..
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient,
<~lld in the case of a. minor, from the parent or guardian.
'In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is
...ecurrd from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth
:-;prvireR as guardian.
'4. Prior authorization for tl1e abortion is secured from the Chief of
.\fedJCal Servte<:'S, Division of Health Services, Department of Social
Serv1cee "
~ At the time tlu~ action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school
.lttnior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital.
\pp:trPntly becam::e of Par's inability to obtain a certificate of medical
uece~o;ity, thr hosp1tal was denied reimbur::;ement by the Department of
1:loc'1al Srrvtee~ . A~ a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
lnll of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable
ro obtam an abortion because of her physician's refusal to certify that the
procedure was medtrally nrcessary. By consent, a temporary restraining
n·der was rntrred by the D1~tnrt Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
rom rrfm;'ng to pay for Hne '~ abort ion. After the retnand from the Court
.,t Apprals, tll<' Dtstrtct Court 1s~ue d temporary restraining orders covermg
•hrr(• addtttonnl women 40R F Supp . 660, 663 (Conn . 1975) .

75-1440-CPINION
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3

Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F .
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy. . . ." 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutwna.Ily protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
·'thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp.,

'15-l440-0PINION
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
" wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to pregnancy." Id., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
t•onstitutionally irrelevant:
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit discrimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
:oertificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic~
aid payments for childbirth , if such conditions or require~
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion
th at she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) .

II
T he Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents! But when a State decides to alleviate some of the
4 Boddie v Connerticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is
JOt to the contrary
Th!lre thP Court invalidated under the Pue Proce6S
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classifications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis
of such a claim is we11-settled ~
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973).
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
'F. S. 307, 312, 314 ( 1976); Applying this analysis here,
C'lause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, incl uding requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
divorce !d., at 372.
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relat,ionship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to
pay, access to its courts to ini1ividuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages:'' !d., at 374.
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
; ('rminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily distinguished from Boddte See abo United States v. Kras, 409 U. S.
\197:n Ort'wein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973).

434 1
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we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con ..
uecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A
This case involves 110 discrimination against a suspect clas~.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within I
the limited category of disadvantaged Classes so recognized:by
our cases. Nor does the fact that ,the impact of the reg,u~
tion falls upon those who cannot pay ·· s 1 y; -s rf~t:"'s~tiny.
In a sense, every denial of welfare t an mdigent creates a
wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able
to pay for the desired goods or services . ..But this Court has
· never held that financiaJ need alone identifies a suspect class
for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez,
supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). 5
Accordingly, the ~1 question · in this case is whether the
regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution:" · The District Court
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different
· treatment of abortion and childbirth. We thihk the District
' Court misconceived the nature arid scope of the fundamental
right recognized in Roe.
'B
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a: Texas' law
In cases such as Griffin v. Illinois , 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec5

tion Clause requires State~ that allow appellate review of criminal convictions to provide indigent defendants 'with trial transcripts aJ1d appellate
coun~el. ThP~<> case,; are grounded in · the criminal justice system, a. governmental monopoly in winch participation. is compelled. Cf. n . 4, supra.
Our ~ubsequent decJ~wns have made it clear that the principles underlying
Gl'iffin and Douglas do uot Pxtend to legislative claSllifications generally.

I

{
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making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor . .
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
affords constitutional protection against state interference
with certain aspects of an individual's personal 11 privacy,H
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy/)
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed~
1
'it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom . .. ." ld., at 170 (STEWART, J., concurring) . We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro...
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand...
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regula.tion of abortions in the second and third trimesters. uThese interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantia1ity as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third td6 A woman hal:' at least an equal right to choose to carry her fetus to
term as to choose to abort 1t. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interference has long been Fecognized as "one of the ·basic Civil rights
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race!1'
l5,ki'f!.:(l.!!r 'lt. Qklqhorrtq,_316 u,·s, 53'1>~ Ml (1942 ),
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mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
!ustifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. ld., at 164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. 'Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the husband] the right to prevent uni1aterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutiona1ly protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra,
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellotti
Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976).
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massach usetts statute regu1ating a minor's access to an abortion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest
' u1 making certain kinds of important decisions" free from
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, U. S. - aud 11n . 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the

v.
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right in Roe V. Wade can be understood only by considering r
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutiOnal right to an abortion,' ' as the District Court seemed to
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the
.allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
f'rom the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis..
1dvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
ehildbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
funds for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut /111.

r·~Iude

that the Connecticut regulation does not
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.1

1 Appellee" rrly on Shap~ro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In

tho~e cases durahonal residence requirements for tl1e receipt of pub1ie
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the
r<xerclt::<' of tbl" constitutional rigllt to travel interstate.
Appellees' relianrr on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricop11
1 ·owity is mi:-;placed
In our view there is only a semantic difference
hetween appe1lt>es' a:;:;ertJOn that the Connecticut law unduly inter.
~~>Ut.:." wi.th a wornnn'~ nght to terminate her pregnancy and their ruli-

* (jJ
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c
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. 8
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
fa miliar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close ana.Iogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny
might be appropriate under either the penalty an.alysis or the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no suppol't in the right
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interf'St for its decision not to fund elective abortions,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (19!'S3), similarly is inapplicable here.
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. Id., at 409.
s rn Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access to the electoral process:
" These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
eandidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding repre~entative government and contemporary issues.
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
·s not :restrictive of voters' right and less restnctive of candidates',
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Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempt&
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en~
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces.
13arily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support -of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. !d., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
inakes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
id., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon
criminal law requiring the patent or guardian of a child to
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendmerit's
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "un·
reasonably interfere[ d) with the liberty of parents and guardIans to direct the upbringing and education of children undet
their control." !d., at 534-535.
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot of"
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability,

if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns wilt
aerive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise
private contributions. Any di:sadvantages suffered by operation of the
dig1bility formUlae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denia1
the enhancement of opportui'lity to communicate with the electol'at&
hat the formulae afford eligible candidates." ld., at 94-95 (emphasis.
A tl.Pd.} (footnote omitted}.

of
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Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con ..
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language;
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than
public school education. But neither case denied to a State
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action .
I ndeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free
public schools that included English and excluded German "is
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some Sta.tes for
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 ( 1973), we explicitly rej ected the
argument that Pierce established a "right of priva.te or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,'~
noting that "[i] t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to
8ay that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection,
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argument, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of
favoring public rather t han private schools, or of preferring
instruction in E nglish rather than German, on grounds identical in principle to t hose advanced here. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a Sta.te must so justify its election to fund public but not
private eciucation,

D
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality
-that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the
Impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that
the di!itinctiqn dtawn between Ghildbirth and nQntherapeutic,

f
I
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a.bortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con.. \
stitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
F S. 56, 74 (1972). We hold that the Connecticut funding
scheme satisfies this standard.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter..
Pst in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
as the woman approaches term.'' Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly." /d., at 159. The State unquestionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries.&
1 ror can there be any question that the Connecticut regula•
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as·
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District
C'ourt in this case, such costs are significantly greater than
those normally associated with elective abortions during the·
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth.
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and eco-·
nomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 4Q6 U. 8. 81, 74 (1972). Our·
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in
~h oosing among competing demands for limited public funds.10 '

I

u In add1hon to tlw dirPrt. interest in protecting the fetus, a State may·
have lrgitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth ..
uch concern;; are ba<>ic to the future o! th~ State and in some circum,;tanres rould constitutr a substantial reason for departure from a position·
of neut ralhy betwern abortion and childbirth.
10 See gen!:'rally Wilkm~on
T he Supreme Court , The Equal Protection·
Clausr, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equa.lity, 61 Va. L. Rev.

'.14~~.

998-1017 ( H.l75).,
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In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). despite recog:
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in.,
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes· clear, the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini..
mal level.
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera..
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a
weighing of its wisdom of social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particulal' school of
'thought." Williamson v. tee Optical Co., 34S U. S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in DandridOe v. ·williams, suprn, at 484. 1~
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nonthetapeutic abor..
tions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. ~ should ~1\ forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'·' Missouri,
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.).
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
-is open to Congress to require ptovision of trtedicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Connecticut is free-through normal democrat"ic processes-to
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe,
ante, at - . We hold only that the Constitution does not
requi~ a .judicially imposed re~olution of these xlifficul't i5s\le'&,

,I
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IV
The District Court also invalid~tted Connecticut's require.
ments of prior written reque~t by the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un~
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simpie answer to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~
nation of a potential human iife. In Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur~
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
similar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is rerriantled for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion~
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at - , we hold today that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of
nonthe'raputic abortions as a condition of participation in the
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for
childbirth.
I
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions~ to those
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 Connecti1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part:
''The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
Mediral Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions
un. met:
l. ln the opmion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior authorization from its Department of Social Services. In
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medically necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of
•·ally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
necessity.
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy.. ..
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient,
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian.
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is
:,;ecured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth
Srrvices as guardian.
'4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
:\-IedJCal Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social
Services."
~ At the time this action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a. Connecticut hospital.
Appa.rE'ntly because of Poe's inability to obtain a. certificate of medical
neeessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of
:::locia.l Services. As a. result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of thrre children, was unable
to obtnin an abortion because of her physician's refusnl to certify that the
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining
•1rder was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
!l'om refus;ng to pn,y for Roe's abortion. After the reroand from the Comt
of AppPa!s, thf' District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering
; hrr.<> aqditional women 408 F Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975) ,
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 ( CA2 1975) . Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F .
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expem;es incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view
that 11 abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy . .. ." 408 F. Supp .. at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court
held that the Connecticut program 11 weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
4
'thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F . .Supp.,

r'
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
" wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to pregnancy." Id., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant :
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit discrimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic~
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require~
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion
that she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutionalIty of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976).

II
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents.4 But when a State decides to alleviate some of the
4 Boddie v. Conuecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is
•ot to the contrary
Then' the Court invalidated under the Pue Proce~
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
m which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutionallimi~
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi~
fications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis
of such a claim is well-settled ~
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973).
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here,
C'lause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
divorce, !d., at 372.
''Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of imibility to
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of thei-r
marriages/' Id., at 374.
Bec~tuse Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
· Prmi nating pregnanCies through abortion the present case is easily distinguished from Bodd~e. See abo United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 f
\197~) Orttl'eirt v. Schwab , 410 U. 8. 656 (1973) .
\

f
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we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con.,
Jlecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect cl~.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within 1
the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized ·by
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay justify strict scrutiny.!
ln a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a
wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able
to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has
never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class 1
for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez,
supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). 5
Accordingly, the central question in this case is whether the
tegulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or
Implicitly protected by the Constitution:" · The District Court
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a
comp.elling state interest would justify Connecticut's different
treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the District
' Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental
right recognized in Roe.
'B
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas' law
5 In ca;;es such as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v.
C'ahfornia, :372 U. S. 35:3 ( 1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec-

tion Clau~e requires State~ that allow appellate review of criminal convictions to proVIde indigent drfendants with trial transcripts and appellate
roun>'<•l Tlw~e ca:-;es are grounded in the criminal justice system, a govt>rnmrntal monoJJoly 111 winch participatiOn is compelled. Cf. n. 4, supra.
Our ,.;ub~Pq\lt'nt dPrt~1on~ hav<· made it clear that the principles underlying
tfJI·iffw and Douglas do not PXtPml to legislative clas~ificatiom; generally,
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making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor~
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
affords constitutional protection against state interference
with certain aspects of an individual's personal 11 privacy,H
Including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy/1
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,.
*'it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom ... ." ld., at 170 (STEWART, J. , concurring). We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro-tected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-..
ing standard, however, the State,s dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in the second and third trimesters. ''1'hese interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiaiity as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trio A woman ha:s at lea!:>t an f'qual right to choose to carry her fetus to
term as to choose to abort 1t. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic Civil rights
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the rac.e:>1'

$ifdt!-.:n..er 'I(, Qklti)wrrto,,_ 316

u,·s, 53t~ Ml

(1942).,
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mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. I d., at 164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. 'Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's·requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutionally protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra,
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellotti
Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976) .
We recognized in B ellotti that "not all distinction between
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massaeh usetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion
un til th e state courts had had an opportunity to determine
\\'hether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest (
' 'm making certain kinds of important decisions" free from
U. S. - governmental comp ulsion. Whalen v. Roe, --. a ud 1m 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the

v.
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right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering f
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion,' ' as the District Court seemed to
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion , and to implement that judgment by the
.allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
fr·om the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disl dvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
ehildbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
fun ds for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby infl uencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.
T he indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut
1\,..1 ~
regulation.
e conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.1
~
' Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974) . In
t ho~e cases durational re:;idence requirements for tbe receipt of pub1ie
l>enefits werE> found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the
,.,,erc1~c of tlm constitutional right to travel interstate.
Apprllees' rrliancr on t lw penalty analysis of Shapiro and M aricop11
( owity is mi~placed . f n our view there is only a semantic difference
hetwren appellee:;' a::>l:iertwn that the Connecticut law unduly inter.
t.i~ti<'J:> wi.th n womnn '>1 nght to terminate her pregnm1Cy and their R$oo
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Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. 8
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recog~
nized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny
might be appropriate under either the penalty a11.alysis or the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a eompelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here,
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. /d., at 409.
8 In Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 (1976) , we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of TexaJJ v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access to the electoral process:
" These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
eandidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues.
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
~~ not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of ca.ndidateil',

f

~
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Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempt&
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en~
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is neces13arily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. /d., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
inakes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted undet
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "unreasonably interfere[ d) with the liberty of parents and guardIans to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control." Id., at 534-535.
Subtitle H does not prevent 'any candidate from getting on the ballot of'
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice ; the inability,

if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will
~erive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise

private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
eligibility form\llae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electo~ate
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." !d., at 94-95 (emphasis
;-J.t d.Pd) (footno~e omitted).
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Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con ..
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language;
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than
public school education. But neither case denied to a State
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action.
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free
public schools that included English a.nd excluded German "is
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 (1973), we explicitly rejected the
argument that Pierce established a "right of priva.te or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,"
noting that "[i]t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to
say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection,
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argument, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring
instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education,
D
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality
-that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the
Impingement of a fundamen tal right. This test requires that
the di~tinction dl..'awn between <;hildbirth and nontherapeutic,
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tLbortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con.. \
t~titutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
TT. S. 56, 74 (1972) . We hold that the Connecticut funding
scheme satisfies this standard.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter..
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
as the woman approaches term.'' Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she 11 cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unquestionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
hormal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries. 9
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regula•
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as•
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District
Court in this case, such costs ate significantly greater than
those normally associated with elective abortions during the
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child·
birth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth.
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution
does not provide judicial retnedies for every social and eco-·
ttomic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). Our·
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in
~h oosi n g among competing demands for limited public funds/ 0 '
o In add1tlon to tht' direct interest in j)rotecting the fetus, a State may·
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth.
~u ch concerns are basic to the future ot th~ State and in some circum,;tances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth.
10 See genf'rallv WJ!kmson The Supreme Court , The Equal Protection·
Clause, and The T hree Faces of CO.nstitutional EquaHty, 61 Va .. L. Rev.

?45·,: 998-1.017 (1975),,
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In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970). despite reco~
nition that laws and regulations al1ocating welfare funds in.,
volve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini..
mal level.
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera..
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
ever which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a
weighing of its wisdom of social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
'thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 34S U. S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, suprn, at 484. 1~
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for tbeir resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'·' Missouri,
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.).
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
·is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Connecticut is free-through normal democrat.ic processes-to
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe,
ante, at - . We hold only that the Constitution does not
'requi~ a .judicially imposed refJolution of the~ ~ifficult i$8\le!,
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The District Court also invalid~ted Connecticut's require.
ments of prior written reque~t by the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not un~
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simpie answer to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~
nation of a potential human iife. In Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
~imilar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opiniOn1
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at - , we hold today that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for
childbirth.
I
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those
,t hat are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 Connecti1

~
~

The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part:
The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
MPd1ral Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions
m·~ met:
'' 1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is m~
~
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior au.
thorization from its Department of Social Services. Iu
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medically necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
/
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenge~
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements o /
,·ally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
tleCeSSity.
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
lic·ensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy.. ..
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient,
atld in the c..'lse of a. minor, from the parent or guardian.
" In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is
,.;ecurcd from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth
Services as guardian .
'4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
:\Ied1cal Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social
ServJcc~ ."

:. At the time tim; action was filed, ~ Poe, a 16-year-old high schoo
,turuor, had already obtained an abortio at a Connecticut hospital.
\pparc'ntly becaust> of Poe's inability to obtain a cert.ificate of medical
nece:;sity, thr hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of
8owtl ServiCe~. A:; a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
b!ll of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of thrC:'e children, was unable
to obtam an abortion bC:'cause of her physician 's refusal to certify that the
procedure was mcdH·ally necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining
order was C:'ntered by the Di~tnrt Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
1rom rC:'fus;ng to pa~· for Roe's abort ion. After the remand from the Court
-1f Ayprnls, tllf' DlstrJCt, Court 1~sucd temporary restraining orders covering
;hfC(' aqdttional women 408 F Supp. 660, 663 (Conn . 1975 ),
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
aud as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F .
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenRes incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973) . and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) , the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy. . . ." 408 F. Supp .. at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
1
'thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp.,

l'

4

The District Court's judgment and order, entered on January

~

A~ '

1976, were not stayed.

On January 26, 1976, the Department of

Social Services revised §275 to allow reimbursement for nontherapeutic abortions without prior authorization or consent.

\.th ,·~

that

~Arevision

was made retroactive to June 16, 1976 ,

The fact
~~=d~e

suggests that

(e)
the

tt~e.
e=~~~~~~~~t~~~e~r~e~~~T-c~
· ~··
· ~~'

i 1-e.,J

o suggestion of
-::::::

mootness has been made by any of the parties, and this appeal was
taken and submitted on the theory that Connecticut desires to reinstate
the invalidated regulation.

Under these circumstances, the revision

of the regulation does not render the case moot.

In any event, there

would remain the denial of reimbursement to Mary Poe, and similarly

SE.c

3~0

F.

S~

t30

y)~

situated members of the class, under the pre-revision regulation. A
The State has asserted no Eleventh Amendment defense to this relief
sought by Poe and those whom she represents.
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to pregnancy." Id., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant:
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis,
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitu_
tional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
~ {

:J

~

~

Lj

The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
~
··ertificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions~
The court also struck down the related requirements of priot ·
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medic~
~
aid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require~/"
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion
that she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional~
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) .

II

s.

The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents:- But when a State decides to alleviate some of the

r '"

.------;H.Boddie v Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is
tho'""'"'" Thon' '"' C-outt involidated undor tho Puo P<oo.,.

(
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classifications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysi/ ~
of such a cla:im is well-settled:
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rational1y
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination .. . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973).
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here,
C'lause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
divorce. !d., at 372.
" Our conclusion is that, given the 'basic position of the marriage relationship ln this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek 'judicial dissolution of thei-r
marriages." Id., at 374.
HPeause Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
i<'rminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dist inguished from Boddle See al~;o United States v. Kras, 409 U. S. 434 '
,_1 97:{ ), Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973).
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we think the District Court erred in holding that the Con ..
pecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

I

A
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect cl~.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within
the limited category of disadvantaged Classes so recognized :by
our cases. Nor does the fact that ,the im act of the regula/e.al fo Ation falls upon those who cannot pay Jtistify stFiet ssrYtiAy,
In a sense, every denial of welfare t an indigent creates a
tii·~Je_y
wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able (..on(.fttSI,OY\.
to pay for the desired goods or services. ... But this Court has
never held that financiitl need alone identifies a suspect class )
;:for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez,
supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 4~0) .~ 'P
Accordingly, the central question in this case is;whether the
reg ulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or
implicitly protected by the Constitution:'' · The District Court
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different
treatment of abortion and childbirth. We thihk the District
· Court misconceived the nature arid scope of the fundamental
\ right recognized in Roe.
-B

uJ·

At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of

(o

a:

Texas· law

__..,..In cast'S such as Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v.
California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963 ) , the Court held that the Equal Protection Clau;;e requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convictiOns to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate
cou n~rl. Thei'ie caoe:< are grounded in the criminal justice system, a governmental monopoly in wluch participatiOn is compelred. Cf. n. 4, supra.
Our Kttb:;equent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying
Oriffiu and Douglas do not f'Xl end to legislative clasiiifications generally.
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making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abor. .
tion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
~tffords constitutional protection against state interference
'1with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy,"
lncluding a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.~
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,
''it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom ... ." /d., at 170 (STEWART, J., c o n - v
curring). We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro..
tected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demand-..
ing standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in the second and third trimesters. "These interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in suhstantiaiity as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.'" ld., at 162-163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third tii'}

~A woman ha~:> at least an Pqual right to choose to carry her fetus to
term as to choose to abort 1t. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interference has long been I'ecognized as "one of the ·basic civil rights
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survlvai. of the race!1'

,cy.,i'f!,n..er ~- Qklu,homq,,_ 311:1

u,·s, 53'0~ '541

(1942).,

I
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mester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
lustifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. !d., at 164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. 'Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's·requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutiona1ly protected from such interference."
(Emphasis addecl.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra,
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellotti
Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976).
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that " [ t] he
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regu1ating a minor's access to an abortion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
mi nor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest
' ' m making certain kinds of important decisions" free from
go vernmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, U. S. - ~
- -. aud Btl. 24 and 26 ( 1977) . As Whalen makes clear, the

v.

,I

I
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,right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion,'' as the District Court seemed to
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether
t.o terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no dis.Jdvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
t"hilclbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
funds for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already t h e r e /
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abortions is
neither. created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut 1'1~ _ di'
e ulatiOn.
yy- n
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not
mpiuge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe.
I
·

~

D

~ AppPliP<'s rrly on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and
Memorial Ilospitol v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In
tho~e cases durational residence requirements for tbe receipt of publie
uenefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" th~
, xE>rcl~<' of tbe constitutional right to travel interstate.
Appdle<>H' reliancr on tlw penalty analysis of Shapiro and M aricoptJ
( 'ounty 1:s mi)oiplacrd In our viE-w there is only a semantic difference
between appellee~>' a::;;;prtJon that the Connecticut law unduly inter·
1:. ·J4t,;..'> with a woman'.; rtght to terminate her pregnancy and their a\lio-
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c
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragemen~
of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.
asertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to
t ravel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny
might be appropriate under either the penalty an.alysis or the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions . But the claim here is
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here.
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. !d., at 409.
----e-~Jn Buckley v. V aleo, 424 U. S. 1 ( 1976) , we drew this distinction in
sustaining t11e public financing of t11e Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access to the electoral process:
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
eandidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues.
ln contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
~~ nQt restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates',
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Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempt&
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en·
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in sup..
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. Id., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
inakes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustain in~ the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under
t he law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruc
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925) , the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "unreasonably interfere[d) with the liberty of parents and guard.
ians to direct the upbringing and education of children undet
their control." Id., at 534- 535.
Subtitle H does not prevent 'any candidate from getting on the ballot ot
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice ; the inability,

i/ any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will
l:ierive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
eligibility formUlae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denia1

bf the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electoi'ate
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." l d., at 94-95 (emphasis
(footnote omitted}.

;~dd.Pd)

~··
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Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on con ..
stitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language;
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than
public school education. But neither case denied to a State
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action.
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free
public schools that included English and excluded German "is
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 ( 1973), we explicitly rejected the
argument that Pierce established a "right of private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,',
noting that "[i]t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to
say that such · schools must, as a matter of equal protection.
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argument, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferrin
instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education.

D
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality
that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the
Impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that
the di~tinction dtawn between childbirth :;tnd nQntherapeutic,

1,,

•
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abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "con..
l:ltitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
F S. 56, 74 (1972) . We hold that the Connecticut funding
scheme satisfies this standard.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter~
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
as the woman approaches term.'' Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unquestionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
tO
i1ormal childbirth , an interest honored over the centuries.~
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regula·
tion rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs as•
sociated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District
Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than
those normally associated with elective abortions during the
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to child·
birth is a rational means of encouraging child_birth.
.~
9 H- -aR- ~ut u~~~ be gcea.t, but "the ConstitutioT!...J
does not provide judicial retnedies for every social and eco-·
homic ill," Lindsey v. N ormet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972) . Ourcases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in \
~hoosing among competing demands for limited public funds.1- - -

II

tO - --t-- -- --In add1tion to tht' direct. interest in protecting the fetus, a Sta.te mitY'

ll

have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth.
Such concern:; are basic to the fut.ure of th~ State and in some circum,;tances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position
of neutraltiy between abortiOn and chitdbirth.
genE>rally Wilkm~on, The ~upr;.lne. Court , Th: Equal Protect~'
on
Clause, and The Three Faces of Cons.t1tut10nal Equality, 61 Va .. L. Rev.

__..--see

'?45\ 998-1017 (1975),,
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In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). despite reco~
nition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds in-:
volve "the most basic economic ·needs of impoverished human
beings," we held that cla..o;sifications survive equal protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini..
mal level.
The decision whether to expend state funds for nonthera..
peutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a
weighing of its wisdom of social desirability, ior this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out oi harmony with a pa-rticula'r school of
'thought." Wiiliamson v. Lee Optical Co., 34S U. S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in DandridrJe v. Williams, supr~, at 484. In..
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nonthetapeutic abort ions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare o
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'., Missouri,
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.).
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
-is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Connecticut is free-through normal democrat'ic processes-to
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe,
ante, at - . We hold only that the Constitution does not
requi~ a .judicially imposed re~olution of these ~ifficul't i$8\le'$,
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IV
The District Court also inva}id!lted Connecticut's require.
ments of prior written reque~t b;y the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of ~hese procedural requirements. It is not un~
reasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi~
nation of a potential human iife. In Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible bur~
den under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
l:limilar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opiniUn;
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court:
In Beal v. Doe, ante, a t -, we hold today that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of
elective abortions as a condition of participation in the Medicaid Program. In this case, as a result of our decision in
Beal, we must decide whether the Constitution nevertheless
requires a participating State to pay for elective abortions
as long as it pays for childbirth.

I
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1. to those
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 Connecti1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part:
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions
are met:
"1. In the opinion of the attending hysician the abortion is medi-
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of priabortion
authorization from its Department of Social ServiCes. In
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medically necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requiremen\ of
cally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
necessity.
, . "2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy . . . .
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient,
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian.
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is
secured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth
"services as guardian.
"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
, Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social
Services."
3 At the time this action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital.
Apparently because of Poe's inability to obtain a certificate of medical
·· necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of
. Social Services. As a. result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable
to obtain an abortion because of her physician's refusal to certify that. the
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining
order was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
from refusing to pay for her abortion. After the remand from the Court
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering
three additional women. 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975).

V

__
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of elective abortions but also required
it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of elective abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F.
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of elective
abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy . . . . " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) , the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right to an elective abortion" and "thus
infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp., at
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663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to pregnancy." !d., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant:

"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis,
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
certifi'cate of medical necesesity for medicaid funded abortions.
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
request and· authorization, holding that the State could not
impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions
that are not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for
childbirth, if such conditions or requirements tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion or to delay the
occurrence of an abortion that she has asked her physician
to perform."· ld:, at 665. We noted probable jurisdiction
to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut regulation.
428 u. s. 908 (1976).
II
The District Court did not hold and appellees do not
contend that Connecticut has a constitutional obligation to
pay the pregnancy related medical expenses of its indigent
citizens. 4 Thus, if the State had refrained from paying any
4 Appell€es cite Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), where the
eourt invalidated under the Due Process Clause "certain state procedures
for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of
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of such expenses-whether for childbirth or abortion-appellees would have asserted no infringement of a constitutional
right. Nor is there any suggestion that the traditional freedom-indeed the normal expectation-of a woman to carry
her fetus to childbirth is any less entitled to state funding
than a woman's freedom during the first trimester, recognized
in Roe, to choose an abortion.G Rather, appellees' claim is
that Connecticut .must accord equal treatment to both, and
may not validly evidence a policy preference by funding only
the medical expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge
to the classifications established by onnec icut regulation
thus presents a question arising unde:r the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
nel'@ the basic framework of analysis is well settled:
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and

.

court fees and costs for service of process" restricting the ability of
indigent persons to bring an action for divorce. !d., at 372.
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, soLely because of inability to
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages." Id., at 374.
The present case is easily distinguished from Boddie in that Connecticut
has made no attempt to monopolize the means for terminating pregnancies through abortions.
5 The right of procreation without st~te interference has long been
recognized as "one of the basic civil rights of 114'Ul . . . fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
u.s. 535, 541 (1942).
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therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973).
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); cf. Craig v. Boren,- U.S.(1976) (sex discrimination). Applying this analysis here,
we think the District Court erred in subjecting the Connecticut regulation to strict judicial scrutiny.

A
The regulation does not discriminate against a suspect class.
There is no claim that an indigent woman desiring an abor'tion falls within the limited category of disadvantaged classes
·recognized by our cases. Appellees emphasize, rather, that
' the impact of the regulation falls upon the indigent. In a
sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to
pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has
never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra,
at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970).

B
In the absence of a suspect classification, the appropriate
standard of review unaer 'the Equal Protection Clause must
,. turn on whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The District Court 'I'ead our decisions in Roe v. Wade,
· supra, and the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing
a fundamental right to abortion. It therefore concluded that
nothing less 't han a compelling state interest would justify
any difference in treatment of abortion and childbirth. This
reading of Roe misconceives the nature and scope of the
· fundamental right recognized there.

?
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1
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion,' physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
affords constitutional protection against state interference
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy,"
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,
11
it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom .... ' 1 !d., at 170 (STEWART, .'f., concurring). We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally protected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demanding standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in the second and third trimesters. "These interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as
the woman approaches te,rm and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.' " I d., at 162. In the second trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trimester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. Id., at 164.
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The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it 11 granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's de•
cision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutionally protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra,
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976).
We recognized in B ellotti that "not all distinction between
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
We recently summa.rized these cases as establishing a fundamental right of "independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions," a right akin to the right to be free "in
action, thought. experience, and belief from governmental
compulsion." Whalen v. Roe, - U. S.-- - , and nn. 24
·a nd 26, quoting Kurland, The Private I, The University of
Chicago Magazine 7, 8 (Autumn, 1976). As this statement
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makes clear, the right in Roe can be understood only by
considering both the woman's interest and the nature of the
State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion," as the District
Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman
from unduely burdensome interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no
'limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
)rom the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.'
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth: she continues as before to be dependent on ~
private funds for the service she desires. The
State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed
no restriction on access to abortions that was not already'
there. The indigency that may make it difficult-and in·
some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women to have
abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the
Connecticut regulation.
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe and
that the regulation need not be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis of Rodriguez or
Murgia.
2
Our conclusion as to the applicable standard of review
·signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative

-
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activity consonant with legislative policy.° Constitutional
concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its
will by force of law; its power to encourage actions deemed
to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in the cases cited in Roe in sup ..
port of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Among these is Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S,
390 (1923), which involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach foreign languages to children who had not passed
the eighth grade. ld., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition
of a criminal sanction on the pi'oviders of desired services
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and the right of parent to engage him so to instruct
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Fedrral Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access to the electoral process:
1
'These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear
on the ballot. These were of course direct burdens not only on the
candidates ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues.
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Pl'esidential candidates
is- not restrictive of voters; right and less restrictive of candidates'.
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his cl10ice; the inability,
0

if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will
derive not from laclc of public funding but from their inability to raise
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
eligibility form11lae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate
that the formulae affords eligible candidates." !d., at 94-95 (emphasis
nd.ded).
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their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
ld., at 400.
Meyer was applied subsequently in Pierce v; Society o}
Sisters, 268 U. S. 51b (1925), another case relied tin in Roe.
In Pierce the Court invaiidated an Oregon criminal law re~
quiring the parent or guardian of a child to send him to a
public schooi, thus precluding the choice of a private schdoi.
Reasoning that the Fou~tenth Amendment's coiicept of liberty
"excludes any generai power of the State to stahdardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers oniy," the Court heid that the law . "unreasonably
interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
(:Iirect the upbringing and education bf chiidren under their
control." j d., at 534-535.
Both cases thus invalidated substantial restrictions on con•
~titutionaily protected liberty intei;ests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign ianguage;
1n Pierce, the parentis right to choose private rather than
public school education. But neither case denied to a State
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred comse of action.
indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curricuium" in its free
public schools that include English and excluded German "is
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
~o shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for
more than a century. See generally Brown v. Board of Edu~
cation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Vet, the indigent parent could
challenge the state policy of favoring public over private
schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than
German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced
by appellees in the present case. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth anymore than
1
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a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education. 7

III
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation can
be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality.
This test requires that the distinction drawn between child.birth and elective abortion by the Connecticut regulation be
Appellees~ on Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In

1>

7

tho e cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public
'benefits were found to be unconstitut'ional because they "penalized') the
exercise of the constitutional right to travel intersta.te.
In attcmptin~ to- inoor~at& the penalty analysis of Shap'iro and
Maricopa County , appellees ignore the basic question as to the natti're of
the right recognized in Roe. ln our view there is only a semantic
difference between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly
·interferes with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their
assertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sa nctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to on€ who had recently exercised the right to
.t ravel across state lines was sufiiciently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general wrlfare benents to all women who had
obtained abortions when they were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and st rict scrutiny
.might be appropriate under either the penalty ~or tl1e analysis
ha-ve applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here jg
a quito different one in that the State penalizes the woman's decision to
have an abortion by refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County
did not hold that States would penalize the right to travel interstate by
refusing to pay for the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no
support in the right to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must
show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
The penalty analysis of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), is
similarly inapplicable here. In addition, that case was decided in the
significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed "governmental
obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. I d., at 409.

l

75-1440-0PINION

MAHER v. ROE

13

('rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest."
Mu.rgia, supra, at 312. We hold that the Connecticut fundi'n.g scheme satisfies this test.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter<tst in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
~ists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
~s the woman approaches term." Roe, supra., at 162. BeGause the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
~e "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no lQnger sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
he measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unquestionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries. 8
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased
significantly in recent yea.rs. As recognized by the District
Court in this case, such costs-including the attendant hospitalization charges-are significantly greater than those normally associated with elective abortions during the first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth,..,ther~.
fore, rationally may be deemed an incentive to a woman to
qarry a fetus to term.
We also have emphasized that where the equal protection
challenge is to the allocation of public funds "the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
8 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may
have legitimate policy concerns as to the demographic implications of its
rate of population growth. Such concerns are basic to the future of the
State and in some circumstances could constitute a compelling reason for
qeparture from a position of neutrality between abortion and childbirth.
I-ndeed, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, the Court emphasized in a different context the importance of marriage and procreation, not only to the
individual but "to the very existence and survival of the race." 316 U.S.,

.!'tt 541.

/
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economic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972), 9
and our cases uniformly have recognized a wider latitude in
the "line drawing" process wh('re the State must make choices
among competing demands for limited public funds. In
Dandridge v. Wmiams, 397 U. 8. 471 (1970) , despite recognition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve "the most basic economic needs of impoverishf'd human
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear. the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth far exceeds this
minimal level.
The decision whether to expend state funds for elective
abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value over
which opinions arf' sharply divided. Our conclusion that the
Connecticut rPgulation is constitutional is not based on a
weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise;
improvident, or out of harmonv with a particular school of
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. , 348 U . S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. In_.
deed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of elective abortions, the
appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the
legislature. Nor should we forget that "legislatures are ul..
timate guardians of the libertif's and welfare of the people in;
quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri, Kansas
and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.).
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does
proscribe government funding of elective abortions. It is
open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits for·
See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection
Clause, and The Three Faces or' Constitutional Equa.lity, 61 Va. L. Rev.
945, 998-1017 (1975).
9

I
(
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such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Connecticut is free-thr,ough noxrmal democratic processes-to
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe,
ante, at - . We hold only that the Constitution does not
require a particular resolution of these issues.

lV
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's requirements of prior a~thorization ~nd prior written request by
the pregnant woman. Our analysis above :vejects the basic
premise that p~ompted invalidation of these procedural re..
quirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon
a prior showing of medical necessity to insu~e that its money
is being spent only for authorized purposes. The simple
·answer to the argument that similar requirements are not
imposed for other medical procedures is that such procedures
·do not involve the termination of a potential human life.
In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
supra, we held that the \voman's written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think
that decision is controlling on the similar issue here.
The decision of the District Court is reversed and remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

.

SUPREME
No. 7&-1440
Edward W. Maher, Commissioner
of Social Services of Connecticut, On Appeal from the
United States District
Appellant,
Court for the District
v.
of Connecticut.
Susan Roe et al.
[April -, 1977]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court..
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at-, we hold today that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for
childbirth.
I
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions~ to those
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 ConnectiThe procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part:
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions
are met:
"1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi1
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior authorization from its Department of Social Services. In
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medically necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the ·regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of
cally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
necessity.
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy . . . .
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted by the patient,
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian.
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is
secured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth
Services as guardian.
"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
Medical Services, bivision of Health Services, Department of Social
Services."
3 At the time this action was filed, Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital.
Apparently because of Poe's inability to obtain a certificate of medical
necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of
Social Services. As a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable
to obtain an abortion because of her physician's refusal to certify that the
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining
order was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
from refusing to pav for R<"e's abortion. After the remand from the Court
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering
three additional women. 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975).
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also re·
quired it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 ( CA2 197 5). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F.
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeu·
tic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy . . . . " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
"thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp.,

,I
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to pregnancy." /d., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant:
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis~
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
·The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.
·- The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions tha.t are not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or requirements tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion
that she has asked her physician to perform." I d., at 665.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 ( 1976).

II
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents.4 But when a State decides to alleviate some of the
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is
not to the contrary. There the Court invalidated under the Due Process
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, in4
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classifications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis
of such a claim is well-settled:
.,
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] op~r
ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U. S. 1, 17 (1973).
eluding requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
'
divorce. I d., at 372.
"Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, soldy because of inability to
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages." /d., at 374.
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
termina.ting pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dist'nguished from Boddie.
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their
marriages." /d. , at 374.
Because Co~ecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
terminating pregnancies through abortions the present case is easily distinguished from Boddie.
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Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here,
we think the District Court erred in subjecting the Connecticut regulation to strict judicial scrutiny.
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not fall within
the limited category af disadvantaged classes so recognized by
our cases. Nor docs the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon the indigent justify strict scrutiny. In a
·sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to
pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has
·never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra,
at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970). Accordingly, the central question in this case is whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The District Court
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different
'treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the District
rCourt ·misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental
right recognized in Roe.

A
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
·affords constitutional protection against state interference
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy,"
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including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 5
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom .... " !d., at 170 (STEWART, J., concurring). We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally protected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demanding standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in the second a.nd third trimesters. "These interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trimester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. I d., at 164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,
A woman has at least an equal right to chose to carry her fetus to
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
5
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70 n. 11 (1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutionally protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra,
we have held that a requirement for a la,wful abortion "is
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976).
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that " [ t] he
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. w~
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abor£ion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
recently summa,rized these cases as establishing a fundamental right of "independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions," a right akin to the right to be free "in
action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental
compulsion." Whalen v. Roe, U. S . - - - , and nn. 24
and 26, quoting Kurland, The Private I, The University of
Chicago Magazine 7, 8 (Autumn, 1976). As this statement
makes clear, the right in Roe can be understood only byconsidering both the woman's interest and the nature of the
State's interference with it. Roe did not declaJ'e an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion," as the District
Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to

We
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decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
funds for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby in-:
ffuencing the woman's decision , but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult- and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abor-tions is
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut
regulation.
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe and
that the regulation need not be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis of Rodriguez or
Murgia. 6
Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In
those cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public
ben efits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the
exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstate.
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic diJierence
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law undul y interfen's with a woman's right to terminate her pregnane~' and their asascrtion that it prnalizes the exercise of that right . Penalties are most
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to
6

I
t
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B
Our conclusion as to the applicable standard of review
signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy. 7 Constitutional
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scn1tiny
might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 ( 1963), similarly is inapplicable here.
ln addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality, originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. Id., at 409.
7
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
'1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
'others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
"access to the electoral process:
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state la.ws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues.
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'.
'Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or
!any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability,
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concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its
will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions
deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebrasl<;,a, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. !d., at 396--397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutionar chal1enge brought by a teacher convicted under
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and· the right of parent to engage him so to instruct
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
( 1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "unreasonably interferer d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control." I d., at 534-535.
Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on constitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language;
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will
derive not from lack of public funding but from theil' inability to raise
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d., at 94-95 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
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in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than
public school education. But neither case denied to a State
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action.
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free
public schools that included English and excluded German "is
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Yet the indigent parent could
challenge the state policy of favoring public over private
schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than
German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced
by appellees in the present case. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education.

III
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation can
be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality.
This test requires that the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic abortion by the Connecticut regulation be "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state
interest.n Murgia, supra, at 312. We hold that the Connecticut funding scheme satisfies this test.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong interest in protecting the potential 1ife of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unques-
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tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries. 8
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District
Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than
those normally associated with elective abortions during the
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth.
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Our
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider attitude in
choosing among competing demands for limited public funds. 9
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 ( 1970), despite recognition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this mini·
tnallevel.
The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a
In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth.
Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circumstances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth.
0 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection
Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev.
945, 998-1017 (1975).
8
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weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are u1timate guardians of the liberties and welfare · of
the peop'le in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri,
'Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904)
· (Holmes, :J.).
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does 'n ot
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid bei1efits
for such abortions as a condition of state ·participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under present · federal law, Connecticut is free-through normal democratic processes-to
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe,
ante;
at - . We. hold only that the Constitution does not
,.
require a judicially 'imposed resolution of these difficult issues.

lV
The District Court aJso invalidated Connecticut's requirements of prior written request by the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument
·that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termi·nation o'f a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of
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Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
similar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Beal v. Doe, ante, at - , we hold today that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for
childbirth.

I
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those
t hat are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.2 Connecti1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
2 Section 27 5 provides in relevnnt part :
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
Medical Assistance (Tit le XIX) .Program when the following conditions
a.rf' met:
"1. In the o_pinion of tho attending physician thl! abortion is medi-
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior authorization from its Department of Social Services. In
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medica.Ily necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of
rally necessa ry. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
necessity.
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy . . . .
"3. The written request. for the abortion is submitted by the patient,
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian.
"In the cHse of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is
secured from the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Youth
Services as guardian.
"4. Prior nuthorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
-:\fedical Services, Divisio11 of Health Services, Department of Social
ervices."
3 At the time this action was filed , Linda Poe, a 16-year-old high school
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospitaL
Appnrentl~· because of Poe's inability to obtain a certificate of medical
necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department. of
Soc ial Services. A~ a result, Poe was being presHed to p a ~· the hospital
bill of $244. Susan Roc, an unwed mother of three children, was unable
to obtnin an · abortion because of her physician 's refusal to certify that the
procedure was medicnlly necessary. By consent, a temporar~· restraining·
order was ent ered by the Di,.trict Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
from refusing to pay for Hoe's abortion. After the remand from the Court
of Appeals, the DiHtrict Comt i;;Hued temporary restraining orders covering;
thn•e addit io11nl women. 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Conn. 1975) .
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal. the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F.
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expem;es incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973) , and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 ( 1973) , the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
mora.! arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy . . . . " 408 F. Supp .. at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) , the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
" thu& infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F . Supp. >

75-144().-..0PINION

MAHER v. ROE

at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to pregnancy." ld., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant:
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit dis,
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authoriza,
tion by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions that are not 11 equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require,
ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion
that she has asked her physician to perform." ld. , at 665.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional,
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) .

II
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents.4 But when a State decides to alleviate some of the
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is
.not to t he <;ontrary. There the Court invalidated undeJ: the Pue ProceSli
4
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hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutionallimia
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classifications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis
of such a claim is wPil ""ttlerl·
"'Ve must decide, first, whetnet L•·'-~ ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or u-.
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must stili be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
ther~fore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973).
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here,
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including rf'quirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
divorce. I d., at 372.
" Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relaIIOn~hip in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the mean:; for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, :;olely because of inability to
pay, access to its courts to individuals who :;eek judicial dis ·olution of their
marriages." !d., at 374.
Because Connecticut hm; made no attempt to monopolize the means for
tcrmina ting pregnancif'fi through abortion the present case is easily distingui ·llf'cl from Boddie.
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we think the District Court erred in subjecting the Connecti.
cut regulation to strict judicial scrutiny,

A
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not fall within
the limited category of disadvantagerl classes so recognized by
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon the indigent justify strict scrutiny. In a
sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth
classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to
pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has
never held that indigency alone identifies a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra,
at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Accordingly, the central question in this case is whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The District Court
read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and the subsequent
cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental right to
abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less than a
compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's different
treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the District
Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental
right recognized in Roe.
B
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
affords constitutional protection against state interference
"nth certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy/ 1
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including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 5
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom .... " !d., at 170 (STEWART, J., concurring). We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally protected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demanding standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abor-·
tions in the second and third trimesters. "These interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.' " !d., at 162- 163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trimester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. !d., at 164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible·
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman 's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,
li A woman has at lea::>t an equal right to choose to carry her fetus to
term as to choo;;e to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights
of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the rao.e..!"
kinner ~., Oklah oma, 316 U. S.. 535,. 541 (1942) ..
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70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutionally protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra,
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976).
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he
constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." !d., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
We recently summarized these cases as establishing a fundamental right of "independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions," a right akin to the right to be free "in
action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental
compulsion." Whalen v. Roe,- U. S . - - - , and nn. 24
and 26 (1977), quoting Kurland, The Private I, The University of Chicago Magazine 7, 8 (Autumn, 1976). As this
statement makes clear, the right in Roe can be understood only
by considering both the woman's interest and the nature of the
State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion," as the District
Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to
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decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion , and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles- absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth ; she continues as before to be dependent on private·
fund s for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was uot already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases·,.
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abortions is
neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut
regulation.
We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does not
impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe and
that the regulation need not be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny under the equal protection analysis of Rodriguez or
Murgia. 0
0 Appellee:; rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969) , and
Me morial Jl ospital v. Maricopa County , 415 U. S. 250 (1974) . In
t ho~c case:; durational residence requirements for the receipt of public
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they " penalized" the
exe rc i ~>C of the constitutional right to travel interstate.
Appellees' reliance on the p e n a lt~· analysi:; of Shapiro and Maricopa
County is misplacrd. In our view there is only a semanti c difference
between appeller:;' as:;ertion that the Connecticut law unduly interl'r rP~ with a woman ':; right to terminate her prrgnancy and their asn»rr tion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
fa miliar t o the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a
ronsequ rnce of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recogll14<'d that dr uial of welfate tu uue who had .recently exe.rcised the right tu
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c
Our conclusion as to the applicable standard of review
signals no retreat from Roe or the cases applying it. There
is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy. 7 Constitutional
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny
might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is
that the St.ate "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here,
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of'
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. !d., at 409.
7 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to ca~s such as American Party
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access to the electoral process:
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state la.ws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear·
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
candidate's abilit.y to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues ..
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of caJ1didates'.
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or·
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability,
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concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its
will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions
deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. Id., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
( 1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control." Id., at 534-535.
Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on constitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language;
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaign.s will
derive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise
private contribution.<~. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d., at 94-95 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
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in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than
public school education. 'But neither case denied to a State
the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action.
Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free
public schools that included English and excluded German "is
~ot questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Yet the indigent parent could
challenge the sta.te policy of favoring public rather than private
schools, or of preferring instruction in English rather than
German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced
by appellees in the present case. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education.

III
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation can
be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality.
This test requires that the distinction drawn between child~
birth and nontherapeutic abortion by the Connecticut regula~
tion be "rationally related to furthering a legitimate state
interest." Murgia, supra, at 312. We hold that the Con..
necticut funding scheme satisfies this test.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong inter~
est in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly.'' I d., at 159, The State unque~
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tionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries. 8
Nor can there be any question tha.t the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District
Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than
those normally associated with elective abortions during the
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth.
We recognize that the impact of the Connecticut regulation
on an indigent woman may be great, but "the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). Our
cases uniformly have accorded the States a wider a4ieitJ~8eVn
choosing among competing demands for limited public funas. 9
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), despite recognition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve "the most basic economic 1weds of impoverished human
beings," we held that cla..'lsifications survive equal protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this minimal level.
The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a
8 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth.
Such concerns are basic to the fut.ure of the State and in some circum:;tances could constitute a substantial reason for departure from a position
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth.
9 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection
Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev.
945, 998-lOJ.7 (1975) .

l
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weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488
(1955) , quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortioos, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri,
, Kansas and 1'exas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.).
In conclusion. we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Connecticut is free-through normal · democratic processes-to
decide that such ·benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe,
ante, at - . We hold only · that the Constitution does not
require a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues.

IV
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's requirements of prior written request by the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. · The simple answer ·to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termination of a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of
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Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
similar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.

The Court today, by its decisions in these cases, allows

the States, and such municipalities as choose to do so, to accomplish

indirectly what the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)-- by a substantial majority and

with some emphasis, I had thought -- said they could not do directly.

The Court concedes the existence of a constitutional right but denies

the realization and enjoyment of that right on the ground that existence

and realization are separate and distinct.

For the individual woman

concerned, indigent and financially helpless, as the Court's opinions

in the three cases concede her to be, the result is punitive and tragic .

•

~ttt..~fJ.._ ~ ?• I
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Implicit in the Court's holdings is the condescension that she may

go elsewhere for her abortion.

I find that disingenuous and alarming,

almost reminiscent of "let them eat cake. "

The result the Court reaches is particularly distressing in

Poelker v. Doe, where a presumed majority, 1n electing as mayor

•

one whom the record shows campaigned on the is sue of closing

public hospitals to nontherapeutic abortions, punitively impresses

upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially desirable,

the publicly acceptable, and the morally sound, with a touch of

the devil-take-the-hindmost.

This 1s not the kind of thing for which

our Constitution stands.

The Court's financial argument, of course, 1s specious.

To be sure, welfare funds are limited and welfare must be spread

Nos. 75-554, 75-1440, 75-442

- 3 -

perhaps as best meets the community's concept of its needs.

But

the cost of a nontherapeutic abortion is far less than the cost of

maternity care and delivery, and holds no comparison whatsoever

with the welfare costs that will burden the State for the new indigents

and their support in the long, long years ahead •

•
Neither is it an acceptable answer, as the Court well knows,

to say that the Congress and the States are free to authorize the use

of funds for nontherapeutic abortions .

Why should any politician incur

the demonstrated wrath and noise of the abortion opponents when mere

silence and nonactivity accomplish the results the opponents want?

There is another world "out there," the existence of which

the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore or fears to recognize.

And so the cancer of poverty will continue to grow.

This is a sad

Nos. 75-554, 75-1440, 75-442
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day for those who regard the Constitution as a force that would

serve justice to all evenhandedly and, 1n so doing, would better

the lot of the poorest among us.
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
It is all too obvious that the governmental actions in these

cases, ostensibly taken to "encourage" women to carry pregnancies
to term .• are in reality intended to impose a moral viewpoint that
no state may constitutionally enforce.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113

(1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

Since efforts to overturn

those decisions have been unsuccessful, the opponents of abortion
have attempted every imaginable means to circumvent the commands
of the Constitution and impose their moral choices upon the rest of
society.

See,

~,

Pln.nned Parenthood or Missouri v. Danfort0-,
Sin gl e ton v. Wulf'f, 428 U.S. 106 (1976);Bellotti v. Bai
428 U.S. 52 (197 6) ;/428 U.S. 132 (197 G). The present cases involve
the most vicious attacks yet devised.

The impact of the regulations

here falls tragically upon those among us least able to help or defend
themselves.
~

As the Court well knows, these regulations inevitably

:.. 2 -

will have the practical effect of preventing nearly all poor women
fr om obtaining safe and legal abortions.-!./
The enactments challenged here brutally coerce poor women
to bear children whom society will scorn for every day of their lives.
Many thousands of unwanted minor lty and mixed race children
n ow spend blighted lives in foster homes, orphanages, and
s ch ools .
(1 977 ).

Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families.

11

reform"

---u.s.

Many children of the poor will sadly attend second- rate

segregated schools.

Cf. Milliken v. Bradley,

---u.s.

(1977).

And opposition remains strong against increasing AFDC benefits for
i mpoverished mothers and children, so that there is little chance
f or the children to grow up in a decent environment.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
of those who preach a

11

Cf. Dandridge v.

I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy

right to llfe 11 that means , under present

social policies, a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor
w omen and their children.
I.

The Court's insensitivity to the human dimension of these
decisions is particularly obvious in its cursory discussion of
respondents' equal protection claim-s in Maher v. Roe. That case
p oints up once again the need for this Court to repudiate its outdated
and intellectually disingenuous

11

two-tier" equal protection analysis.

'--------------------~------~·

See generally, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 317 ( 1976)

(M~rshall, J.,

dissenting).

As I have suggested

before, this "model'~ two fixed-~dcs of analysis. strict scrutiny

- 3 -

and mere rationality, simply do not describe the inquiry the Court
has undertaken -- or should undertake -- in equal protection cases.

11

Id. at 318. In the present case, in its evident desire to avoid strict
scrutiny -- or indeed any meaningful scrutiny -- of the challenged
legislation, which would almost surely result in its invalidation,
see id. at 319, the Court pulls from thin air a distinction between
laws that absolutely prevent exercise of the fundamental right to
abortion and those that
people.

11

merely11 make its exercise difficult for some

See Maher v. Roe, ante at

---- ---

------

Mr. Justice Brennan

demonstrates that our cases support no such distinction, ante at ___•
and I have argued above that the challenged regulations are little
different from a total prohibition from the viewpoint of the poor.
But the Court's legal legerdemain has produced the desired result:
a fundamental right is no longer at stake and mere rationality becomes
the appropriate mode of analysis.

To no one's surprise, application

of that test -- combined with misreading of Roe v. Wade to generate
a

11

strong 11 state interest in

11

potentiallife 11 during the first trimester

of pregnancy, see ante at ____ (Brennan, J., dissenting); post at
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)

11

leaves little doubt about the outcome;

the challenged legislation is [as] always upheld. 11 Massachus e tts v.
Murgia, supra, 427 U.S., at 319. And as has happened before,
factors [are] misapplied or ignored,

11

427 U.S., at 321, and the

Court 11 forego[ es] all judicial protection against discriminatory

11

relevant

- 4 legislation bearing upon" a right "vital to the flourishing of a free
society" and a class "unfairly burdened by invidious discrimination
unrelated to the individual worth of [its] members."

Ji·,

at 320.

As I have argued before, an analysis far more in keeping
with the actions, rather than the words, of the Court in equal protection
cases, see Id. at 320-321, takes account of three factors -- "the
i mportance of the governmental benefits denied, the character of lhe
class, and the asserted state interests," Id. at 322. Application of
this standard would invalidate the challenged regulation.
As I have noted above, the governmental benefits at issue here,
while perhaps not representing large amounts of money for any
i ndividual, are nevertheless of absolutely vital importance in the lives
of the recipients.

The right of every woman to choose whether to bear

a child is, as Roe v. Wade held, of fundamental importance.

An

u nwanted child may be disruptive and destructive of the life of any
woman, but the impact is felt most by those too poor to ameliorate
those effects.

If funds for an abortion are unavailable, a poor woman

may feel that she is forced to obtain an illegal abortion that poses a
serious threat to her health and even her life.

See note 1 supra.

~-

If she refuses to take this risk, and undergoes the pain and danger

of state-financed pregnancy and childbirth, she may well give up
all chance of escaping lhe cycle of poverty.

Absent day- care facilities,

she w ill be forced to care for a child for many years to come; she
will be unable tow ork so that her family can break out of the welfare

- 5 system or the lowest income brackets.

If she already has children,

another infant to feed and clothe may well stretch the budget past the
breaking point.

All chance to control the direction of her own life

will have been lost.
I have already adverted to some of the characteristics of the
class burdened by these regulations.

While poverty alone does not

entitle a class to claim government benefits, it is surely a relevant
factor in the present inquiry.

See San Antonio School District v.
(1973)
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 117-124' (Marshall, J., dissenting).

1

Indeed, it was in the San Antonio case that Mr. Justice Powell for the
Court stated a lest for analyzing discrimination on the basis of
wealth that would, if fairly applied here, strike down the regulations.
The Court there held that a wealth discrimination claim is made out
by persons who share "two distinguishing characteristics: because of
their impecunity they [are] completely unable to pay for some desired
benefit, and as a consequence they sustain[] an absolute deprivation
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Id. at 20.

Medicaid

recipients are, almost by definition, "completely unable to pay for':
abortions, and are thereby completely denied "a meaningful opportunity"

2/
to obtain them.It is no less disturbing that the effect of the challenged regulations
will fall with great disparity upon women of minority races.

Non-

3/

white women now obtain abortions at nearly twice the rate of whiles,and it appears that almost 40 percent of minority women -- more
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than five times the proportion of whites -- are dependent upon
medicaid for their health care .

41

Even if this strongly disparate

racial impact does not alone violate the Equal Protection Clause,
see Washington v. Davis, 426 U . S. 229 (1976); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1972), "at some point a showing that state action has

a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial groups must be
relevant." Id., at 558, 675-576 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Against the brutal effect that the challenged laws will have
must be weighted the asserted state interest.

The Court describes

this as a "strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus."
Ante at 13. Yet in Doe v. Bolton, supra, the Court expressly held
that any state interest during the first trimester of pregnancy, when
88 percent of all abortions occur, CDC Surveillance, at ___.• was
wholly insufficient to justify state interference with the right to abortion.

5/
Id., at 192-200.

If a state's interest in potential human life before

the point of viability is insufficient to justify requiting several
physicians' concurrence for an abortion, Ibid, I cannot comprehend how
it magically becomes adequate to allow the present infringement on
rights of disfavored classes.

If there is any state interest in potential

life before the point of viability, it ~certainly does not outweigh the
deprivation or serious discouragement of a vital constitutional right of

6/
especial importance to poor and minority women.Thu s, taking account of all relevant factors under the flexible
standard of equal protection review, I would hold the Connecticut

- 7and Pennsylvania medicaid regulations and the St. Louis public
hospital policy violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.

II.

When this Court decided Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, it
properly embarked on a course of constitutional adjudication no
less controversial than that begun by Brown v. Board of Education,
34 7 U.S. 483 (1954).

The abortion decisions are sound law and

un doubtedly good policy.

They have never been questioned by the Court

and we are told that today' s cases "signal[] no retreat from Roe or the
c ases applying it." Maher v. Roe, ante, at 10. The logic of those
cases inexorably requires invalidation of the present enactments.
Yet I fear that the Court's decisions will be an invitation to public
officials,

~ready

under extraordinary pressure from well-financed

a nd carefully orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to approve more
such restrictions.

The effect will be to relegate millions of people

to lives of poverty and despair, only to serve the moral vanity of

-

---

---

------------------------~

those who presume to dictate where righteousness lies.

.....

-----

When elected

l eaders cower before public pressure, this Court, more than ever,
must not shirk its duty to enforce. tpj; Constitution for the benefit of
the poor and powerless.

I

FOOTNOTES

1../

Although an abortion performed during the first trimester

of pregnancy is a relatively inexpensive surgical procedure, usually
costing under $200, even this modest sum is far beyond the means
of most medicaid recipients.

And "if one does not have it and

is unable to get it the fee might as well be" one hundred times as
great.

Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
Even before today' s decisions, a major reason that perhaps

as much as one-third of the need for an estimated 1. 8 million
abortions went unmet was the fact that 8 out of 10 American counties
did not have a single abortion provider.

Sullivan, Tietze & Dryfoos,

Legal Abortion in the United States, 1975-1976, 9 Family Planning
Perspectiyes 116, 117, 121, 129 (1977).

In 1975, 83,000 women

had to travel from their home states to obtain abortions (there were
100 abortions performed in West Virginia and 310 in Mississippi),
and about 300, 000 more, or a total of nearly 40 percent of abortion
patients, had to seek help outside their home counties.
121, 124.

Id. at 116,

In addition, only 18 percent of the public hospitals in the

nation performed even a single abortion in 197 5 and in 10 states not
one public hospital provided abortion services.

Id . at 121, 128.

Given the political realities, it seems inevitable that the number
and geographical distribution of abortion providers will diminish as a
result of today ' s decisions.

It is regrettable but likely that fewer

- 2 public hospitals will provide the service and if medicaid payments
are unavailable, other hospitals, clinics and physicians will be
unable to do so.

Since most medicaid and public hospital patients

probably do not have the money, the

time~

or the familiarity with the

medical delivery system to travel to distant states or cities where
abortions are available, today' s decisions will put safe and legal
abortions beyond their reach.

The inevitable human tragedy that will

a

result is reflected in/government report:
11

]F)or some women, non-availability of public funding
for legal abortion acted as a deterrent to their obtaining
the safe procedures. The following case history of a
death which occurred during 1975 exemplifies such a
situation:
11

A 41-year-old black married female with
6 previous pregnancies, 5 living children, and 1 previous
abortion, sought an illegal abortion from a local
die~ician . . . • Her stated reason for seeking an
illegal procedure was financial, since Medicaid in her
state of residence would not pay for her abortion. The
illegal procedure cost $30, compared to an estimated
$150 for a legal procedure . . . . Allegedly, the
operation was performed by inserting a metal rod to
dilate the cervix . . • . [The woman died of cardiac
arrest after two weeks of intensive hospital care and
twooperations.]" U.S. Dep'tofHEW, Centerfor
Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance, 1975 (1977).
(hereafter 11 CDC Surveillance. 11 ) .
2 1 If public funds and facilities for abortions are sharply
reduced, private charities, hospitals, clinics, and doctors willing
to perform abortions for far less than the prevailing fee will, I trust,
take up some of the need.

But since abortion services are inadequateJ y
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available even now. see note 1 supra, such private generosity is
unlikely to give many poor women "a meaningful opportunity" to
obtain abortions.

~/ Blacks and other nonwhite groups are heavily overand medicaid recipients.
represented among both abortion patients I In 1975, about 13. 1
percent of the population was nonwhite, Statistical Abstract of the
United States,

197~

at 25, yet 32.2 percent of women obtaining

abortions were of minority race.
Summary Table, Table 8.

CDC Surveillance at

&

Furthermore, nonwhites secured abortions

at the rate of 47 6 per 1000 live births, while the corresponding
figure for whites was only 277.

Id. a t - - - - - · tables 8, 9.

Abortion is thus a family planning method of considerably more
significan~e

for minority groups than among whites.

41 Although complete statistics are unavailable (3 states,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands having furnished no racial
breakdown, and 8 states giving incomplete data). nonwhites accounted
for some 43.4 percent of medicaid recipients during fiscal year 1974
in jurisdictions reporting.

U.S. Dep't of HEW, National Center for
~-

Social Statistics, Medicaid Recipient Characteristics and Unit s of
Selected Medical Services, Fiscal Year 1974. Report B-4 (FY 74)
Supplement, at 19.

Extrapolating this percentage to cover the

entire medicaid caseload of over 17. 6 million, minority racial groups

- 4 would account for 7, 656, 000 recipients.

Assuming comparability

of the HEW and Census figures, this amounts to 27. 4 percent of
the nation's nonwhite population.

See Statistical Abstract, at 2 5.

Since there are 1. 8 female medicaid recipients for every male,
see Medicaid Recipient Characteristics, supra, the proportion of
nonwhite women who must rely upon medicaid is probably far higher,
about 38. 5 percent.

The comparable figure for white women appears

to be about 7 percent.

E._/ Requirements that the abortion be performed by a
physician exercising his best clinical judgment, and in a facility
meeting narrowly tailored health standards, are allow able.

Ibid.

2._/ Application of the flexible equal protection standard would
allow the Court to strike down the regulations in these cases without
necessitating invalidation of laws funding public education or English
language teaching in public schools.

See ante at 12-13. By permitting

a court to weigh all relevant factors, the flexible standard does not
logically require acceptance of any equal protection claim

that is

"identical in principle" under the traditional approach to those
advanced here.

See id. at 13.
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SUPREME COUBT OF THE UNITED STATES PLEASE RETURN
No. 75-1440

Edward W. Maher, Commissioner
.of Social Services of Connecticut, On Appeal from the
United States District
Appellant,
Court for the D!strict
v.
of Connecticut.
Susan Roe et al.
'[June -, 197.7]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Beal v. Doe, ante, ·at-, we hold today that Title XIX
·of the Social Security Act does not · require the funding of
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when 'it pays for
childbirth,

I
A regulation of the Connecticut ·Welfare Department·limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions 1 to those
that are "medically' necessary," a term de'fined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare' Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. '3, c. III, '§ 275. 2 Connecti1 The procedures governing abortions'beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
l Section 275 provides in·relevant part:
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditioll8
ttl't.> met:
''L In the otlinion of too attending physician the abortion is meiH-

TO FlLE
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cut enfot·ces this limitation through a system of prior authorization from its Department of Social Services. In
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medically necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of
cally necessa.ry. The term " Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
nccesi:iity.
" 2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
hcenscd clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy . . . .
"3. The written request for the abortion is submitted· by the patient,
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian .

"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
Medwal ServiCes, Division of Health Services, Department of Social
crviCes "
Srr n . .f, mfra.
" At thr hme tim; nrtwn wns filed, Mnry Poe, a 16-yenr-old high school
,tu mor, hnd already obtamed an abortion at a Connecticut hospita1.
Appn rrntly bcrnuse of Poe's inability to obtain a. certificate of mediral
necessity, thP ho:spital was denied reimbursement 'by the Department of
Socinl Services. As a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
bill of $244. Susnn Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable
to obtain an abortiOn because of her physician's refusal to certify that the
procedure wa, medically necessa ry. By consent, a temporary restraining
order was entered by the District Court enjoining the Connecticut offirials
from refu i:i in~?: to pa~· for Roc':- nho rtion . After the remand from the Court
of Appeals, thr Dtstnct Court ts:sued tempora-ry restraining orders covering
thn'l' nrldnionnl women . Noe v Norton , 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Cor111,

107.') l
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regula.tion
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
ocial Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F .
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975) .
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held: that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth . The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973) , and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg408 F . Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
nancy.
Shapiro v. 'T hompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
'''thu~ 'tnfrrnges upon a. fundamental interest." 408 F . Supp.,,
0

0

."
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to a pregnancy." ld., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant :
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit di~
crimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.~
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or requireThe Di~trict Court's judgrrumt and order, entered on January 16, 1976,
were not ~tayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of Social Services
revised § 275 to allow reimbur~emcnt for non therapeutic abortjons without
prior aut.horization or consent. The fact that t.his revision was made retroactive to January 16, 1976, sugg~ts that the revision was made only for
the purpose of int,erim compliance with the District Court's judgment and
order, which were entered the ~tune date. No suggestion of mootness has
been made by any of the parties, and this appeal was taken a1~d submitted
on the theory that Connecticut de~ires to reinsktte the invalidated regula.tlon. Under these circum;;tances, the :subsequent revi~ion of the regula.tion
does not, render thl' case moot.. In any event, there would remain the
d<'nial of r<'imbur:;ement to Mary Poe, a.nd similarly situated members of
the class, under the prerevision regulation. See 380 F. Supp., at 730 n. 3.
The State ha<> a.,;erted no Eleventh Amendment defense to t.his relief
sought by Poe and thQlSe whom she represents.
4
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rnents tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion
or to delay the occurrence of an ~bortion that she has asked
her physician to perform." !d., l\-t 665. We noted probable
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut
regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) .

II
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent wo·
men, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indi·
gents.~ But when a State decides to alleviate some of the
hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limi•
tations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment. to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classi·
ncations established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
F ourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis
of such a claim is well-settled :
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper5 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U . S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is
not to t he contra ry. T here the Court invalidated under the Due Process
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including rcquiremrnts for pay ment of court fees and costs for service of
proces " rest ri cting t he ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
divorce ! d., at 372. The Court held tha t :
''LG iiven t hr bns1e position of t he marriage rela tionship in this society 's
hiera rchy of va l u~ and the concomitan t state monopoliza tion of the
means for lega lly dissolving t his rela tionship, due process does prohibit a
Stnte from denyi ng, solely beca use of inability to pay, access to it::; courts
to ind1vid uals who ::;rek judirinl di:;solution of their ma rriages." !d., at 374.
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
tc·rminating pregnancies t hrough abortion the present case is easily distmglllslwd from Boddie. See nlso United States v. K ras, 409 U. S. 434
(1 97;l) Ortwem v, Schwab, 410 U S, 656 (1973) .
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ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im·
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. • . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination .•.." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973) .
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here,
we think the District Court erred in holding that the Connecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause <O'f
t he Fourteen'th Amendment.

A
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within
the limited category of disadvantaged c1asses s(l) rec(l)gnized 'by
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regula,tion falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a sense, every denia.I of welfare to an indigent
creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents
who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this
Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, a.t 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
( 1970) .() Accordingly, the central question in this case is
In cases such UR Griffi n v. Ill-inois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) a.nd Douglas v.
California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec6

tion Clause requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convict ions to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate
counsel. These cases are grounded in the criminal justice system , a governmenta l monopo l~· m which pa rticipation is compelled. Cf. n. 5, supra.
Our ~ ubsequen t decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying
Gri!Jin an<i Douglas dQ not extencl to legislative classifications generally.
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whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The
District Court read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and
the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental
right to abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less
than a compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's
different treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the
District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the
fundamental right recognized in Roe.

B
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
affords constitutional protection against state interference
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy,"
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregna.ncy.7
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom .
/d., at 170 (STE,WART, J., concurring). We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro0

••"

1 A wotrum hal; at least an equal right to cl10ose to carry her fetus to
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights
of man .• fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
Skinner v. Oklo.h.oma,. 316 U. S. 535. 541 (1942).
o

'.
I
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tected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demanding standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman a.nd the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify, substantial regulation of abortions in the second and third trimesters. · "These interests
are separate and distiJ;J.Ct. Each grows in substantiality as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.'" ld., at .162-163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. ld., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trimester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
justifies prohibition with rriminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. /d., at 163-164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, · different in · form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. · Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 70-7r
n 11 (1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spous 1
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the hu band] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstaCle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutionally protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra~
we have held that a requirement for a ·lawful abortion "is
not unconstitutional mi.lcss it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellottt v Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976).
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction· between
~bortion and Qther procedures is forbidden" and that "~tlhe

eonstitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." Id., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor"s decision or the less burdensotne requirement of
parental consultation.
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest
11
in making certain kinds of important decisions" free from
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, U. S. - - , and nn. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the
nght in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion,' 1 as the District Court seemed :to•
think. Rather, the 'tight protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitdi0n on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring child'birth ovet abortion, and to implement that judgment by the
aiiocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
f'rom the laws invalidated in our previous abortitm decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles'-absolute or
otherwise~in the pregnant woman's path tO' an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fun·d'
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
sources for the service she desires. · The State may have·
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, · thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no re-striction on access to abortions that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,.
t l:f'th~ps, impossible-fot wlne watoon·: t.o have abortiQil.S: .-~
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neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut
regula.tion. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does
not imping~ upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe. 8

c
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
8 Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and
Memorial I/ospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In
those cases clurational residence requirements for the receipt of public
benefits Wt;lre found to' be unconstitutional because they "penalized" ·the
exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstaw.
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut ·law unduly interferes with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their asasertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
familiar to the criminal 'law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfa-re to one who had recently exercised the right to
travel across sta.te lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine .to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare ·benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny
might be appropriate under either the penalty jlntftysis or. the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. · But -the claim here is
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro al).d Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to. travel interstate by refusing to pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here.
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of
a constitutionally unposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the Fir~t
Amendment, ld,, at 409,
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of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. 0
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law ma:king it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. ld., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
0 In Buckley v. V aleo, 424 U. S. 1 ( 1976), we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of Texa8 v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access t() the electoral process :
"These cases, however, dealt primarily w1th state laws requiring a
candidate to satiSfy certam rcqmrements in order to have his name appear
on thr ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues.
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Pl'esidential candidates
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'.
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate !rom getting on the ballot or
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice ; the inability,
:J any, of minonty party ca11didatu to wage effective campaigru will
derive not from lack of public fu11ding but from their inability to rai8e
pn·vate contribution.!. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
~ligibility formulae under Subt1tle H is thus limited to the claimed denial
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate
that the formulae afford eligible candidates" /d ., at 94-95 (emphasis
J.dded) (footnote omitted).

f
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their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the
'
, upbringing and education of children under
· their control." /d., at 534-535.
Both cases invalidated substantial restrictions on constitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign language;
in Pierce, the parent's right to choose private rather than
public school education. · But neither case denied to a State
· the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action.
'.Indeed, in Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" that included
English and excluded German in its free public schools "is
not questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding itr-a policy choice pursued in some States for
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 (1973), we explicitly rejected the
argument that Pierce established a "right of private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse/'
noting that" [i] t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to
say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection,
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argument, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring
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instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identical in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education.1 0

D
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality
t hat applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the
impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that
the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic
abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "constitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U. S. 56, 74 (1972); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U. S., at 314. We hold that the Connecticut
fu nding scheme satisfies this standard.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "gruw[ing] in substantiality
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy
[Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly." Id., at 159. The State unquest ionably has a "strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
normal childbirth," Beal v. Doe, ante, at - , an interest
o

o

0

o

10 MR..JusTICE BRENNAN's reliance on Singleton v . Wulff, 428 U. S.
106 ( 1976), to refute t h1s conclusion is misplaced. The principal
q uestion in Singleton was the sta nding of doctors to assert the rights
of thei r patient~ m a challenge to a Missouri medicaid statute similar to
t he one at 1ssue here. T lw language quoted by MR. JusTICE BRENNAN,
post, nt 4-5, hnd not hing to do with t he underlying question of the const itutionality of t he ::;tatutl.'. As MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN was careful
to note at the beginning of his opinion in Singleton, the case presented
" issUE'~ not going to the merits of this dispute." 428 U. S., at 108.

li
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honored over the centuries. 11 Nor can there be any question
that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that in·
terest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased significantly in recent years. As
recognized by the District Court in this case, such costs are
significantly greater than those normally associated with elec.
tive abortions during the first trimester. The subsidizing of
costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging
childbirth.
We certainly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an
'indigent woman who desires an abortion, but "the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S., at 74. Our cases
uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in choos·
ing among competing demands for limited public funds. 12 In
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 ( 1970), despite recognition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," we held that classifications survive equat protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this minimal level.
· The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a
u In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth.
Such concerns are basic to ' the future of the·· State . and. in some circumstances could constitute a substantial reason for. departure from a position
of ncutraltiy between abortion and childbirth.
12 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection
Clause, and The Three Faces of' Constitutj9nal ·Equality, ·61 Va~· J.dl~v.
945~· 998-1017 (1975).
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weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri,
Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.).
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under Title XIX as col1strued in
Beal v. Doe, ante, Connecticut is free-through normal demo~
cratic processes-to decide that such benefits should be
provided. We hold only that the Constitution does not require a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues.

IV
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's requirements of prior written request by the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termin.a.tiQn Qf a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood oi

I/
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~Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
similar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JusTICE MAR~
SHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
The District Court held:
"When Connecticut refuses to fund elective abortions
while funding therapeutic abortions and prenatal and
postnatal care, it weights the choice of the pregnant
mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally
protected right to an elective abortion. . . . Her choice
is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the
abortion, but by the availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses not to have the abortion. When the
state thus infringes upon a fundamental interest, it must
assert a compelling state interest." 408 F. Supp. 660,
663-664 (1975) .
This Court reverses on the ground that "the District Court
misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right
recognized in Roe [ v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 ( 1973) ]," ante, at 7,
and therefore that Connecticut was not required to meet the
"compelling interest" test to justify its discrimination against
elective abortion but only "the less demanding test of rationality that applies in the absence of . . . the infringement of a
fundamental right," ante, at 13. This holding, the Court
insists, "places no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the
pregnant woman's path to an abortion"; she is still at liberty
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to finance the abortion from "private sources.". Ante, at 9.
True, "the state may [by funding childbirth] have made
childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing
the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on
access to abortions that was not already there." Ilnd. True,
also, indigency "may make it more difficultr-and in some
cases, perhaps impossible--for some women to have abortions," but that regrettable consequence "is neither created
nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation."
Ante, at 9-10.
But a distressing insensitivity to the plight of impoverished
pregnant women is inherent in the Court's analysis. The
stark reality for too many, not just "some," indigent pregnant
women is that indigency makes access to competent licensed
physicians not merely "difficult" but "impossible." As a
practical matter, many indigent women will feel they have
no choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the
State will pay for the associated medical services, even though
they would have chosen to have abortions if the State had
also provided funds for that procedure, or indeed if the State
had provided funds for neither procedure. This disparity
in funding by the State clearly operates to coerce indigent
pregnant women to bear children they would not otherwise
choose to have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only
operate upon the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this
form of financial pressure. AeeurdinglYJ, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words are apt:
"To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably
resulting from a money hurdle erected by the State, would
justify a latter-day Anatole France to add one more item
to his ironic comments on the 'majestic equality' of the
law. 'The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich
as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets,. and to steal bread' . . . ." Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U. S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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None can take seriously the Court's assurance that its 11 con..
clusion signals no retreat from Roe [ v. Wade] or the cases
applying it," ante, at 10. That statement must occasion great
surprise among the Courts of Appeals and District Courts
that, relying upon Roe and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179
( 1973), have held that Sta.tes are constitutionally required
to fund elective abortions if they fund pregnancies carried to
term. See Doe v. Rose, 499 F. 2d 1112 (CA10 1974); Wulff
v. Singleton, 508 F. 2d 1211 (CAS 1974) , rev'd and rem. on
other grounds sub nom. SingLeton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106
(1976); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (SD 1974), rem.
in light of Hagans v. Lavine, sub nom. West by v. Doe, 420
U. S. 968 (1975) , dec. on rem. 402 F. Supp. 140 (SD 1975);
Doe v. Wohlegmuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (WD Pa. 1973), aff'd
on statutory grounds sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F. 2d 611
(CA3 1975) , rev'd- U.S.- (1977) ;Doe v. Rampton, 366
F. Supp. 189 (Utah 1973); Klein v. Nassau County Medical
Center, 347 F. Supp. 496 (EDNY 1972); rem. in light of
Wade and Bolton, 412 U. S. 924 (1973) , dec. on rem., 409
F. Supp. 731 (EDNY 1976). Indeed, it cannot be gainsaid
that today's decision seriously erodes the principles that Roe
-¥. H'ut1e and)1e ~·e~eey announced to guide the determination of what constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of
the fundamental right of pregnant women to be free to decide
whether to have an abortion.
The Court's premise is that only an equal protection claim is
presented here. Claims of interference with enjoyment of
fundamental rights have, however, occupied a rather protean
position in our constitutional jurisprudence. Whether or not
the Court's analysis may reasonably proceed under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court plainly errs in ignoring, as it
does, the unanswerable argument of appellee, and holding of
the District Court, that the regulation unconstitutionally impinges upon her claim of privacy derived from the Due
Process Clause.
Roe v. Wade and cases following it hold that an area of
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privacy invulnerable to the State's intrusion surrounds the
decision of a pregnant woman whether or not to carry her
pregnancy to term. The Connecticut scheme clearly infringes
upon that area of privacy by bringing financial pressures on
indigent women that force them to bear children they would
not otherwise have. That is an obvious impairment of the
fundamental right established by Roe. Yet the Court concludes that "the Connecticut regulation does not impinge
upon [that] fundamental right." Ante, at 10. This conclusion is based on a perceived distinction, on the one hand, between the imposition of criminal penalties for the procurement of an abortion present in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
and the absolute prohibition present in Planned Parenthood
of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 ( 1976), and, on the
other, the assertedly lesser inhibition imposed by the Connecticut scheme. Ante, at 8-10.
The last time our Brother PowELL espoused the concept in an abortion case that "there is a basic difference between direct State interference with a protected activity and
State encouragement of an alternative activity concurrent
with legisla.tive policy," ante, at 10-11, the Court refused to
adopt it. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 122 (1976). This
was made explicit in Part II of our Brother BLACKMUN's
opinion for four of us and is implicit in our Brother STEVENS'
essential agreement with the analysis of Part II-B. !d., at
121-122 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part). Part II-B stated,
"MR. JusTICE PowELL would so limit Doe and the other
cases cited, explaining them as cases in which the State
'directly interfered with the abortion decision' and
'directly interdicted the normal functioning of the
physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain
procedures' [428 U. S.], at 128. There is no support in
the language of the cited cases for this distinction ....
Moreover, a 'direct interference' or 'interdiction' test does
not appear to be supported by precedent . . . . For a
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doctor who cannot afford to work for nothing, and a
woman who cannot a.fford to pay him, the state's refusal
to fund an abortion is as effective an 'interdiction' of it
as would ever be necessary. Furthermore, since the
right ... is not simply the right to have abortions nondiscrimina.torily funded, the denial of such funding is as
complete an 'interdiction' of the exercise of the right as
could ever exist." /d., at 118 n. 7.
We have also rejected this approach in other abortion
cases. Doe v. Bolton, the companion to Roe, in addition to
striking down the Georgia criminal prohibition against elective abortions, struck down the procedural requirements of
certification of hospitals, of approval by a hospital committee,
and of concurrence in the abortion decision by two doctorp
other than the woman's own doctor. None of these req~
ments operated as an absolute bar to elective abortions in
the manner of the criminal prohibitions present in the other
aspect of the case or in Roe, but this was not sufficient to
save them from unconstitutionality. In Planned Parenthood, supra, we struck down a requirement for spousal consent
to an elective abortion which the Court characterizes today
simply as an "absolute obstacle" to a woman obtaining an
abortion. Ante, at 8. But the obstacle was "absolute" only
in the limited sense that a woman who was unable to
persuade her spouse to agree to an elective abortion was
prevented from obtaining one. Any woman whose husband
agreed, or could be persuaded to agree, was free to obtain
an abortion, and the State never imposed directly any prohibition of its own. This requirement was qualitatively
ea:,s
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different from the criminal statutes that the Court
today says are comparable, but we nevertheless found it
unconstitutional.
Most recently, also in a privacy case, the Court squarely
reaffirmed that the right of privacy was fundamental, and
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that an infringement upon that right must be justified by
a compelling state interest. Carey v. Population Service3
International,- U. S . - (1977). That case struck down
:in its entirety a New York law forbidding the sale of con~
traceptives to minors under 16 years old, limiting persons who
could sell contraceptives to pharmacists, and forbidding advertisement and display of contraceptives. There was no
New York law forbidding use of contraceptives by anyone,
including minors under 16, and therefore no "ab~olute" prohibition against the exercise of the fundamental right. Nevertheless the statute was declared unconstitutional as a burden
on the right to privacy. In words that apply fully to Connecticut's sta,t ute, and that could hardly be more explicit,
Carey stated, "'Compelling' is of course the key word; where
a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget
a child is involved, regula,tions imposing a burden on it may
be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be
narrowly drawn to express only those interests." !d., at-.
Carey relied specifically upon Roe, Doe, and Planned Parenthood, and interpreted them in a way flatly inconsistent with
the Court's interpretation today: "The significance of these
cases is that they establish that the same test must be applied
to state regulations that burden an individual's right to
decide to prevent contraception or terminate pregnancy by
substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that
decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision
entirely." !d., a t - .
Finally, cases involving other fundamental rights also make
clear that the Court's concept of what constitutes an impermissible infringement upon the fundamental right of a pregnant
woman to choose to have an abortion makes new law. We
have repeatedly found that infringements of fundamental
rights are not limited to outright denials of those rights.
First Amendment decisions have consistently held in a wide
variety of contexts that the compelling state interest test is
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ttpplicable not only to outright denials but also to restraints
that make exercise of those rights more difficult. See, e. g.,
$herbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of
religion), NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 ( 1963) (freedom
of expression and association), Linmark Associates v. Towr~r
8hip of Willingboro, - U. S. ( 1977) (freedom of expression). The compelling state interest test has been applied
in voting cases, even where only relatively small infringements
upon voting power, such as dilution of voting strength caused
b mala ortionment, have been involved. See, e. g., Reyr~r
olds v. Sims,
, 562, 566 (1964), Chapman v. Meier, 420
U.S. 1 (1975 , Connor v. Finch,- U.S.- (1977). Similarly, cases involving the right to travel have consistently held
that statutes penalizing the fundamental right to travel must
pass muster under the compelling state interest test, irrespective of whether the statutes act.ually deter travel. Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-258 (1974),
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-341 (1972), Shapiro v.
Thompson,J~ And indigents asserting a fundamental
right of access to the courts have been excused payment of
entry costs without being required first to show that their indigency was an absolute bar to access. Griffin v. Illinois,
Milf'l"lil' Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971).
Until today, I had not thought the nature of the fundamental right established in Roe was open to question, let
a.lone susceptible to the interpreta.tion advanced by the Court.
The fact that the Connecticut scheme may not operate as
an absolute bar preventing all indigent women from having
abortions is not critical. What is critical is that the State
has inhibited their fundamental right to make that choice
-') .fee from state interference.
Nor does the manner in which Connecticut has burdened
the right freely to choose to have an abortion save its Medicaid program. The Connecticut scheme cannot be distin•

fI

A 3rl

J

h
(t(..•

•

ll.-

Cf4J"')

1

75-1440-DISSENT

MAHER v. ROE

guished from other grants and withholdings of financial
benefits that we have held unconstitutionally burdened a.
fundamental right. Sherbert v. Verner, supra, struck down
a South Carolina statute that denied unemployment compensation to a woman who for religious reasons could not
work on Saturday, but that would have provided such compensation if her unemployment had stemmed from a number
of other nonreligious causes. Even though there was no proof
of indigency in that case, Sherbert held that "the pressure upon
her to forgo [her religious] practice [was] unmistakable," 374
U. S., at 414, and therefore held the effect was the same as a
fine imposed for Saturday worship. Here, though the burden
is upon the right to privacy derived from the Due Process
Clause and not upon freedom of religion under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the governing principle is the same, for Connecticut grants and withholds
financial benefits in a manner that discourages significantly
the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right. Indeed,
the case for applica.tion of the principle actua.lly is stronger
than in Verner since appellees are all indigents and therefore
even more vulnerable to the financial pressures imposed by
the Connecticut regulations.
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976), held, and the
Court today agrees, ante, at 8, that a state requirement is
unconstitutional if it "unduly burdens the right to seek an
abortion." Connecticut has "unduly" burdened the fundamental right of pregnant women to be free to choose to have
an abortion because the State has advanced no compelling
state interest to justify its interference in that choice.
Although Connecticut does not argue it as justification, the
Court concludes tha.t the State's interest "in protecting the
potential life of the fetus" suffices, ante, at 13. * Since only the
*The Court also suggests, ante, at 13 n. 10, that a "state may have legitimate demographic concerns about the rate of population growth" which
might ju tify a choice to favor live births over abortions. While it is
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first trimester of pregnancy is involved in this case, that justi.
fication is totally foreclosed if the Court is not overruling
the holding of Roe v. Wade that "[w]ith respect to the State's
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'com~
pelling point is at viability.'' occurring at about the end of the
second trimester. 410 U. S., at 163. The State also argues a
further justification not relied upon by the Court, namely,
that it needs "to control the amount of its limited public funds
which will be allocated to its public welfare budget." Brief,
p, 23. The District Court correctly held, however, that the
asserted interest was "wholly chimerical" because the "state's
assertion that it saves money when it declines to pay the cost
of a welfare mother's abortion is simply contrary to indisputed
facts." 408 F. Supp., at 664.
Finally, the reasons that render the Connecticut regulation
unconstitutional also render invalid in my view the requirement of a prior written certification by the woman's attending
physician that the abortion is "medically necessary," and the
requirement that the hospital submit a Request for Authorization of Professional Services including a "statement indicating the medical need for the abortion." Appellees Brief,
p. 203. For the same reasons. I would also strike down the
requirement for prior authorization of payment by the
Connecticut Department of Social Services.

conceivable that under some circumstances this might be an appropriate
. factor to be considered as part of a Statf''s "compelling" interest, no one
contends that this is the case here, or indeed that Connecticut has any
demographic concerns at all about the rate of its population growth.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
I~ Beal v. Doe, ante, at - , we hold today thfl.t Title XIX
of the Social Sepurity Act does not requ\re ~~~ fup~ing of
nontheraputic abortions ~a ·condition of paryicipation in the
joint federal-state mediQaid program established by tha~
statute. In this case, as "' result of our decision in Beal, we
mm~t decide whether the Constitution requires ~ participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pa)'eJ for
childbirth.

I
A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abor~ions 1 to .thoee
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut .Welfare Department, Public
Assistance ·Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 ConnectiTh& procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are net
!Challenged here.
2 Section 275 provides in relevant part:
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under tlae
Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions
are met:
1
' 1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi· ·
1
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cut enforces this limitation through a system of prior authorization from its Department of Social Services. In
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the patient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medically necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigent
women who were unable to obtain a physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 3 In a complaint filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of
oally necessary. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatric
necessity.
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital or
licensed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy. . . .
"3. The written request for tne abortion is submitted by the patient,.
and in the case of a minor, from the parent or guardian.
"4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Department of Social
Services."
See n. 4, infra.
:! At the time this action was filed, Mary Poe, a 16-year-old high school
junior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital.
Apparently because of Poe"s inability to obtain a certificate of medical
necessity, the hospital was denied reimbursement by the Department of
Social Services. As a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
bill of $244. Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable
to obtain an abortjon because of her physician's refusal to certify that the
procedure was medically necessary. By consent, a temporary restraining
order was entered by the Distrid Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
from refusi ng to pay for Roe's abortion. After the remand from the Court
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders covering
three additional women. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663 (Conn.
1975) .

I
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C: §' 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380' F. Shpp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for· the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow; but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d' 928 (CA2 1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F.
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) , the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with preg-.
nancy . . . ." 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
tl.thus infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp.,
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify this
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to a pregnancy." !d., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant:
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit discrimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
certificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded abortions.4
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or requireThe District Court's judgment and order, entered on January 16, 1976,
were not stayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of Socia.! Services
revised § 275 to allow reimbursement for nontherapeutic abortions without
prior authorization or consent. The fact that this revision was ma.de retroactive to January 16, 1976, suggests that the revision was made only for
the purpose of interim compliance with the District Court's judgment and
order, which were entered the same date. No suggestion of mootness has
been made by any of the parties, and this appeal was taken an,d submitted
on the theory that Connecticut desires to reinstate the invalidated regulation. Under these circumstances, the subsequent revision of the regulation
does not, render the case moot. In any event, there would remain the
denial of reimbursement to Mary Poe, and similarly situated members of
the class, under the prerevision regulation. See 380 F. Supp., at 730 n. 3.
The State has asserted no Eleventh Amendment defense to this relief
sought by Poe and those whom she represents.
4
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ments tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion
or to delay the occurrence of an abortion that she has asked
her physician to perform." !d., at 665. We noted probable
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Connecticut
regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976).

II
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent womell, or indeed to pay any of the medical expellses of indigents."' But when a State decides to alleviate some of the
hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classifications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis
of such a claim is well-settled:
"We must decide, first, whether [state legislation] operBoddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), cited by appellees, is
not to the contrary. There the Court invalidated under the Due Process
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including requirements for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
divorce. Id., at 372. The Court held that :
" [G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the
means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a
State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts
to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages." /d., at 374.
Because Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
terminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily distinguished from Boddie. See also United States v. Kras, 409 U, S, 434
(1973) ; Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973) ,
6
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ates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly.
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973).
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this analysis here,
we think the District Court erred in holding that the Connecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within
the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent
creates a wealth classification a~ compared to nonindigents
who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this
Court has never he~d that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
( 1970) .() Accordingly, the central question, in this case is
()In cases such as Griffin v. !Uinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956) and Douglw v.
California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec-·
tion Clause requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convictions to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate·
counsel. These cases are grounded in the criminal justice system, a governmental monopoly in which participation is compelled. Cf. n. 5, supra.
Our subsequent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying
Gril[tn and Doug,las dQ nQt exte.nd to legislati.ve classifications generally_
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whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The
District Court read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, s-upra, and
the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental
right to abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less
than a compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's
different treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the
District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the
fundamental right recognized in Roe.

B
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
affords constitutional protection against state interference
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy,"
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 7
410 U. S., at 153.
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As MR. JusTICE STEWART observed,
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of a
constitutional freedom ...." /d., at 170 (STEWART, J., concurring). We held that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro1 A woman has at least an equal right to choose to ca,r ry her fetus to
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interferel?ce has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights
of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race ."
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942).
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tected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against . this demanding standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in the second and third' trimesters. "These interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as
the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.'" /d., at 162-163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. /d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trimester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. /d., at 163-164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 70-71,
n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy.'' Missouri had interposed
an "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutionally protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be abwlute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra.
Carey v. Population Services International, U. S. ( 1977) , we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion
"is not constit utional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion.'' B ellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976).
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distihction between
abortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[t]he
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oonstitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." Id., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest
"in making certain kinds of important decisions" free from
U. S. - governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, -,and nn. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the
,right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's interference with it. Ro~ did not declare an unqualified "constitutional right to an abortion," as the District Court seemed to
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion , and to implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
sources for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible- for some women to have abortions is
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neither created nor in any way affected , by the Connecticut
regulation.. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does
not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe. 8

c
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and ·state encouragement
a Appellees rely .on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In
those cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the
exercise of the constitutional right to travel'interstate.
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly interferes with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their asasertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal· sanctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had· recently exercised the right to
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to aU women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny
might be appropriate under either the penalty analysis or the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. But the claim here is
that the State "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right.
to travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S, 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here,
In addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and Freedom of Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. Id.1 at 409 ..
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of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.11
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
This distinction i8 implicit in two cases cited in Roe in suppbrt of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law ma:king it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. ld., at 39&-397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
Wach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
11 In Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1~71. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of TexM v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access to the electoral process:
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding represen~ative government and contemporary issues.
contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'.
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability,
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will
de'rive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate
,that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d., at 94-95 (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted) .

In
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cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education/0
D
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality
that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the
impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that
the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic
abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "constitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U. S. 56, 74 (1972); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U. S., at 314. We hold that the Connecticut
funding scheme satisfies this standard.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
10 In his dissenting opinion, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN rejects the distinction
betwren direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity and argues that our previous abortion decisions are inconsistent with today's decision. But as stated above,
all of those decisions involved laws that placed substantial state-created
obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. Our recent decision in Carey v. Population Services International,- U.S.- (1977),
differs only in that it involved state-created restrictions on access to contraceptives, rather than abortions. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN simply asserts
that the Connecticut regulation "is an obvious impairment of the fundamental right established in Roe." Post, at - . The only suggested
source for this purportedly "obvious" conclusion is a quotation from
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). Yet, as MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN
was careful to note at the beginning of his opinion in Singleton, that case
presented "issues [of standing] not going to the merits of this dispute."
428 U. S., at 108. Significantly, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN makes no effort
to distinguish or explain the much more analogous authority of Norwood v.
Harrison, supra.
·
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as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly." /d., at 159. The State unquestionably has a "strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
normfl,l childbirth," Beal v. Doe, ante, at - , an interest
honored over the centuries.11 Nor can there be any question
that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased significantly in recent years. As
recognized by the District Court in this case, such costs are
significantly greater than those normally associated with elective abortions during the first trimester. The subsidizing of.
costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging
chiJdbirth.
·
We certainly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an
indigent woman who desires an abortion, but "the Constitution
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S., at 74. Our cases
uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in choosing among competing demands for limited public funds. 12 In
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970), despite recognition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection
cha.llenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
sh~wn. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state
11 In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may.
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth.
Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in some circumstances could constitute a substantial reason for departm:e from a position
of neutraltiy between abortion and childbirth.
12 See generally Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection
Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev.
945, 998-1017 (1975).
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interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this minimal level.
The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a ·
weighing of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
does not strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Williamson v. Lee Op,tical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488
(1955), quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. Indeed, when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those implicated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri,
Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.) .13
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under Title XIX as construed in
Beal v. Doe, ante, Connecticut is free-through normal democratic processes-to decide that such benefits should be
provided. We hold only that the Constitution does not require a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues.

IV
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's requirements of prior written request by the pregnant woman and
1a Much of the rhetoric of the three dissenting opinions would be equally
applicable if Connecticut had elected not to fund either abortions or childbirth. Yet none of the dissents goes so far as to argue that the Constitution requires such asistance for all indigent pregnant women.
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prior authorization by the Department of Social Service:s,
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medical necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termination of a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
similar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Real v. Doe, ante, at-, we hold today that Title XIX
of the Social Security Act does not · require the funding of
nontheraputic abortions as a condition of participation in the
joint federal-state medicaid program established by that
statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Real, we
must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating
State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for
childbirth.
I
A regulation of the Connecti~ut Welfare Department limits
state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions l. to those
that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public
Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275. 2 Connecti1 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not
challenged here.
:Section 275 provides in relevant part:
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the
MC"dical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions
are met:
"1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-
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put enforces this limitation through a system of prior authorization from its Department of Social Services. In.
order to obtain authorization for a first trimester abortion,
I
the hospital or clinic where the abortion is to be performed
must submit, among other things, a certificate from the pa-;
tient's attending physician stating that the abortion is medi-:
cally necessary.
This attack on the validity of the Connecticut regulation
was brought against Appellant Maher, the Commissioner of
Social Services, by Appellees Poe and Roe, two indigen~
women who were unable to obtain a~ physician's certificate of
medical necessity. 8 In a coinpl~.int filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, they challenged
the regulation both as inconsistent with the requirements of
I

!'ally necessa ry. The term "Medically Necessary" includes psychiatrio
.
.
necessity.
"2. The abortion is to be performed in an accredited hospital o ~
liec n~ed clinic when the patient is in the first trimester of pregnancy. . . .
"3. The written request for tbe abortion is submitted by the patient 1
,1nd in the case of a minor, froii; the parent or guardian.
"In the case of a committed child, a written consent for the abortion is
secured from the. <:;ommissione~ of the Department of Children and Youth
Services as guardian .
''4. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from the Chief of
Medical . Services, Division of Health Se;vices, Department of Social
;;\ervices."
.I At the time_t !Lis action . was filed, .Mary Po,~, a~ lp.cyear-ol~ . high school
,1 nnior, had already obtained an abortion at a Connecticut hospital,
Apparently because of Poe's inability .t o obtain a certificate of medical
necp,ssity, the hospital wa~ denied reimbursement by the Department of
f3ocial Services. As a result, Poe was being pressed to pay the hospital
bill of $244. .Susan Roe, an unwed mother of three children, was unable
to obt!Jin an abortion because of her physician's refusal to certify that the
procedure was medically necessary . .BY consent, a temporary restraini~g
order was entered by the Distric t Court enjoining the Connecticut officials
from refusing to pay fo r Roe 's abortion. After the remand from the Cour~
of Appeals, the District Court issued temporary restraining orders coverin~
\ hi:ee addltional women. 408 F . Supp. 660, 663 (Conn . 1975) .

f I
I
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Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1396 et seq.,
and as violative of their constitutional rights, including the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal
protection. Connecticut originally defended its regulation
on the theory that Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibited the funding of abortions that were not medically
necessary. After certifying a class of women unable to obtain
medicaid assistance for abortions because of the regulation,
the District Court held that the Social Security Act not only
allowed state funding of nontherapeutic abortions but also required it. Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (Conn. 1974). On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit read the
Social Security Act to allow, but not to require, state funding
of such abortions. 522 F. 2d 928 (CA2 1975). Upon remand for consideration of the constitutional issues raised in
the complaint, a three-judge District Court was convened.
That court invalidated the Connecticut regulation. 408 F .
Supp. 660 (Conn. 1975).
Although it found no independent constitutional right to
a state-financed abortion, the District Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to pregnancy and childbirth. The court found implicit in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S.
113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the view
that "abortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive
moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are
simply two alternative medical methods of dealing with pregnancy. . . . " 408 F. Supp., at 663 n. 3. Relying also on
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 lJ. S. 250 (1974), the court
held that the Connecticut program "weights the choice of the
pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right" to a nontherapeutic abortion and
t'thus. infringes upon a fundamental interest." 408 F. Supp.,
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at 663-664. The court found no state interest to justify thi!!
infringement. The State's fiscal interest was held to be
"wholly chimerical because abortion is the least expensive
medical response to pregnancy." /d., at 664 (footnote
omitted). And any moral objection to abortion was deemed
constitutionally irrelevant:
"The state may not justify its refusal to pay for one type
of expense arising from pregnancy on the basis that it
morally opposes such an expenditure of money. To
sanction such a justification would be to permit discrimination against those seeking to exercise a constitutional right on the basis that the state simply does not
approve of the exercise of that right." Ibid.
The District Court enjoined the State from requiring the
c-C'rtificate of medical necessity for medicaid-funded ·abortions. 4
The court also struck down the related requirements of prior
written request by the pregnant woman and prior authorization by the Department of Social Services, holding that the
State could not impose any requirements on medicaid payments for abortions that are not "equally applicable to medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or require4

The District Court 's judgmEmt and order, entered on January 16, 1976,
were not. stayed. On January 26, 1976, the Department of Social Services
revi,;rd § 275 to allow reimbursement for nontherapeutic abortions without.
prior authorizat.ion or consent. The fact that this revision was made
wtroactive to June 16, 1976, ,;uggests that the revision was made. only for
the purpose of int,erim compliance with the District Court's judgment and
nrdrr, which were entered the same date. No suggestion of mootness has
hren made by any of t he parties, and this appeal was taken an,d submitted
on the theory that Connecticut desires to reinst.ate the invalidated regulation. Under these circumstances, the subsequent revision of the regula.tion
doe,; not. render thr ca:;e moot. In any event, there would remain the
denial of rrimbur~ement to Mnry Poe, !Lnd similarly situated member,; of
thr rlas~:;, under the prerevi:sion regulation. See 380 F. Supp., at 730 n. 3,
'Thr State has as:serted no Eleventh Amendment defense to this rcli<lf
.~ought b~· Poe and tho~e whom ~h<> rcpr<>sent~,

{
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Plents tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortioQ
that she has asked her physician to perform." Id., at 665,
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutional ..
ity of the Connecticut regulation. 428 U. S. 908 (1976) .

II
The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to
pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent woinen, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents. r. But when a State decides to alleviate some of the
hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limit ations. Appellees' claim is that Connecticut must accord
equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth, and may not
evidence a policy preference by funding only the medical
expenses incident to childbirth. This challenge to the classifications established by the Connecticut regulation presents a
question arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The basic framework of analysis
of such a claim is well-settled:
"'Ve must decide, first, whether [state legislation] oper~ Boddie

v. Connect1:cut. 401 U. S. 371 (19'71), cited by appellees, is
There the Court invalidated under the Due Process
Clause "certain state procedures for the commencement of litigation, including rrquiremcnts for payment of court fees and costs for service of
process" restricting the ability of indigent persons to bring an action for
divorce. /d. , at 372.
" Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state
monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due
process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to
pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of theit
marriages." !d., at 374.
Bcrausc Connect icut has made no attempt to monopolize the means for
terminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily dis"t inguishcd from Boddie . See also United States v. Kras, 4t09 U. S. 434
{1973) ; Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U. S. 656 (1973) .
.no't to the contrary.
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ates to the disadvantage of l!lome suspect class or im~
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the [legislative] scheme
must still be examined to determine whether it rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination . . . ." San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 17 (1973).
Accord, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U. S. 307, 312, 314 (1976); Applying this .analysis here,
we think the District Court erred in holding that the Connecticut regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A
This case involves no discrimination against a suspect class.
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within
the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by
our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different con- (
elusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent
creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents
who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this·
Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analy~is. See Rodriguez, supra, at 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471
( 1970) .{' Accordingly, the central question in this case is·
In cast'~ such a~ Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and Douglas v.
California. 372 U. S. 353 (1963), the Court held that the Equal Protec0

tion Claus!:' requires States that allow appellate review of criminal convictions to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts and appellate
counsrl. These ca::lei:' arr grounded in the criminal justice system, a. governmrntal monopoly in which participation is compelled. Cf. n. 4, supra.
Our subsequent decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying
Qri!Jin and. Douqlas do not extend. to legislative classifications generally,

I /
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whether the regulation "impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution." The
District Court read our decisions in Roe v. Wade, supra, and
the subsequent cases applying it, as establishing a fundamental
right to abortion and therefore concluded that nothing less
than a compelling state interest would justify Connecticut's
different treatment of abortion and childbirth. We think the
District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the
fundamental right recognized in Roe.

B
At issue in Roe was the constitutionality of a Texas law
making it a crime to procure or attempt to procure an abortion, except on medical advice for the purpose of saving ·the
life of the mother. Drawing on a group of disparate cases
restricting governmental intrusion, physical coercion, and
criminal prohibition of certain activities, we concluded that
the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
affords constitutional protection against state interference
with certain aspects of an individual's personal "privacy,"
including a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy/
410 U. S., at 153. .
The Texas statute imposed severe criminal sanctions on
the physicians and other medical personnel who performed
abortions, thus drastically limiting the availability and safety
of the desired service. As ·Ma. ;JusTICE STEWART observed,
"it is difficult to imagine a more complete abridgement of -a
constitutional freedom ...." Id., at 170 (STEWART, J., concurring) . We held ·that only a compelling state interest would
justify such a sweeping restriction on a constitutionally pro:7 A woman has at least an equal right to choose to carry her fetus tO'
term as to choose to abort it. Indeed, the right of procreation without
state interference has long been recognized as "one of the basic civil rights
of man ... fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."'
Ski'IW£r 'V~ Oldflboma, 316. U. S... 53.5~ S41 (1942}.

75-144D-OPINION

8

MAHER v. ROE

tected interest, and we found no such state interest during
the first trimester. Even when judged against this demanding standard, however, the State's dual interests in the health
of the pregnant woman and the potential life of the fetus were
deemed sufficient to justify substantial regulation of abortions in the second a.nd third trimesters. "These interests
are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as
t he woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy,
each becomes 'compelling.'" !d., at 162-163. In the second
trimester, the State's interest in the health of the pregnant
woman justifies state regulation reasonably related to that
concern. !d., at 163. At viability, usually in the third trimester, the State's interest in the potential life of the fetus
Justifies prohibition with criminal penalties, except where the
life or health of the mother is threatened. !d., at 164.
The Texas law in Roe was a stark example of impermissible
i11terference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate
l1er pregnancy. In subsequent cases, we have invalidated
other types of restrictions, different in form but similar in
effect, on the woman's freedom of choice. Thus, in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52,
70 n. 11 ( 1976), we held that Missouri's requirement of spousal
consent was unconstitutional because it "granted [the husband] the right to prevent unilaterally, and for whatever
reason, the effectuation of his wife's and her physician's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Missouri had interposed
fill "absolute obstacle to a woman's decision that Roe held
to be constitutionally protected from such interference."
(Emphasis added.) Although a state-created obstacle need
not be absolute to be impermissible, see Doe v. Bolton, supra,
we have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion "is
not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek
an abortion." Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976).
We recognized in Bellotti that "not all distinction between
~bortion and other procedures is forbidden" and that "[tlhe

{ .'
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constitutionality of such distinction will depend upon its
degree and the justification for it." /d., at 149-150. We
therefore declined to rule on the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute regulating a minor's access to an abortion
until the state courts had had an opportunity to determine
whether the statute authorized a parental veto over the
minor's decision or the less burdensome requirement of
parental consultation.
These cases recognize a constitutionally protected interest
1
'in making certain kinds of important decisions" free from
governmental compulsion. Whalen v. Roe, U. S. - - , and nn. 24 and 26 (1977). As Whalen makes clear, the
right in Roe v. Wade can be understood only by considering
both the woman's interest and the nature of the State's interference with it. Roe did not declare an unqualified "constitu·
tional right to an abortion," as the District Court seemed to
think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly
burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the
authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the
allocation of public funds.
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind
from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman,s path to an abortion.
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund
childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private
funds for the service she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there.
The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is
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neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut
regula.tion. We conclude that the Connecticut regulation does
not impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe. 8

c
Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement
8 Appellees rely on Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969), and
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974). In
t hose cases durational residence requirements for the receipt of public
benefits were found to be unconstitutional because they "penalized" the
exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstate.
Appellees' reliance on the penalty analysis of Shapiro and Maricopa
County is misplaced. In our view there is only a semantic difference
between appellees' assertion that the Connecticut law unduly interferes with a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and their asasertion that it penalizes the exercise of that right. Penalties are most
familiar to the criminal law, where criminal sanctions are imposed as a
consequence of proscribed conduct. Shapiro and Maricopa County recognized that denial of welfare to one who had recently exercised the right to
travel across state lines was sufficiently analogous to a criminal fine to
justify strict judicial scrutiny.
If Connecticut denied general welfare benefits to all women who had
obtained abortions and who were otherwise entitled to the benefits, we
would have a close analogy to the facts in Shapiro, and strict scrutiny
might be appropria.t e under either the ·penalty analysis or the analysis we
have applied in our previous abortion decisions. :But the claim here is
t hat the Smte "penalizes" the woman's decision to have an abortion by
refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing w pay
the bus fares of the indigent travelers. We find no support in the right
w travel cases for the view that Connecticut must show a compelling interest for its decision not to fund elective abortions.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), similarly is inapplicable here.
I n addition, that case was decided in the significantly different context of
a constitutionally imposed "governmental obligation of neutrality" originating in the Establishment and FreeQ..om of ]leli~ion Gla~J_Se§ o{ the Firlit
A,mEmdmen ~, [q,1 at 409,
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of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. 9
Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
This distinction is implicit in two cases cited in Roe in support of the pregnant woman's right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923),
involved a Nebraska law making it criminal to teach
foreign languages to children who had not passed the
eighth grade. !d., at 396-397. Nebraska's imposition of
a criminal sanction on the providers of desired services
makes Meyer closely analogous to Roe. In sustaining the
constitutional challenge brought by a teacher convicted under
the law, the Court held that the teacher's "right thus to
teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct
11 ln Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), we drew this distinction in
sustaining the public financing of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971. The Act provided public funds to some candidates but not to
others. We rejected an asserted analogy to cases such as American Party
of Texas v. White, 415 U. S. 767 (1974), which involved restrictions on
access to the electoral process:
"These cases, however, dealt primarily with state laws requiring a
candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear
on the ballot. These were, of course, direct burdens not only on the
candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice
preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues.
In contrast, the denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
is not restrictive of voters' right and less restrictive of candidates'.
Subtitle H does not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or
any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice; the inability,
if any, of minority party candidates to wage effective campaigns will
derive not from lack of public funding but from their inability to raise
private contributions. Any disadvantages suffered by operation of the
eligibility formulae under Subtitle H is thus limited to the claimed denial
of the enhancement of opportunity to communicate with the electorate
that the formulae afford eligible candidates." I d.: at 94-95 (emphasii
dded) (footnote omitted) .
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their children" were "within the liberty of the Amendment."
ld., at 400. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925), the Court relied on Meyer to invalidate an Oregon
criminal law requiring the parent or guardian of a child to
send him to a public school, thus precluding the choice of a
private school. Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty "excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only," the Court held that the law "unreasonably interfere[ d) with the liberty of parents and guard'ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
'their control." ld., at 534-535.
Both cases inva]idated ·substantial restrictions on constitutionally protected liberty interests: in Meyer, the parent's
right to have his child taught a particular foreign ·language;
in Pierce, 'the parent's right to choose private rather than
public school education. 'But neither case denied to a State
'the policy choice of encouraging the preferred course of action.
lndeed, in 'Meyer the Court was careful to state that the
power of the State "to prescribe a curriculum" in its free
·public schools that included English and excluded German "is
~ot questioned." 262 U. S., at 402. Similarly, Pierce casts
no shadow over a State's power to favor public education
by funding it-a policy choice pursued in some States for
more than a century. See Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U. S. 483, 489 n. 4 (1954). Indeed, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 462 ( 1973), we explicitly rejected the
argument that Pierce established a "right of private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,"
noting that " [ i] t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to
say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection ,
receive state aid." Yet, were we to accept appellees' argument, an indigent parent could challenge the state policy of
favoring public rather than private schools, or of preferring

f
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instruction in English rather than German, on grounds identi~
cal in principle to those advanced here. We think it abundantly
clear that a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth any more than
a State must so justify its election to fund public but not
private education.

D
The question remains whether Connecticut's regulation
can be sustained under the less demanding test of rationality
that applies in the absence of a suspect classification or the
impingement of a fundamental right. This test requires that
the distinction drawn between childbirth and nontherapeutic
abortion by the regulation be "rationally related" to a "constitutionally permissible" purpose. Lindsey v. Norrnet, 405
U. S. 56, 74 (1972). We hold that the Connecticut funding
scheme satisfies this standard.
Roe itself explicitly acknowledged the State's strong interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. That interest
exists throughout the pregnancy, "grow[ing] in substantiality
as the woman approaches term." Roe, supra, at 162-163. Because the pregnant woman carries a potential human being,
she "cannot be isolated in her privacy . . . . [Her] privacy
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must
be measured accordingly." !d., at 159. The State unquestionably has a strong and legitimate interest in encouraging
normal childbirth, an interest honored over the centuries. 1 0'
Nor can there be any question that the Connecticut regulation rationally furthers that interest. The medical costs associated with childbirth are substantial, and have increased
significantly in recent years. As recognized by the District
10 I n addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State may
have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of population growth.
Sueh concerns are basic to t he future of the State and in some circumstances could constit ute a substantial reason for departure from a position
qf 1..\CtJ.tJ:alti.y betwew abort ion. and. chikibirth.
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Court in this case, such costs are significantly greater than
those normally associated with elective abortions during the
first trimester. The subsidizing of costs incident to childbirth is a rational means of encouraging childbirth.
We certaiuly are not unsympathetic to the plight of an J
indigent woman who desires an abortion , but "the Constitution
·does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill," Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 74 (1972). Our
eases uniformly have accorded the States a wider latitude in
choosing among competing demands for limited public funds. 11
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), despite recognition that laws and regulations allocating welfare funds involve "the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings," we held that classifications survive equal protection
challenge when a "reasonable basis" for the classification is
shown. As the preceding discussion makes clear, the state
interest in encouraging normal childbirth exceeds this minimal level.
The decision whether to expend state funds for nontherapeutic abortion is fraught with judgments of policy and value
over which opinions are sharply divided. Our conclusion that
the Connecticut regulation is constitutional is not based on a
weighiPg of its wisdom or social desirability, for this Court
docs net strike down state laws "because they may be unwise,
impro\ [dent, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488
( 1955). CJ UOted in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, at 484. Indeed , ·,. 'wn an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as
those i 11)licated by public funding of nontherapeutic abortions, f,' appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature. We should not forget that "legislaSeC' grnerally Wilkinson, The SupremE> Court, The Equal Protection
ClausC', and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev~
·q4{1\ 998-1017 (197&).
11
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tures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of
the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." Missouri,
Kansas and Texas R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267-270 (1904)
(Holmes, J.) .
In conclusion, we emphasize that our decision today does not
proscribe government funding of nontherapeutic abortions. It
is open to Congress to require provision of medicaid benefits
for such abortions as a condition of state participation in the
medicaid program. Also, under present federal law, Conhecticut is free-through normal democratic processes-to
decide that such benefits should be provided. Beal v. Doe,
ante, at - . We hold only that the Constitution does not
require a judicially imposed resolution of these difficult issues.

IV
The District Court also invalidated Connecticut's requirements of prior written request by the pregnant woman and
prior authorization by the Department of Social Services.
Our analysis above rejects the basic premise that prompted
invalidation of these procedural requirements. It is not unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of
medicfl.l necessity to insure that its money is being spent only
for authorized purposes. The simple answer to the argument
that similar requirements are not imposed for other medical
procedures is that such procedures do not involve the termination of a potential human life. In Planned Parenthood of'
Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, we held that the woman's
written consent to an abortion was not an impermissible burden under Roe. We think that decision is controlling on the
similar issue here.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with thia
opiniqn,
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MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, concurring in the judgment.
I do not read any decision of this Court as requiring a State
to finance a nontherapeutic abortion. The Court's holding'S
in Roe and Doe, supra, simply require that a State not create
an absolute barrier to a woman's decision to have an abortion.
These precedents do 11ot require tha.t the State assist her in
procuring it.
From time to time, every state legislature determines that,
as a matter of sound public policy, the government ought to
provide certain health and social services to its citizens.
Encouragement of childbirth and child care is not a novel
undertaking in this regard. Various governments, both in this
country and in others, have made such a determination for
centuries. In recent times. they have similarly provided educational services. The decision to provide any one of these
services-or not to provide them-is not required by the
Federal Constitution. Nor does the providing of a particular
service' require. as a matter of federal constitutional law, the
provision of another.
Here. the State of Connecticut has determined that it will
finance certain childbirth expenses. That legislative determination places no state-created barrier to a woman's choice
to procure an abortion, and it does not require the State tQI
provide it. Accordingly, I co11cur in the judgment.
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dissenting.

/2-~ District Court held:
~
"When Connecticut refuses to fund elective abortions
while funding therapeutic abortions and prenatal and
postnatal care, it weights the choice of the pregnant
mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally
protected right to an elective abortion. . . . Her choice
is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the
abortion, but by the availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses not to have the abortion. When the
state thus infringes upon a fundamental interest, it must
assert a compelling state interest." 408 F. Supp. 660,
663-664 (1975) .

This Court reverses on the ground that "the District Court
misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right
recognized in Roe [ v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 ( 1973) ]," ante, at 7,
and therefore that Connecticut was not required to meet the
"compelling interest" test to justify its discrimination against
elective abortion but only "the less demanding test of rationality that applies in the absence of ... the infringement of a
fundamental right," ante, at 13. This holding, the Court
insists, "places no obstacles--absolute or otherwise-in the
pregnant woman's path to an abortion"; she is still at liberty
tn finance the abortion from "private funds." Ante, at 9.
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True, "the state may [by funding childbirth] have made
. childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing
the woman's decision , but it has i_mposed no restriction on
access to abortions that was not already there." Ibid. True,
also, indigency "may make it more difficult-and in some
cases, perhaps impossible-for some women to have ·abortions," but that regrettable consequence "is neither created
nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation."
Ante, at p - ........_ _ _ _ _ __
But a ·stressing insensitivity o the plight of im overished
=~
t e ourt;s ~nalzyis. · T e
pregnant ~men
·stark reahty for too many, not JUSt (tsome," md1gent pregnant
women is that indigency makes access to competent licensed
physicians not merely "difficult" but "impossible." As a
practical matter, many indigent women will feel they have
no choice but to carry their pregnancies to term because the
State will pay for the associated medical services, even though
they would have chosen to have abortions if the State had
also provided funds for that procedure, or indeed if the State had provided funds for neither procedure. ' This disparity
ln funding by the State clearly operates to coerce indigent
pregnant women to bear children they would not otherwise
choose to have, and just as clearly, this coercion can only
operate upon the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this
form of financial pressure. Accordingly, Mr. Justice Frankurter's words are apt :
"To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably
resulting from a monel hurdle erected by the State, would
j ustify a latter-day Anatole France to add one more item
to his ironic comments on the 'majestic equality' of the
law. 'The law. in its majestic equality, forbids the rich
as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal bread' . . . ." Griffin v. Illinois, 35t
U. S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

ee .
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elusion signals no retreat from Roe [v. Wade] or the cases
p,pplying it," ante, at 10. That statement must occasion great·
surprise among the Courts of Appeals and District Courts
that, relying upon Roe and Doe v. Bolton,Jhave held that
States are constitutionally required to fund efective abortions
if they fund pregnancies carried to term. See Doe v. Rose,
499 F. 2d 1112 (CAlO 1974); Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F. 2d
1211 (CAS 1974) rev'd and rem. on other grounds sub nom.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106 (1976); Doe v. Westby,
383 F. Supp. 1143 (SD 1974) rem. in light of Hagans v.
Lavine, sub nom. Westby v. Doe, 420 U. S. 968 (1975), dec.
on rem. 402 F. Supp. 140 (SD 1975); Doe v. Wohlegmuth,
376 F. Supp. 173 (WD Pa. 1973), aff'd on statutory grounds
sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F. 2d 611 (CA3 1975), rev'd U. S. (1977); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (Utah
1973); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp.
496 (EDNY 1972); rem. in light of Wade and Bolton, 412
U. S. 924 (19·73), dec. on rem., 409 F. Supp. 731 (EDNY
1976). Indeed,
cannot be amsa1 that today's decision
seriously erodes the prmCip e
oe v. Wade and its progeny announced to guide the determination of what constitutes an unconstitutional infringement of the fundamental 1
right of pregnant women to be free to decide whether to have (
an abortion.
The Court's premise is that only an equal protection claim is
presented here. Claims of interference with enjoyment of
fundamental rights have, however, occupied a rather protean
position in our constitutional jurisprudence. Whether or not
the Court's analysis may reasonably proceed under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court plainly errs in ignoring, as it
does, the unanswerable argument of appelle~~hat tl'ie regulation unconstitutionally impinges upon her c rum of Qnvacy
derived from the Due ProCe'Ss Clause.
Roe v. 1ifade and cases fo11o;ing it hold that an area of
privacy invulnerable to the State's intrusion surrounds the

4-111 () ·S. I "7f
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decision of a pregnant woman whether or not to carry her
pregnancy to term. The Connecticut scheme clearly infringes
upon that area of privacy by bringing financial pressures on
indigent women that force tEem to hear children they-;,ould
not otherwise have. That is an obvious impairment of the
fundamental right established by Roe. Yet the Court concludes that "the Connecticut regulation does not impinge
upon [that] fundamental right." Ante, at 10. · This conclusion is based on a perceived distinction, on the one hand, between the imposition of criminal penalties for the procurement of an abortion present in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton
and the absolute prohibition present in Planned Parenthood,
and, on the other, the assertedly lesser inhibition imposed by
the Connecticut scheme. Ante, at 8-10.
The last time our Brother PowELL espoused the concept that "there is a basic difference between direct State
interference with a protected activity and State encouragement of an alternative activity concurrent with legislative.
policy," ante, at 10-11, the Court refused to adopt it.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U. S. 106, 122 (1976). This
was made explicit in Part II of our Brother BLACKMUN's
opinion for four of us and is implicit in our Brother STEVENS'
essential agreement with the analysis of Part II-B. ld., at
121-122 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part). Part·II-B stated,
"MR. JusTICE PowELL would so limit Doe and the other
cases cited, explaining them as cases in which the State
'directly interfered with the abortion decision' and
'directly interdicted the normal functioning of the
physician-patient relationship by criminalizing certain
procedures' [428 U. S.], at 128. · There is no support in
the language of the cited cases for this distinction ....
Moreover, a 'direct interference' or 'interdiction' test does
not appear to be supported by precedent . . . . For a
doctor who cannot afford to work for nothing, and a
woman who cttnnot afford to pay him, the state's refusal
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to fund an abortion is as effective an 'interdiction' of it
as would ever be necessary. Furthermore, since the
right ... is not simply the right to have abortions nondiscriminatorily funded, the denial of such funding is as
complete an 'interdiction' of the exercise of the right as
could ever exist." !d., at 118 n. 7.
Cases involving other fundamental rights also make clear
that the Court's concept of what constitutes an impermissible
infringement upon the fundamental right of a pregnant
woman to choose to have an abortion makes new law. We
have repeatedly found that infringements of fundamental
rights are not limited to outright denials of those rights.
First Amendment decisions have consistently held in a wide
variety of contexts that the compelling state interest test is
applicable not only to outright denials but also to restraints
that make exercise of those rights more difficult. See, e. (!.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of
religion), NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963) (freedom
of expression and association), Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro,- U. S . - (1977) (freedom of expression) . The compelling state interest test has been applied
in voting cases, even where only relatively small infringements
upon voting power, such as dilution of voting strength caused
by malapportionment, have been involved. See, e. g., Reyr~r
olds v. Sims, supra, 562, 566 (1964), Chapman v. Meier, 420
U. S. 1 (1975), Connor v. Finch,- U.S.- (197!)"':"" Similarly , cases involving the right to travel have consistently held
that statutes penalizing the fundamental right to travel must
pass muster under the compelling state interest test, irrespective of whether the statutes act.ually deter travel. Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-258 (1974),
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-341 (1972), Shapiro v.
Thompson, supra. And indigents asserting a fundamental
right of access to the courts have been excused payment of
entry costs without being required first to show that their in-

I':
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digency was an absolute bar to access. Griffin v. Illinois,
supra, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). Thus the fact that the
Connecticut scheme may not operate as an absolute bar preventing all indigent women from having abortions is not crit.
ical; what is critical is that the State has inhibited their
fundamental right to make that choice... free from state
interference.
The Connecticut scheme cannot be distinguished from other
withholdings of financial benefits that we have held un~
constitutionally burdened a fundamental right by making the
e:xercise of that right unattractive. Sherbert v. Verner, supra,
struck down a South Carolina statute denying unemployment
compensa.tion to a woman who for religious reasons could not
work on Saturday. Even though there was no proof of indigency in that case, Sherbert held that "the pressure upon her
to forgo [her religious] practice [was] unmistakable," 374
U. S., at 414, and therefore held the effect was the same as a
fine imposed for Saturday worship. Here, though the burden
is upon the right to privacy derived from the Due Process
Clause ana not upon freedom of religion under the Free
~ise Clause of the First Amendment, the governing principle is the same, for Connecticut grants and withholds
financial benefits in a manner that discourages significantly
the e:xercise of a fundamental constitutional right. Indeed,
the case for applica.tion of the principle actually is stronger
than in Verner since appellees are all indigents and therefore
even more vulnerable to the financial pressures imposed by
the Connecticut regulations.
Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 ( 1976), held, and the
Court today agrees, ante, at 8, that a state requirement is
unconstitutional if it "unduly burdens the right to seek an
abortion." Connecticut has "unduly" burdened the fundamental right of pregnant women to be free to choose to have
an abortion because the State has advanced no compelling
r-;tat~" mterest to justify its interference in that choice.
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Although Connecticut does not argue it as justification, the
Court concludes that the State's interest "in protecting the
potential life of the fetus" suffices, ante, at 13. * Since only the
first trimester of pregnancy is involved in this case, that j"usti·
fication is totally foreclosed if the Court is not overruling
the holding of Roe v. Wade that "[w]ith respect to the State's
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 'com·
peUing' point is at ~i*slit~." occurring at about the end of the
10 U. S., at 163. The State also argues a
second trimester.
further justification not relied upon by the majority, namely,
that it needs "to control the amount of its limited public funds
which will be allocated to its public welfare budget." Brief,
p, 23. The District Court correctly held, however, that the
asserted interest was "wholly chimerical" because the "state's
assertion that it saves money when it declines to pay the cost
of a welfare mother's abortion is simply contrary to indisputed
facts." 408 F . Supp., at 664.
Finally, the reasons that render the Connecticut regulation
unconstitutional also render invalid in my view the requirement of a prior written certification by the woman's attending
physician that the abortion is "medically necessary,'' and the
requirement that the hospital submit a Request for Authoriza.tion of Professional Services including a "statement indicating the medical need for the abortion." Appellees Brief,
p. 203. For the same reasons, I would also strike down the
requirement for prior authorization of payment by the
Connecticut Department of Social Services.

*The Court also suggests, ante, at 13 n. 10, that. a "£tate may have legitimate demographic c o n ce rn~ about the rate of population growth" which
might ju~ tify a choice to favo r live births over abortions. While it is
conctwabiP that under some circumstances this might be an appropriate
factor to be considrred as part of a State's "compelling" interest, no one
contends that this is the case here, or indeed that Connecticut has any
drmo~raplue eoncern~;> at all about the rate of its population growth,
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No. 75-1440 Maher v. Roe
No. 75-442 Poelker v. Doe
The Statutory Question: Beal
whether
The question is/Title XIX, which provides medical
assistance to needy families and individuals whose incomes
are insufficient to meet the costs of ·"necessary medical
services", requin- s participating states to fund elective,
non-therapeutic abortions.

The best arguments for reading

such a requirement into Title XIX are in Judge VanDusen's
opinion (Beal Appendix at 143a-152a); the best arguments on
the other side are in Petioners' Brief (7-22) and Reply Brief

-------

(4-5 & n. 8) and in the SG's Memo (4-9).

to decisions in CAs 2, 6, and 10 and to the positiDn of HEW,
read the statute so as to avoid
Constitutional problems.

CA 3 said that Title XIX gives the

states broad discretion in defining the conditions requir i ng
treatment, but mandates that the states leave the manner of
treatment to the judgment of physicians, except where the policies
of Title XIX support regulating the physidan's judgment.

-

found no justification for restriction of the physician's

--

---------

--CA 3

judgment
of when abortion is medically indicated, either in
--------~~-------------------------------~

economy or in concern for the mother's health, and found such
a restriction contrary to the congressional purpose of equal

provision of services.

CA 3 concluded that Title XIX

requires the states to finance non-therapeutic abortions,
because "the decisions of the Supreme Court have forced the
States to include elective abortions in the legal practice
of medicine through the second trimester of pregnancy . • • • "
App. lSOa.
The SG differs from this

analys~s

only on one

~

point:

he says that a non-therapeutic abortion is not a
----~------~-----------------------"medically indicated" ab9rtion xxJixxk:aX by definixtion; therefore

\
when Pennsylvania limits abortions to those which are therapeutic
it has left the judgment to the physician just as Title

fT'

? ~

XIX requires.

In the SG's view, CA 3 erred in holding

)~ on the basis of Roe -~~~ "medically nece ssary."

~~D),~
vrn,p ~'

that an elective abortion is invariably

The Petitioners go somewhat beyond the SG: they argue

-

-

·:.,~~· t~at ~ngre~s not only intended to permit states to decline
1 r~

~

-~ ~~

to finance anything non-therapeutic in general, but also intended
to permit states to exclude abortions as socially undesirable.

~/ They
~A

point to

~urJndicaf22'?-~ that

Congress

_dis!~pro-:.e.s

of

elective abortions: (1) when title XIX was enacted, abortion

was prohibited in a majority of states; (2) when Congress
in 1970
passed the Family Planning Services Act/, it excluded abortion
as a means of family planning; (3)

when Congress established

the Legal Serviced Corporation, Congress similarly excluded
funds for legal assistance for those seeking elective abortions;
~-·-

----

3.

a d (&) cost recently, Congress has excluded the use of
·~~~-

~
Aftftpftftri

t

for non-therapeutic abortions
t of

1976:

•. •one of the funds contained in this Act
shall be used to perform abortions except
,.'hen the life of the mother '\YOuld be
endangered if the fetus,ere carried to term."
(See Petitioners' Reply Brief at 5 n.8 for an explanation of
why this 1-year appropriations IBstriction does not moot the
issues in Beal -- I think this is worth a question at argument.
My view is thE there is no support for CA 3's
result, apart from a concern for constitutional problems.
'----="-"'

Nothing in the statute or its history suggests that Congress
,.
intended to force states to fund a procedure that both
or many
Congress and most/of the states found and XER continue to find
morally objectionable.

Given that the Court has to reach

the constitutional question anyway in Poelker, I see nothing
to be gained from straining to uphold CA 3.

The Constitutional Questfun: Maher and Poelker

~I

The question is whether it violates Equal Protection
~

for a state to fund childb4rth but not elective abortions.
The best arguments for finding a violation are in the DC
-----~

opinion in Beal (Bei Appendix at 9la-10Sa) and in the Pool
Memo in Poelker.
are in Justice

The best arguments against finding a violation

White~

dissent in Poelker, Judge WkiXexxx

I ~~a, - 114- Q;

Weis~s

dissent in the DC in Beal (Beal Appendix at 9le>l65a), and in

'(.

the SG's Memo in Beal (9-10).
Under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a woman
has a "fundamental" interest in deciding for herself, with
a physician's concurrence, whether or not to have an abortion.

~

Whrre the state has legitimate interests in protecting the

~~~

health of the mother and the potential life of the fetus,

~-~

M~~

these interests do not: become "comp.elling" until after th~/?1~ -first trimester.

Therefore, a state is absolutely

·w-I . fl.
forbidden~~-

#f~

~
~

by the Due Process Clause from prohibiting abortion in the
first trimester.

In this case the same fundamental interest in autonomy
is invoked against a refusal to fund elective abortions.iRxx
xkexfixxx

On the other side, the same state interest in

protecting the potential human life is at stake.

(Other

state interests, such as those in economizing and protecting
health, are discussed in the briefs but seem to me largely
irrelevant because of the undisputable facts that (1) abortion
costs less than childberth and (2) abortion is less risky in
the first trimester than childberth at term.)

The crucial

\

my view is whether the autonomy right is so
the refusal to fund the choice to abort while
<::-.--

funding the choice not to abort as to require invocation of
------------~--------

the compelling interest test.

That test will, as Roe demonstrates,

defeat the state's intaest in protecting the life of the fetus;
any lesser test probably will not.

--- - - - --

Roe involved an absolute bar to the exercise of
'

free choice by the pregnant woman.

This case involves a

significant burden on the exercise of free choice.

Here

the statute is concerned only with indigent women, who, by
definition, are unable to purchase medical services in the
private market.

The refuaal of the state to pay for

the abortions of these women means that in a significant
number of cases they will be unable to exercise the right
of free choice and will have to forego a desired abortion.
becau~

The situation is not, however, as desp§rate as in Roe,
fsx in many other cases private resources will be made
available, as for example through charitable
like Planned Parenthood.

~

organizations~

The crucial question in this case

is whether the precise burden that is involved here is sufficient

as the absolute bar involved in Roe.
on an inquiry into four

The answer must depend

considerations~~fh~~atu~~· ~f ~~~~t

es;:~h~~-::~-::-Rr-::::=-macy -: t~e
J1

state's interest

(uiJ

in promoting the potential life in the womb, the degree of
'\

interference with the right that is involved,

(IV)
and~the

claim

of the group affected to special judicial solicitude.
1. The Nature of the Right

Because the right .eo , "'

~~

~t

o/~Jv

~.

~

is essentially a rlght to privacy, one might expect it to be
or intrusion
subject to reasonable regulation/in the same manner as oth~
such rights, as for example the right not to be arrested
or the right to live together as a family.
of Roe, as well as the result,
It

i~dicate __t~~~-

But the language
the right to

\'

an abortion is more absolute than the rights from which
it evolved.

7

It is "fundamental," subject to deprivation - Cat

least) only on the basis of "compelling" interests.

The

extent 'to which the Court adheres to this preferred position
for abortion will contribute to the result in this case,
but not necessarily control it.
2. The State's Interest

In my view the only

state interest worthy of discussion in this case is the
interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.
Roe held that before the third trimester this

intere~

is not

compelling enough to outweigh the fundamental right to an

4-x.

abortion.

But~

_.

--

did not deny, as some of the opinions

in these cases suggest, that the interest is legitimate
or that it is well served by limiting abortions.

Gunther

------~------~

suggests that the difficulty in defining when life begins,
acknowlegged by the Court in Roe, militates in favor of
deference to the state legislatures.

The Court took the

opposite view, determining on the basis of medical evidence
that life begins only at viability . and rej ecting state "theories"
to the contrary.

Nonetheless, it recognized tmt: the

state has a legitimate interest in
life."

promoting "potential

Again, how close the Court considers the balance

1.
to be between that interest and the mother's r i ght of
free choice will affect the result here.

If the balance

was close in Roe, the different kind of interference with
the result that is involved here may be enough to tip the
scales.
3.

The Degree of Intrusion

The Courts below

relied on the "penalty" analysis .of cases like €Lap i rJ) v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, and Memorial Hospital v. ~~ico~
County, 415 U.S. 250.

Both cases involve residence requirements

for receipt of governmental benefits, and in both cases the
Court held that denial of benifits to those who have recently
moved into the community penalizes the fundamental right to
travel and cannot be sustained absent compelling state
interests.

The analogy is a fair one, since the Court has

referred to the right to travel in terrris reminiscent of Roe
as an "unconditional rigkx personal right, a right whose
exercise EXHHRX
405

u.s.

below

rna:§~

not be conditioned."

330, 339-40.

Dunn v. Blumstein,

And the cases do support the result

XHXXXHXHXEXXHX~xx±REH

here, since they hold that any

penalization of the right can be justified only by a compelling
But I don't think the r ight to travel cases

state interest.
can aarry the day.
:ior

OI:Hil

thing- the "penalty" analysis of these
::::

cases . was ,largely abandoned by the Court in Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, where the Court upheld a one-year residency
requirement for divorce despite the burden on both the
right to travel and the right of access to the courts, see
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371.

Justice Rehnouist read

the earlier cases as involving only budgetary or recordkeeping

justifications.

As Justice Marshall pointed xke out, the

opinion manifests a "distaste for the mode of analysis we
have applied to this corner of equal protection law. In
its stead, the Court has employed what appears to be an
as hoc balancing test . .

"

Id. at 419.

I have already discussed the possiblity that
many indigent women will be unable to obtain abortions
as a result of the restriction tbt ls involved in this
case.

Against this are two competing considerations that
......_____

may diminish the extent of the burden on the right.

First,

as the SG points out, the Court in Roe and Doe recognized
the need for inteeposition of medical judgment, and the
requirement of "therapeutic" reasons for an abortion may
be read as consistent with that recognition.

The SG would

define "therapeutic" to include psychological and long-term
considerations that one would normally associate with "elective"
abortions.

This approach may

kxe~

help a to shift the

balance towards the state in Maher, but it may not be a
feasible approach in Poelker (disuussed below).

·,

Second,

1.

Evansville Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707
(because an airport user charge

~'aids

rather than hinders

the right to travel" it is not "a burden in the constitut:io nal
sense")
4. The Class Affected:

To me this consideration

provides the strongest impetus towards extending Roe in this
case.

To recognize a right to abortions but to eeny it

in many cases to indigent women seems anomolous.
/(

.

The

pol1cy considerations that justify the exercise of judicial
power, despite questionable support in the constitutional

-

text, structmua and history in Roe apply a fortiori in this
case.

The only trouble is that this consideration, as Jay

has pointed out in his Three Faces of Equality, is the least
legitimate as a basis for judicial invalidation of legislation.
-----~

-------------

Additional Problems in Poelker
Poelker raises four additional problems that
are not involved in Maher:
1. Mootness

The plaintiff in Poelker

was

pregnant when she filed her complaint in the DC, but had
a private abortion five days later, before any action by the
DC.

The DC said that the claim "became moot and should

be dismissed for lack of standing."· . CA 8 reversed.
The problem is not one of standing.

At the time

she filed the complaint, the plaintiff was pregnant, had been
injured in fact by the municipal policy of which she was
complaining, and was seeking relief that was both necessary
and sufficient to remedy the injury.

The right she was

asserting was her own right to an abortion under the Due Process
Clause.

Standing is a threshold determination made on the

face of tre complaint.

The plaintiff in this case satisfies

the requirements of standing under any test.
~------~

---~--~~~--------~

The question is whether her claim became moot
when she had her abortion, or whether the case is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review."

In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113, 124-25, the Court found that that case was not moot
despite

RR~xixEk

the lack of any evidence

tha~he

was still pregnant at the time of the DC hearing.

plaintiff
But the

Court did note that the plaintiff was pregnant on the day
before the hearing in the DC.

Petitioners argue from this

that Roe's mootness holding is distinguishable.
I see no basis for distinction.

Even if one can

infer that in Roe the case was still live during the DC
hearing, the crucial fact is that it was no longer live

T(
on review.

Article III applies equally to appellate and

trial tribunals, and there is no basis in the decisions
for concluding that a case must survive trial before the
"capable of repetition, etc" analysis comes into play.
This is implicit in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.l1,
where you found a prisoner's complaint about pretrial
detention without probable cause to be within the "capable
of repetition" exception despite t?e absence of any evidence
that the plaintiffs were still in custody when the DC
first acted on their complaints.
In this case the complaint focuses on the right
to an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy.

The

period between discovery of pregnancy and the end of the
and
trimester will ordinarily be brief, / for reasons made clear
in Roe, an expeditious decision is important . regardless of
how soon the discovery is made.

Women in the plaintiff's

position cannot wait for trial in the DC, or even for class
certification in most cases.

The case provides "a classic

justification for a conclusion of nonmootness."
at

125~

Roe, 410 U.S.

The burden on the right to an abortion, of which

the plaintiff complained, is in its application to an individual
"too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
e~tpiration

. ."

Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147. *

* Petitioners do not contend that the problem is
not "capable of repetition".
Roe found this element satisfied
H«X because "[p]regnancy often comes more than once to the
same woman • • • • " 410 U.S. at 125.
While there is no
"demonstrated probability" of recurrence of unwanted pregnancies
under Weinstein's more recent formulation, I think Roe must
control on this point as w~ll.

IZ.

2. Attorneys' Fees:

Justice White's p.c., which

you joined last year, fully and correctly addre,sses this
issue.

3. State Action and Private Scruples
two kinds of state action which it held

CA 8 identified

unsonstitutiona~

city policy limiting the conditions under which abortions
could be performed in city hospitals,

.

and~ity

policy by

which the ob-gyn clinic at one of the two hospitals was
staffed by Jesuits who opposed abortion.

The court

directed the DC to order the city (1) to change its antiabo r tion hospital policy so as to make abortions available
on an equal basis with- -other pregnancy care; and (2) "to

~tain the services of responsible physicians and other
necessary
do not

personnel whose personal views on abortion

prohibit them from providing an abortion."

op. at 10).

-

The reliance oq and ordered remedy for, the

"staffing policy" raises two problems.

---

(Xeroxed

The first problem is the petitioners' argument

that the

injury suffered by this plaintiff in

failing to get a free abortion from the city was not the
result of city action at all, but the result of private scruples.
The answer is that the evidence clearly shows that but for
the city policy abortions would have been available in at
least one of the hospitals to which plaintiff went for
help.
that

The city's hospital director, a defendant, testified
'~ad

it not been for the policy promulgated by the mayor

he would have proceeded to implement the providing of abortions
at the city's public hospitals".

(Op at 6).

The staffing

of the hospitals by doctors opposing abortion was not
a fact found by the DC and was only an additional problem
found by CA 8, which affirme d the DC's finding of a
city anti-abortion policy unrelated to staffing.

~--

~
../f;vr
r"""

is no question that the anti-abortion policy
apart from any employment policy

--

There
quite

"caused" the injury of

which plaintiff complains.
But that leaves the question of what
to do with CA 8's finding of an unconstitutional staffing
policy that would have to be remedied by some sort of
I'

•
• '\
a ff"lrmatlve
actlon.

I don't think there is anything un-

constitutional about a hospital being staffed by obstetricians

----------------------------------------------

who uniformly oppose abortion, at least in the absense of
evidence that their hiring was the product of discrimination
on the basis of beliefs.

And absent such evidence of

discrimination, the remedy itself raises serious constitutional
problems, since it intrudes on the doctors' First Amendment

-

rights.

Here, there was no evidence on the staffing of one

of the city's two hospitals (Op. at n.S), and as to the other
the evidence was only that it was staffed by faculty and students
it
from a Catholic insuUtion which regarded non-therapeutic abortions
as immoral.

The DC made no findings as to whether the faculty

was made up solely of Catholics ( at least one of the faculty
affiliated doctors was not a Catholic),

what the faculty's

views were on abortion (CA 8 found uniform opposition to

J'f
abortion basea on the testimony of one Jesuit professor),
what arrangement the City had with the University, if any,
w~her ' non-university-affiliated doctors had been hired in

non-obstetric capacities or had applied to the ob-gyn clinic,
etc.

In the absence of such findings, CAS's appellate

finding of a "staffing procedure" motivated by opposition
to abortion is unwarranted.
If the Court holas in Maher that there is no
constitutional right to a state-funded or state-performed
abortion, it will be unnecessary to deal with this staffing
question.

See Justice White's opinion.

If the Court

holds that there is such a right under the Equal Protection
Clause, then I think the appropriate dispostion will be
to redefine the duties of a municipal hospital with respect
to staffing -- discrimination on the basis of attitudes
towards abortion is

unconstitutional~

and remand for findings

on wheeher there is such discrimination in St. Louis.
5. Content of the St. Louis Policy
and theCA diverge on the facts.

Again the DC

The DC found a policy

only against non-therapeutic or elective abortions, relying on
the hospital by-laws and the testimony on one of the doctors
who examined the plaintiff.

This policy is indistinguishable

from the one involved in Maher.

But the CA, finding the

facts de novo . , found a policy "prohibiting the performance
of abortions in the city;owned public hospitals for reasons
other than to sav.e the mother from grave psychological injury

or death."

(Op at 4).

(CA 8 doesn't believe in the

clearly erroneous standard of review!)

By working a

greater restraint on the physician's judgment of medical
necessity, the policy found by the CA works a greater interference
with the right of privacy established in Roe. I'm not sure
would
this difference wiii affect the result, arrlin any event I
would be inclined to state the facts.as found by the DC.
(See Justice White's dissent).

GP/gg
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1.

--

The primary issue in this case is whether the

Constitution bars a State from refusing to reimburse welfare
recipients for abortions absent a prior showing
'-='

-

-

-

~hat

the abortion

L /

is necessary to preserve the physicial or psychiatric health of
(

~

the woman.

2.

2.

Facts and Decisions:

Connecticut Welfare

Department, Public Assistance Program Manual, § 27 5 require s ·,
prior to the performance of a first-trimester abortion for which
welfare assistance is sought, that a certificate be submitted
from the attending physician that the abortion is "recommended
..._
~;*

Appellees
~~1~!----------------~--~n~e~c~e~s~s~~~ry. ·
-!l<k .
brought this § 1983 class action - contending, inter alia,
§

275 is invalid because it denies them equal protection.

The State originally defended its policy on the ground that Title
XIX (Medicaid) of the Federal Social Security Act prohibited
payment for elective abortions.

CA 2 eventually held that

the Social Security Act was IIneutral" as to abortion
¥"'\"'~.,.,~

f\Or forbidding the states

oW> · reimburse.

recipients for the expense of an elective abortion.

h

services,n~\~e~

welfare
The case

was remanded for consideration of the constitutional issues by
the three-judge court in this case, in the event -which occurredthe state chose to continue its policy once reliance on Title
XIX was removed.

*

Section 275 provides in relevant part:

Therapeutic abortion services within the State are
covered under Title XIX when all the following condit ions are met:
1. The abortion is recommended as medically
necessary by the attending physician in an accredited hospital
or licensed clinic . • . •
2. The written consent for the abortion is secured from
the patient . . . .
3. Prior authorization for the abortion is secured from
the Chief of Medical Services, Division of Health Services, Dept. of
Social Services.

. .

** Every plaintiff i n

th~s lawsuit.is a potential medic ai ~
whose pregn~ ncy was terrn~nated dur~ng the first trimest er
of pregnancy and who elected to undergo an abortion for reasons
unrelated to preservation of the mothPr'~ health.

rec~p~ent

3.
it

The three-judge court emphasized that although
the Constitution does not require a state to pay for any
medical services, once a state chooses to establish a pro gram
for reimbursing the medical expenses of the indigent, and a dopts
as part of that program a provision that requires state f unding
for medical expenses arising from pregnancy, a serious equal
protection issue arises if the state refuses to reimburse
expenses incurred in procuring an abortion.

It further noted

that the pregnant woman's choice is not simply affected by
the absence of payment for the abortion but also by the
availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses

(

not to have an abortion.

When the state thus infinges upon a

'-...,..

"fundamental interest", it must assert a compelling state
interest that justifies the incursion.

u.s.

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405

330, 338-42 (1972).
Analyzing the State's asserted financial intere st

in not providing money for elective abortions the court
_..,.

concluded "[t]h'is interest is wholly chimerical because abortion

-{~ is the least expensive response to a pregnancy."

* This case was decided on a pre-trial motion for
summary judgment.

4.

The only other potential ground of objection -morality-- was held
insufficient under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), at least
during the first tri-mester of pregnancy.

state interest in not financing elective abortions, the court
concluded that § 275 flunked

~ the

---

I

Finding no legitimate

"compelling interest" and

the "rational relationship" equal protection tests.
The court also invalidated § 275's prior approval
requirement, noting that the state had asserted no interest in
prior approval other than the fact it required prior authorization
before certain other claims would be honored and that it does
not require prior approval for reimbursement of medical
expenses arising out of childbirth.*

Affidavits had been

submitted by physicians indicating that any delay in procuding
an abortion increases the danger to the pregnant woman.
* ~o state regulation of medicaid payments for
abortions performed in the first trimester of pregnancy can impose
conditions or requirements that are not equally applicable to
medicaid payments for childbirth, if such conditions or requirements tend to discourage a woman from choosing an abortion or to
delay the occurrence of an abortion that she has asked her
physician to perform. Accordingly, those provisions of § 275
that require certification that an abortion is medically
necessary are unconstitutional, and the defendants are hereby
enjoined from enforcing them.'.'

5.

3.

Contentions:

Appellants essential contention is

that since Connecticut has limited all coverage under its
Title XIX Medicaid program to providing payment thereunder for
services which are medically necessary for the patient's health
the limitation here is rational.

The State is not required to

fund the exercise of an indigent's right to an abortion.
~·~·'

See,

Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 193-194 (Weis, J.,
Finally, as to the prior approval requirement,

dissenting).

it is reasonable since all that is necessary in a'critical
situatiorr'is a telephone call from the physician, to be followed
later by the necessary paper work.
Appellees add nothing.

4.

Discussion:

This case represents another variation

of the issues presented in Poelker v. Doe, No. 75-442, Beal v.
Franklin, No. 75-709, etc., all being held for the current
abortion cases.

I

c~s\t is

The issue here is rather cleanly presented

~~d ~

a strong candidate to fill out next Term's potential

troika of abortion cases.
There is a motion to affirm.
May 19, 1976

Palm

Op in Appx. to Jur. St.

~npum.c
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June 26, 1976

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Holds for the Abortion Cases

With the avalanche of paper the print shop has been compelled
to process this last week in cases earmarked for announcernent, the
shop was delayed until this past weekend in getting out the revisions in
Planned Parenthood. I had intended to hold any memorandum on abo rtion holds until there was some indication of the ultimate decision on
the revision. With Bill Brennan's departure now imminent, and even
though the Chief's vote remains outstanding , I feel I should no longer
withl-10ld this memorandum.

TI1ere are five cases concerning the exclusion of " elective"
abortions from the category of medical services provided to indigents.
Four of these, No. 75-554, Beal v. Doe; No. 75-709, Beal v. Franklin;
No. 75-813, Westby v. Doe; and No. 75-1440, Maher v. Doe, concern
denials of Medicaid payment s for elective abortions . So does No. 756721, Doe v. Stewart, whic J a ppears on Summer List 2, Sheet l. In
addition , No. 7 5-442, Poelk £ v. Doe, concerns a city policy agains t
the use of municipal hospitals for elective abortions .
Bea l v. Franklin also has an issue concerning restrictions on
advertising of abortion services; this issue has nothing to do with state
subsidies and is not treated in Planned Parenthood. In addition, Beal
v. Franklin and No. 75-772, Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, and No. 75-713,
Gerstein v. Coe, concern issues resolved in Planned Parenthood.

· -

...

?~~

Doe.~is

~/:f~~'ur~J~..P~

l. No. 75-442, Poelker v.
one ,
familiar to all of us. The CA 8 held unconstitutional a poliff'oi 'fhe~
"ty of Saint Louis against the use of municipal hospitals for the performance of elective abortions . Byron's ~ curiam well describes
the case, including the is~e as to attorneys' fees. There may or may
not be a standing problem, depending on the resolution of Singleton v.
Wulff.
.

I

-

.

~55!,.~v. Doe~~~~~n~

CA 3, w1th two dissents, declaring Pennsylvania's restrictions on
Medicaid payments for elective abortions to be in conflict With Title XIX
on the Socia l Security Act. It is a class action ; the plaintiffs are ~g::~
nant participants in Medicaid and a physician. They challenge the Pennsylvania system on~. and constitution~ ! _ar~unds . The case
was heard originally by a 3-judge ~~hlchl1'e1d that the regulations were not inconsistent with the Act but that they did vio late equal
protection. That court, however, declined to enter injunctive relief an d
lin1ited itself to a declaratory judgment. On appea l to the CA 3, the
plaintiffs abandoned their request for an inj unction. After a pane l decision the case went en bane. T11e CA 3 rnajority reasoned that since the
State had determined that pregnancy was a condition for which medica l
services were "necessary,'' there was no ju stification for preventing a n
attending physician fro1n choosing nontherapeutic abortion as a rnetho d
of treatrnent. It held tha t the Sta t e was required to fund abortions through
the end of the second trimester. The court found it unnecessar y to reach
the constitutional issue. The dissent argued tbat the regulations are permissib le under both the statute and the C onstitution. The State seeks
certiorari.

The SG has fi l ed a memorandum arguing that both the statute and
the Constitution allow the State to refuse Medicaid coverage when an
abortion is no t " medically indicated." His definition o f the quoted term,
however, arguab ly ma y be said to be synonymous with "the physician's
bes t judgment." The SG suggests that No. 75-813, Westby v. Doe, is Ll~
a better candidate for certiorari . _l_wonde r.
t~-R. t:"" P~~

,?

V:

~ ~V.A..~~~~. __.;::j ~~-~--A~

3 a
No. 7 5-709, Bea l v. Franklin;~No. 7 5-77'2, FranKfin
v. Fitzpat
These cases are a_ppea l~ from a mu lti -facete d 3 - judge
court deCl
n Pennsyl vania ' s Abortion Control Act. The plaintiffs
were a physician (Franklin ), the Obstetrical Society of Philade lphia (on
behalf of its men1bers ), and various abortion referral societies (appa rently in their capacities as such and not on behalf of their clients). The
District Court held that the socie ti es were not sufficiently threatened to
create a case or controvers y, but tl1at the physicians l1a d standing both
on their own behalf and ~n behalf of their patients . Although the i ssue
docs no t appear to be raised by the State, there ma y be a problem with
standing, in connection with the subsidization issue, depending upon the
resolution of Singleton v. Wulff.
In No. 75-772, the plaintiffs appeal from the District Court's
ruling upholding a provision requiring "informed, written consent" from

the mother . This provision is much the same as the one being uph~ld
in Planned Parenthood, except that the Missouri statute did not specify
the content of the consent form, whereas the Pennsylvania statute· r ·e quires that it affirmativel y appear :
"(i ) that she has been advised that there may be
detrimental physical and psychological effects which
are not foreseeable, (ii ) of possible alternatives t o
abortion, including childbirth and adoption, and (iii )
of the medical procedures to be used . 11
The sta ternent also nmst be signed by the physician or a counselor
authorized by him. Although the requirement that the patient be infanned of possible unforeseeable effects may be questionable, there
seems to be no bar to a requirement that the physician explain how
likely or unlikely such unforeseen events are . It is also worth noting
that failure to obtain written consent is crinlinal in the abortion context, but not for other procedures . Nevertheless, I am inclined t o
conclude that this provision of the Pennsylvania statute is not imper missible under the rule announced in Planned Parenthood. This "infanned consent" is sue is the only one raised in No . 7 5-772 .
In No . 7 5-709, the State appeals from the following rulings of
the District Court :

~

(a ). Striking a definition of "viability" as. "the capability of a
fetus to live outside the mother's womb albeit with artificial aid . 11 A
definition of this kind is upheld in Planned Parenthood . On the basis
of the invalidation of the definition , the District Court also struck a
provision prohibiting abortions after viability except to preserve the
life or health of the mother .

I

(b) . Striking a provision to the effect that one who performs
an abortion shall have made a decision that in his professional judgment
the fetus is not viable , and if his deternlination is that the fetus is or
11 1nay be viable , 11 shall exercise that degree of care to preserve its life
as he would be. required to exercise with respect to any fetus _intende d
to be born, etc . The District Court found that the statute in its application spilled over into the second trimester and was violative of Roe . I
am uncertain as to whether a linliting construction of this statute is
possible .

(c). Striking a provision requiring the consent of one parent
in the case of an unrnarried pregnant r:ninor. The Pennsylvania statute
explicitly forbids any court order waiving consent requirements. Under
Planned Parenthood, this ruling is correct.
(d). Striking a requirement of spousal consent.
Planned Parenthood, this is correct.

Again, under

(e). Striking a provision forbidding public subsidization of an
abortion unless a physician certifies that it is necessary to preserve
the life or health of the 1nother. The District Court struck this provision insofar as it related to Medicaid payments, relying on Beal v.
Doe. It recognized, however, that the statute affects n:wre than Medicaid payments and proceeded to the constitutional challenge . The court
concluded that the only basis for the statute's distinction was social
policy, and that this interest was insufficient, ruling that so long as
the state provides subsidy for childbirth and non-abortion costs of
pregnancy, it cannot deny indigents subsidization for nontherapeutic
abortions.
(f). Striking a provision to the effect that no physician or clinic
shall engage in advertising having the purpose of attracting the public
to come to the advertiser to have abortions or to purchase abortifacients.
The District Court noted that the plaintiff physician sought only a yellow
pages listing with referral services, which one of the defendants (the
District Attorney of Philadelphia) conceded was not in violation of local
medical canons. Relying on Bigelow v. Vi~ginia, the District Court
held that the statute was overbroad. I suspect that this particular holding
is consistent with Bigelow and with the more recent Virginia State Board
of Pharm~. I cannot judge, however , the extent to which this case
presents the concerns expressed by Lewis and the Chief in Virginia State
Board.
It perhaps should be recalled that we have noted l2.£_Q};2..~b~
j~isdiction in No. 75-443, Carey v. Population Services, where the
lower court struck a statute prohibiting the sale of non-prescription
contraceptives to persons under the age of 16, the sale of nonprescription contraceptives by other than licensed pharmacists , and
advertise1nent of non-prescription contraceptives. I doubt that Carey
will shed much light on the provisions under attack here.

We could , of course , affirm in No . 75-772. I ihink, however,
that , on balance, subj ect to what the Conference discussion may bring
forth, I would vacate and rernand both 75-709 and 75-772 for recon - ·
sideration in the light of Planned Parenthood , Singleton v. Wulff, and
Virginia State Board . This arguably would put to rest a nurnber of
issues and , if and when the case cornes here again , as it probably y.ril~ 11 .•
it should be in a much cleaner posture.
~ ~ 1~

/CL W;,Ji'~ . ~~ ?

5. No . 75-813, Westby v . Doe . Here a 't1'1feei:'}Udge court
struck a South Dakota regulation fe_rbidding payr:nentof1viediC<ila!~mds
fo ·non-therapeutic abortions . The plaintiff was a pregnant wornan
eligible for Medica1d . T e challenge was on both statutory and constitutional grounds . Initially, the three- j udge court declared the regulation
unconstitutional and did not reach the sta tutory is sue . We vacated and
re1nanded for reconsideration in the light of Hagans v. Lavine . On the
re1nand , the District Court held the regulation invalid as being in con flict with the Social Security Act , adopting the reasoning in Beal v. Doe
by reference . It also held the regulation violative of equal protection .
The case is not a class action s o there might be some question about
m~s ; the findings include one to the effect that the plaintiff is 11 still
( i~d~bt~~lher physician,

11

so presurnably ;~~~~e~.

'~· No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe . Here a three- judge..Jl!!ft~
Court struck as unconstitutional a Connecticut reguiahon denying Medicaid for an abortion unless it is necessar y to preserve the physical or
psychiatric health of the rn.othe r. The plaintiffs in this class action are
pregnant women . At an earlier stage of the case the CA 2 reversed a
single - j udge District Court decision to the effect that the regulation conflicted with the Social Security Act; the CA 2 held that the Act neithe r
requires nor forbids payments for non-therapeutic abortions . 522 F. 2d
928 . Apparently, the CA 6 in a decision not now before us has a lso
taken this view . On re1nand for consideration of the constitutional is sue ,
a three- j udge District Court held that the State 1 s interest was conser vation of resources but that n o resources were saved by denying reilnbursement for elective abortions while granting it for childbirth and
related costs . The District Court als o struck provisions requiring
prior State approval and prior sub1ni ssion to the State of a signed consent form.
7.

Coe.f'He~

No. 75-713, Gerstein v.
struck down
Florida s requirement s of spousal consent and , in the case of an unmarrie d woman unde r 18 years of age , of parental consent. The only
1

~~
exception is in the spousal consent requirement,
ere such consent
need not be obtained if the husband is voluntaril~ 1vmg away from
the wife . The CA 5's disapproval of these stat tes is supported by
Planned Parenthood, and I shall vote to affir
f{it~
8. No . 75-6721, Doe v . Stewart . This appears on Sununer
List 2, Sheet 1. No motion to affirrn has yet been filed. The plaintiffs
in this class action were an unmarried pregnant rninor and her mother .
The District Cou;t held that the Louisiana regulation denying Medicaid
for non-therapeutic abortions violated neither the Social Security Act
nor the Constitution. It was said that there is no constitutional right
to receive welfare and that a rational relationship test is appropriate .
The court then held that the exclusion is rationally related to a legitimate govenunental interest which preswnably was the conservation of
funds through restricting rein'lbursen:1ent to 11 rnedically necessary' '
expenditures .

.,

Plenary consideration see1ns warranted in regard to both the
constitutional challenge to a refusal to subsidize non-therapeutic abortions, and the claim that the Social Security Act forbids such discrimi nation in the Medicaid programs. As of the mo1nent, and with this hasty
review, I suspect No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe, is the best vehicle or,
as a second choice , No. 75-554, Beal v . Doe. The underlying papers
in these c·ases seem to be more illurninating than those in No . 75-813,
Westby v. Doe .
I reg ret the haste with which this was prepared.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Justice Powell

FROM;

Phil Jordan

DATE:

June 29, 1976

Holds for Abortion Cases

Two of the eight cases discussed in HAB's hold
memo can be disposed of easily.
should be

affi ~ed

No. 75-713, Gerstein v. Coe,

on the basis of Planned Parenthood, as it

involves only spousal consent and parental consent.

The other,

No. 75-772, Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, also can be affirmed on
the basis of Planned Parenthood, as it involves only "informed
consent."

(Fitzpatrick is one of two appeals growing out of

a single three-judge court decision, the other being No. 75-709,
Beal v. Franklin, discussed below.)
This leaves six cases.

As I understand the desires

of the Conference,you want the best case presenting the issue
of whether exclusion of elective abortions from Medicaid violates
either the Social Security Act or the Constitution, and the
best case presenting the issue of whether a state's selective
refusal to subsidize elective abortions violates the Constitution.
Fully five of these six cases involve the Medicaid/
SSA/Constitution issue.

A holding in any case that the selective

exclusion violates the SSA would make it unnecessary to reach

2.

the issue of whether such selective exclusion violates the
Constitution.

Thus, the Conference should take only one of

these five cases in order to decide the Medicaid question.
In addition to a case on the Medicaid question,
the Conference will have to take a case not involving
Medicaid if you want to be sure of reaching the constitutionality
of a selective refusal to fund or otherwise subsidize elective
abortions.

This is because the Medicaid question may be

resolved solely on the ground of the SSA, with the Constitutional
issue not reached.
There are two cases that can assure the Court's
reaching the constitutionality of selective refusals to fund
or subsidize.

One of these, No. 75-709, Beal v. Franklin

("Franklin"), involves the Medicaid issue but in addition
involves a straight issue of selective refusals and the
constitution.

I shall discuss Franklin last in this memo.

The other case clearly presenting the constitutional
issue is No. 75-442, Poelker v. Doe, which involves St. Louis'
policy against the use of municipal hospitals for elective
abortions.

This case has been around since the November 7,

1975 conference, and has occasioned writing from Justice
White and some switching of votes over the course of the Term.
It appears from your notes on the April 16 Conference sheet
for this case that you are now inclined to grant.

In terms

of the primary issue in the case, a vote to grant is in order.

3.

Before the Conference takes the case, however, the Justices
should refresh their memories about a couple of lurking
"hookers," both of which show up in Chris' excellent cert.
pool

memo~

(1)

The question of plaintiff's standing --

HAB's hold memo for some reason states that there could be
a standing issue in this case depending on how Singleton comes out.

.......__

That is flatly incorrect (as HAB's clerk now admits), for the
plaintiff in this case is a woman instead of a doctor.
is, however, a standing issue of another sort.

There

The woman was

pregnant when she filed suit, but obtained an abortion five
days later, before the case was certified as a class action.
The DC

or~ginally

dismissed the case as moot, on the ground

that a woman had to be pregnant at the time of a DC hearing.
CA 8 reversed this and the case has proceeded since then on the
assumption that the woman had and retains standing.

Probably the

Court ultimately would conclude that she does have standing,
but it is an issue that must be addressed and that is not
squarely controlled by Roe.

In Roe, the woman was pregnant

in the DC but not so by the time the case reached the appellate

court;

the Court held that the case remained alive even absent

a class action, on the "capable of repetition yet evading review"
theory.

That particular theory technically does not fit here,

since there's no reason to think that in another case a woman

4.

would be unable to get a DC hearing while still pregnant.
(2)

-

The question of the doctors' religious

beliefs - The City of St. Louis has a pmlicy against
allowing elective abortions in the two public hospitals.
Apparently the only evidence presented in the DC went
to one of those hospitals, which is staffed with Jesuits
from St. Louis University.

These doctors have moral

scruples against abortions - which Roe and Doe give doctors
the right to exercise, and thus to refuse to perform
abortions.

Almost surely the Court would be able to say that

the city policy is brought into question by this case, as
CA 8 said, but there is the problem that the DC held
plaintiff's failure to obtain an abortion to have been due
to the doctors' personal beliefs rather than to the city

-

-

policy.

(For descriptions of the two courts' opinions, see

Chris' memo at 3-4.)

Again; this is a question the Cburt will

have to face in this case.
Assuming that the standing and the "doctors'
beliefs" issues can be surmounted and the merits of the
city policy reached, this case should be granted.

l
I

5 .

This leaves the five cases involving Medicaid.
I shall immediately reduce the number to four for purposes of
discussion, since one of the five appears on a summer list
and there has been no motion to affirm.

The Court probably

should not consider taking this case unless none of the other
four is / satisfactory.

This summer list case is No. 75-6721,

Doe v. Stewart.
Of the four remaining cases, three of them are pretty
much the same:

No. 75-554, Beal v. Doe ("Beal");

Westby v. Doe (''Westby");

No. 75-1440,

No. 75-813,

Maher v. Roe ("Maher").

There seems to be a pregnant woman with clear standing in

ach

-

case, so there's no threat of a wash-out because of Singleton.
Granting Westby appears out of the question, since Chris noted
the poor briefing and conclusory opinions in that case.
As between Beal and Maher it may be a toss-up.

--

recommends Maher over Beal,

,

HAB

albeit for undisclosed reasons.

-

If the Court takes Maher it probably will have to ask the parties

-

to brief the Social Security Act question in addition to the

---

.---....._

Constitutional one - as the case arrived in this Court, the
parties may be focusing exclusively on the Equal Protection
issue (since CA 2 held, at an earlier stage of the litigation,
that the SSA was "neutral" as to funding of elective abortions,
and sent the case back to a three-judge court for consideration

6.

of the constitutional issue alone).

It does appear, to me

at least, that both the SSA and the constitutional issues are
in the case.
Beal seems like a perfect grant.

It is an en bane

decision, with dissents, reversing a DC opinion

all facets

of the SSA and constitutional issues are spread on the record.
The CA 3 majority held the exclusion violative of the SSA and
thus did not reach the constitutional issue, but both issues
are still in the case since respondents can seek to support
the CA 3 judgment on the constitutional ground.

(The only

possible snag in this case is a procedural nicety.

As noted

in the pool memo, at 6, the statutory claim could have been
adjudicated by a single judge instead of a three-judge court but there is no reason to think it was improper for the threejudge court to consider the statutory issue, since there was a
constitutional issue in the case.)
I just have a "feel" that Beal is the better case,
without being able to put my finger on why.

Perhaps it is the

fact that the CA 3 opinion presents the issues in the proper
order and very cleanly - whether the exclusion violates the
statute and, if not, whether it violates the Constitution.
The three-judge court opinion in Maher dealt with the constitutional
issue alone, after CA 2 had held that the SSA was neutral.
noted in Greg's pool memo in Maher,

As

the State had relied on the

~-

J

7.

SSA as a defense,

arguing that it prohibited payment for

elective abortions.

That is an odd twist on the SSA facet

of these cases, since normally the argument is that the SSA
requires payment for elective abortions.

I am afraid this

twist somehow could foul up this case, although I cannot explain
how.
Finally, there is No. 75-709, Beal v. Franklin ("Franklin")
mentioned earlier.

This is the other appeal arising from the

same three-judge court decision as No. 75-772, Franklin v.
Fitzpatrick, discussed at the beginning of the memo.

This

Franklin appeal contains many issues, some of which - parental
c..

- -

consent, spousal consent - were settled by Planned

Parenthood~

The case also contains an issue about the definition of
"viability."

The court in this case held the definition -

essentially the same as in Planned Parenthood - void for vagueness.
Some Justices probably consider this definition issue settled
in favor of the State by Planned Parenthood, but you and· I know
better!

And this time, unlike Planned Parenthood, the

definition appears to have operative significance.
memo at 3-4.

See pool

If you could get anyone in Conference interested in

considering "viability" anew in this context, it might be worth
taking Franklin because it contains this issue.

Aside from

"viability," the case also contains an issue about permissible
advertising by abortionists - presenting probably tough issues under

~.

Virginia State Board.

The presence of this issue is another

reason to want to take this case.

And finally, the case also

presents the issue found in Beal, Maher and Westby - selective
exclusion of elective abortions from State subsidies.

Franklin,

however, necessarily presents both aspects of the question statutory and constitutional.

This is because the state

statute in Franklin broadly prohibits the use of all public
funds for elective abortions.

Thus, it includes but also goes

beyond Medicaid, and even if the exclusion from Medicaid falls
strictly on SSA grounds the exclusion from other public funds
still must be considered under the Constitution.
Franklin thus seems to provide an opportunity to consider
SSA and constitutional issuffiat once, thus doing away with the need
to grant Poelker in order to be sure of reaching the constitutional
issue involved in exclusion of elective abortions from public funds.
There is a momunental "hooker" in Franklin, however, which is the
,.

-

~

._..,_,~_..,.....,

reason I have saved it for last.

-:?

If S1ngleton goes our way,

Franklin appears to fall by the wayside insofar as the public
funding issues are concerned - the only plaintiff who has
appealed
is......a doctor
and
of
\,_......
..-..._..,..._ suing on his
=-- own behalf
....
__
_ _ on
_ _behalf
_ _ __
~

other doctors, and there never was a pregnant woman in the case.

..........

...

See pool memo at 2.

Thus, to be assured of getting a case that

will stay here, regardless what happens to Singleton,

it will

be necessary to take Poelker on the constitutional question, and
either Maher or Beal on the SSA question.
Phil

April 15, 1977
I~:.£.

-~

No. 75-1440

".!"

Maher v.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I circulate herewith a first draft of a proposed opinion
for the Court in the above case.

~

;•
\'1

)'

'"'

.'1>.

This case addresses the constitutional issue. I also
am writing Beal v. Doe that involves the statutory question.
Normally, I would circulate both opinions at the same time,
but it will be perhaps another week before .' I have a first
printed draft of .!!!!!·
r.,
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 18, 1977

Re:

75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Jh-

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 28, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

v

~.u:prtutt

<!}o-url d tlft 'Jhrittb ~hdtg

jilasfringhm. ~. <If. 2ll&f~~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 28, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Sincerely,/

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

)

.inprtntt <!fourlof tlrt ~b Jtatts
Jlaelfingbm. ~.

<!f.

2llgt)l.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

April 29, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis:
I think I shall wait for the
dissent in this case before finally
coming to rest.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

t.Irt

,jttpTtntt C!}ltlttt of
~a .ihdts
~uJri:tt:ghm. ~. <!f. 2ll,?J!.$
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 28, 1977

75-1440, Maher v. Roe
Dear Lewis,
Upon the understanding that you are willing to make the minor verbal change on page 6
that we discussed, I am glad to join your opinion
for the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

To:
From:
Re:

Justice Powell

Date:

5/4/77

Tyler Baker
Maher (whether the regulation has been amended)

The Library has answered Judy Miller's request concerning
the present status of the Conn. regulation.
really be sure, it seems that the

~~XMRKXK

Although one cannot
relevant regulation

(§275) was revised on 1/16/76 to that very short form that I
showed you which addresses only second and third trimester
abortions.
I have been thinking about this issue since you were gone,
and I think that we may be able to salvage the opinion with only
an addition to a footnote.

If you recall, one of the name plaintiffs

had had an MX abortion and was complaining that it had not been
reimbursed with the effect that she was being pursued by the
hospital to pay the bill herself.
that the court

~MJMX«XKkKX

The complaint also requested

order the defendants to notify all persons

denied reimbursement &QQ tie notify theRL that they are eligible now.
As to

XMX~

these claims involving MX reimbursements denied in the

past, the case is not moot.

I have checked the

KM~XXIMXX

Answer

and the state did not raise any Eleventh Amendment objection to
these claims.

No mention was made of the (potential) problem in

the 3JC or in the H» briefs to this Court.

Short of an express

statement, it is hard to imagine a better argument for a waiver
than this.

If we mention this problem at all, and I am inclined to

think that we should, this would be the way

would handle it.

~u.preme ~(ltt.rt

of tire ~nittlt ,jtafcg

'IDaslrbt¢41lt. tD.

<.~. 20,?J~.;J

CHAMBERS OF

May 31, 1977

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe

Dear Bill:

.1

Please join me.
Sincerely,

1f!tA .
•

T. M.
Mr. Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

.ittpTtmt aJ~urt ~f tqt 1!ttittb .Jtattg
~agqmgbm. ~. aj:. 2ll&f){.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 1, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1440 --Edward W. Maher, Commissioner
of Social Services of ConnectLcut v.
Susan Roe, ~ al.

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your circulation of
May 6, 1977.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.hprnm ~ottri nf tlr.t ~b ~htttg

._uJri:nghn4 ~.

~· 2llgt'!~

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

June 1, 1977

Re:

No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

The Conference

I

.,

In view of your extensive changes circulating
today, and other opinions that are now engaging my full
attention, it may be a couple of days before I decide
whether to makE> . any response.
"··''
"'·
... -·~~· ..~

I, therefore, see littJe possibility of
bringing these cases down on Thursday.

Justice
Copies to the Conference

~
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u
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TO:

Tyler ''
Powell~

13,
Jr. "

Beal, Maher and Poelker
lij

am rather · atrongly inclined to add a footnote to
generally along the linea of the 'a ttached draft.
It is becoming a bit tiresome to be berated by

Brothers .~/

whose arguments, it now seems to me, should be addressed to
the Congress and the state legislatures.
1':\,In~.~a
"l'~(

more pragmatic sense, perhaps a footnote along these

:q

lin~~ would make our decisions more readily .underatood by lay
As we should make this addition - if
promptly, I would appreciate your reaction MOnday morning.

sa

In Beal v. Doe, the preceeding case, we held that the
Social Security Act does not require the funding of
nontherapeutic abortions.
I

question:

This case presents the c9nstitutional

whether a state medicaid program

~~

~~ deny

funding

for such abortions/ while providing it for childbirth.

A Connecticut regulation limits medicaid

benefits~for

first trimester abortions/to those that are "medically
necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity,
but not elective abortions.
Respondents in this

case,~two

indigent women unable

to obtain a physician's certificate of medical necessity,
challenged the regulation.

Relying on our decisions in

Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, a three-judge District Court
held that the regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause.
We noted probable jurisdiction, and we now reverse.
In our view, the Connecticut regulation does not
discriminate against a suspect class.

Nor does it . impinge

upon a fundamental right protected by the Constitution / / Our

cases recognize a basic differencejbetween direct state
interference with a protected activity, and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative
policy.

2.

~J..J.ttt.e

Unlike the laws s &~\ielt i18wn in our previous abortion

-

decisions, the Connecticut regulation does not interfere
with the protected right to choose abortion.

The pregnant

woman remains free of legal restraints.
Nor does the regulation violate the equal· protection
clause.

We have noted in prior decisions~that a state has

a strong and legitimate interest/ in encouraging normal
childbirth.

Connecticut,j as a matter of polic1'and in

furtherance of this interest,j has chosen to fund childbirth
expensef' but not those for nontherapeutic abortions.

We

cannot say that the Constitution~orbids a state to make
this policy choice.
It is important to the understand;'the nature and

scop~

of our decision.
We do
unlawful.

~

hold;fthat the funding of such abortions is

Congress is quite fre, 'to require provision of

medicaid benefits for abortion~s a condition of state
participation in the medicaid program.

Also, under the

Social Security Act - as we have construed it today in
Beal v. Doe - Connecticut is equally freeJ'to provide such
benefits.

3.
We hold onl; ft hat the Constitution does not
a judicially imposed resolution of this issue.

require~
It is

an issue involving the weighing of public interests, the
type of issue that/ - under the Constitution/ - should be
resolved by representatives of the

peopl~rather

than by

federal judges.

***
Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in
which Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Blackmun
joined.

~

opinionh

Justice Marshall also filed a dissenting

Mr. Justice Blackmun also filed a dissenting

opinion in which Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice
Marshall joined.

·-

-~~-------

'COURT RULES STATES
MAY DENY MEDICAID
FOR SOME ABORTIONS
ELECTIVE OPERATIONS ARE ISSUE

lIJustices Also Hold, 6-3, That Public
Hospitals Are Not Required to
Give or Permit Such Surgery
By LESLEY OELSNER
SP<CIS:I to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 20-The Supreme
Court ruled today, 6 to 3, that neither
the Constitution nor current Federal law
requires states to spend Medicaid funds
for elective abortions.
The Court ruled by the same vote that
cities and towns that had public hospitals
were not required under the Constitution
to provide or even permit elective abor·
tions in those hospitals.
The rulings do not mean that states
must bar funds for abortions. They do
mean, however, that all states and localities are free, if they wish and if their
state laws and constitutions permit, to
bar the use of public funds and facilities
for so-called "nontherapeutic" abortions.
The rulings may alsG mean that the
Federal Government is free to bar the
use of Federal funds and resources for
such abortions.
Reaction in New York
In New York, Joseph T. Lynaugh, tbe
president of the New York City Health
and Hospitals Corporation, said that mu·
nicipal hospitals there would continue to
perform abortions with Medicaid funds
while the legal implications of the Court's
decisions were being studied.
Spokesmen for Governor Carey and
Governor Byrne of New Jersey said that
these would be no comment until a legal
study of the decision had been completed.
The rulings came in three cases from
Connecticut, Pennsylvanilt and Missouri
that involved only state and local, rather
than Federal, efforts to limit public sup·
~o!t for a~ortions. Undoubtedly, more
htJgahon wtll be needed to clarify the
full reach of the decisions.
The logic that the Court followed seems
as applicable to the Federal Government
as to state and local bodies. The point
is critical, because Congress is currently
considering proposals that would bar· the
use of Federal funds for many and . perhaps alrl abortions.
Total Ban May Be Invalid
Today's rulings suggest that a ban on
all abortions, even those that are medically necessary, might be invalid. They appear to clear the way, however, for a
ban on funds for "abortions which are
elective," or not medically necessary.
The rulings are a major victory for an·

c
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COURT BACKS ST.~_TES
ON AN ABORTION CURB
Continued

F~

Page I

tiabortion forces, the biggest so far in
the effort to limit the reach of the supreme Court's landmark 1973 decisions
striking down state laws that made it
a crime to perform an abortion.
The rulings are a severe setback for
the proabortion forces and for the women's movement generally.
The decisions seem sUre to have practi·
cal consequen~ for tens of thousands
of women. Medicaid funds have paid for
abortions for as many as 300,000 women
in a year, at a cost of $50 million.
Indigent women will find it increasingly difficolt to get abortions and some,
as the Court conCeded, may find it im·
possible. Consequently, abortion advocates contend, more unwanted children
may be born, and the number of illegiti·
mate births may rise.
The rulings also appear to have sociological significance, because they affect
only the poor-well-to-do and ~piddle·
class women are not dependent on Medi·
caid funds.
Legally, the rulings seem to change a
trend in the law started by the 1973 Supreme Court abortion decisions. Various
lower courts that have ruled on the issues
presented by today's cases reached a contrary result to the one the high court
reached today. Those lower courts had
generally based their rulings on what
they thought the Supreme Court's 1973
decisions required.
The majority today insisted that the
Court was standi~ by its 1973 abortion
tulings. The decision, Justice Lewis F.
Powell Jr. wrote for the majority in the
Connecticut case, "sign·ats no retreat"
, from its earlier rulings.
The dissenters-William J. Bren·n an Jr.,
Thurgood Musha:ll and Harry A. Black·
mun-disputed th:a.t
"None can take seriously the Cout't's
assurance," Justice BreMan said in a dis·
sent joined by his two colleagues.
An antiabortion leader, Msgr. James T.
McHugh, director of 1Jhe Committee for
Pro-Life Activities of the National Coun·cil
of Catholic Bishops, welcomed the deci·
sion, caUing it heJ.pful to th_e famly unit.
Many groups and persons on the opposing side of the question, Including tftte
American Civil Uberties Union, the
Plan'ned Parenthood Federation of Ameri·
ca, Americans for Democratic Action and
Della S. Abzug, the New York mayoral
contender, issued statements deCrying the
rulings.
The tone of tlhe SJtaJtement.c; ra11~·An f,.l\m

Continued on Page 20, Column I

···'

.-

gry
1 er to sad.
"The Supreme Court antiabortion decision this morning was a national tragedy,
forcing poor women into back ai'Ieys for
their abortions," Joseph L. Raub Jr.,
president of the A.D.A., said.
"What today's decisions do is re-establish pregnancy termination as a secondclass medical service, unequll'l to preg·
nancy continuation, and the poor as
second-clas·s patients, unequal to the more
affluent in their opportunities for service," said a statement from Planned Parenthood.
The Medicaid system was set up in
accord with provisions of the Social Security Act. The states set up their own
programs wLthin t:M guidelines and rules
set out by the act. The Federal Government provides financial ald.
Last year, Congress enacted an amend·
ment to the Social Security Act known
as the Hyde Amend!Dent, after its spon·
sor, Representative Henry J. Hyde of Illi·
nois, that barred the payment of Medicaid
funds for abortions unless the abortion
was necessary to save the life of the
mother.
However, that amendment has not been
enforced. Last fal:l, responding to two
lawsuits challenging the law, including
one suit by New York City's Health and
Hospitals Corporation, a Federal District
Court held the statute unconstitutional.
Its enforcement has been enjoined pend·
1 ing appeal.
·
Last week, the House passed a new
amendment barring the use at Medicaid
funds for all abortions, including those
to save the life of the mother.
What was b~ore the Supreme Court ,
today was not the Hyde amendment, but -e=!!~!:!!!:=========~===--1
the Medicaid system as rurrently in effect, under the statute without ' this Social Security Act. requiring states to
amendment.
establish "reasonable standards" for
Various states under this system have detennining the extent of medica:! assist·
on their own limited the use of funds ance the state will give, permitted states
for abortion. In the case from Pennsylva- to bar funding for elective abortions. It
nia, the issue was whether the Social Se- said in part that states had a "valid and
curity Act permitted states to bar Medl- important interest In encouraging childcaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions. birth," and that there was nothing in the
In the case from Connecticut, the ques· words of the statwte to show that it was
tion was whether the Constitution permit- "unreason~ble'~ for a state to further this
ted states to do this.
Interest.
Second, the Court found that the Con·
The third caae involved a public hospl·
tal in St. Louis. Because of a policy dlrec· stitutional guarantee of equal protection
tive from the mayor, and also the long· of the laws was not violated by state
time practice of staffing the hospital's Medicaid plans that bar funding of elecobstetrlcs-gy.necology clinic with faculty tive abortions, even while providing fundand students from a local Jesuit-operated ing for women who chose to bear their 1
institution, women could not get elective children.
abortions there.
The theory of lower courts that have '
The Court decided the first two cases reached the opposite conclusion, and the
with separate majority opinions, both by theory of the dissenters, is that paying
Justice Powell. It decided the third case for childbirth but not for abortion is an
with a brief unsigned opinion, resting on undue interference with a woman's conthe opinion in the Pennsylvania case.
stitutiona:l right, established in the 1973
The Court made two basic findings.
decisions, to decide whether to bear the
·
First, it found that the words of the child.
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t this abor- had· been raped or had conceived this child
the paper through incest. You see, to be consistent-and c~nlities clon't sistency is very important in the law-the Su·
ic hospital preme Court would probably have to uphold a fcdthe 80 per era! ban, the way it upheld the state ban in Con·
-necticut. 1
·
no way in·
But, I would quickly repeat, this would not be a
t" from, his retreat from the Court's 1973 position. You sec, I
can still go would explai~ slowly, b~cause he is po_or an~ pre~spital-shop- nant and havmg an anxiety attack, this dec1s1on IS
though, so simply. a ~atter of public policy. It's not that the
mester.
six justices had opinions on the subject of abortion.
might look It's ju~t t~at they don't like the idea o_f using the
whether his ConstitutiOn to boss the s~tes. They thmk the law
. The issue sh~uld be ma~e by t~e leg~slatures, not the cou~ts.
nce, in my ·. ~ott was no~h~ng agamst him perso~ally.
I f t h
. Why, he 1s JUSt as free as ever 7mce 19_73_to de. n ac ' . e . C!de whether or not to have a .child. He 1s JUSt as .
free as any member of the mtddle class. He can . ,
ke sure that still pay privately for an abortion in a private clinic ·
He knows or a private hospital with a private doctor, anys last year. where he can find one and any-way he can get to
ver a baby. . it.
.
\
, the sta.tes
At that point, despite my best efforts, he might
or elective be a touch frustrated. What good does it do him to .
.. .
have the right to aportion if he has no way to pay
down with for it and no hospital that will perform it for him?
yet banned He might start blabbering about discrimination .
urse, there against th.e poor. He might even throw himself
hurry. The upon the mercy of the court, wailing, "You don't
~ppropria·
UJ1derstand. I don't have the money to travel. I
may elimi- can't afford to pay for an abortion."
most abor- .'· At that unseemly conduct, I would simply have
· :
: .to turn away. My logic, after all, would be intact. I
n if his life would say judicially: ''I can't help you. You see,
e sclerosis, · .that's a very private matter."
y--or if he
e>lm, The Boaton a lobe Newspaper eompanr
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no restric- l_: be aborted than . ~o be born poor·ln America and ::'
ot already .:· suffer "second-rate" schools and other problems: ''1'
difficult- ·' Marshall supported the 1973 decision that imposed 1 : •·
e-for some : '. an extremely liberal a~ortion policy on the states. ~~ i.
ated nor:in : ·Now he says that states that.stop short of subsldlz· :.:.. .
gulation." · ) !)ng elective abortions are trying to, "impose their ··,. ·
ctive abor-; . moral choices on the rest of society."
·
..
Courts.ays: ..· Blackmun asserts that refusal to' sub~ldize un· :·.
s that par- ~ ·necessary abortions "punitively" impresses upon . ·
very. mcdi- the po'o r a community's "concepts of the :~oclally .• T
eated 'cate- desirable:" Blackmun thinks it is socially desirable , ,
.. ·, . ··•, ., · ; · and constitutionally necessary to compel taxpayer~ 1; 1
interest in · to fund a form of:killing that many taxpilyers con· ·
ot' presume " Sider murder:. . ,
'· ·
·:
. - . ··~
state's par- • The dissenters embraced some particularly re- 1
its 'willing- : pellent and revealing language !rom a 1975 Court ' c..
st by subsi- . ruling: "Abortion and childbirth·, when stripped o! ·~·
ons." '
the sensitive moral arguments .$urrounding the ~;;.
defends a - abortion controversy, are simply two alternative
te "refuses . medical methods of dealing with pregnancy."
ding thera- Abortion enthusiasts are enraged because the dec!· ·
atal care, it sions reject the idea that social policies mtut treat ···
her against
childbirth as merely a "medical method" In' no way ._
y protected preferable to abortion. ·
I · ~
·· l • ·
·.
, The three recent decisions stop the pro-abortion · ·
ortibn. kills forces short of their goal, which is to u~e court! to ·
abortion a coei:ce society into abandoning its moral sensitlvhat it is un- · ity ·about unrestricted abortion-on-demand. Re- ···
ourage the garding policy choices as sen~itive as the funding ~
on. The two of elective abortions, the Court majority says: "The
ed, . . .
appropriate forum for their resolution in a democ- '
s the "ethi- · racy is th!! legislature." Advocates of. unrestricted ·.'
understand•:· abortion-on-demand ·are depressed because· they ·: ..
is better to ··· know what awaits them there.
·

Washington Star, June 24, 1977
~--------------~ ~ ~;;;;~;;;;:;;=;=========~~--------------------~--
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In recent years, we have sometimes lost,sight
Justice Marshall, .. brutally coerce poor women
·.::of the .distinction between .two very different
·to bear -children whom society will lJC;:orri fof'
' "'\kinds. of personal liberty.- One is thtt familiar · every day "Of their.lives.'~(Perlulps itis distas~ · ·. :
-..... ~libezttJroin·government constraint or,coercion: · .~ :' ful to ask;-.though· the question -suggests:Jtlelf,:. · 7 •
~:;'the~ ~nd o'r-jtiberiy tKUaratiteed ·in ·the' Bill•of
whether 1lnyone is ·~brutally.,..~oerc~'~ to ..})e.! .~:·
-~- Rights. :The other .is lib:erty viewed ~sa kind_of, . !.:1_ c9mepregnantin the'f'U'S~.·place.)
:'·' .. ' ,
: .. ·:·
·!!.· :entitlement .or; expectation, often ~:equiring ~ , • - . .f In ~nY revent, ~rgue . the.~dis~nters,Jf state ·~·
:~ n~li'Eentg~veninien!al int,e rvention. ' . ~-", . -:. : ,-. ,I. ..le~~·B;tures refuse.. to acknow~~dge the, li~rty- : '
.. , 'Both :ldnds ::Of 'liberty haye i:beir ·place ·in a .. ·~~ ·SS~ntif:Iement, 1~tbis. Court ·'--·.. must no(shirk 1ts/~ .' .' ..
~ moderjf ~em~ racy; but whiie ~~first is fund a-·:~
duty to e~orce1the Consti~.tion f~r ·~e ·benefit
·,
mental, and protected, the-other ~ually resUlts
of the poor .and the powerless.~· . ,
1
f~m~iety's exercise _of .an option- a,l~gisla- - : :;To' l;>e Yair aboutit, the ·~~~ten .offer a. sub- . , j
ttve cho1ce among conflicting values. . · .. · 1 , ·~ tler.Mgument than.mere.Judicml force m8)eure,
_ . ·~,It ~a~ .oveJ:' these :co~i>eting risions'of ii~rty, .1 ~;::: ~nning a~ ;follo~s ;' ,Eve~" though electiv~ 'abo~- .·
it seems to ~~ that .the Supreme, Court battled '"'"'>.:tio~ ·Wa~ ill~gal :m mos~ st~t~s when. the M«:cb., .this week, _in .a bitterly contested set of deci- · .... ;cmdleg~slap~n was .P~ssed, ~ ye!l!'B ~o,.J'ustice
c .siomi, ·w henlt Reid that states have no obligation·-,. . ~ ~ren~n sees a~~se :f_o~ · cons~g ~e act as
. 1
~ under the 1965 Medicaid .Act to pay for "elec- . reqwnng th~ fun~. of that. pr~~e. Not only · ··
:•ave" abortions~ -· · · ·
~.
·'.
•
. does ,what 1s medtcaUy penmss1ble change,
,.
. •r: .~ ... . · ···-"";. '-~"· .-·· : .._. · .
::: also, ·asalowe? federal .courtput.it,/ 'aportion, _
• At a;;sue, b_aslcally,: ~as the, mea~ng ·of the
and chil~irth, when stripped ·.of .the ..sensiti~e -; ...
• :Co~~ s pr-:vrous dec1s1ons, on. aboi"!ion: Th?se .. · moral argymen~s surrounding the a!><>rtiC?n ":onl.
' dec1~10ns plc~re a ":oman S diS(:ret19n 1D ~bildtroversy, ate Simply two alternattve medt~ .~
•·.. beanng-as a!l-:xte~s1onof he~ personal p~vac~, . methods of dealing with pregnancy." · .~
- ~ .-,
"' .::..... ~ m~tter1 wh1cb IS! at least .pl the .early stages . . '
In one sense, that'is undeniable:·· In ',a morally · · ·
;:·.~f, p~e~y~ <entirely ~tween · h~t an.d .her ';~ · neutral W~pld there_WOl,lld .indeed be ~0 differ: ·
physiCian and not even subJ,ect to ~e veto of her ' ·""'· enee betWeen abortion· and childbirth . .But it is
. ~ spouse . .,.., :·~- .
precisely because abortion andchildbi~h ::...like
I ••
Justice Le~s Poweil and.those'of the major-· . -~- most ~tissues - ·carinotbe':"stripped of..•.•
:~ lty. .who· share his view, see this established
r. ,._sensitive·mor8.1 arguments" ~at Wise judges do · ·(
:· ~ .'right" to an abOI'tioii as, in other words,,. ~ · · not J?re-empt those ..p6licy choices" of which
,. another right . . to be let alone." But whet~er or · · Justice Powell speaks: Try an· alternati~e ver-·
not elective:or "non-therapeutic" abortion must
sion of the lower court's words: "Forced steri. be routinely paid for by a state or federal treas- ·· lizatioil and the use of mechanical ·contrace~1
· ury they see as another question altogether:
tives, stripped of the sensitive moral\arguments
. :_7!ow a woman exerci~es ~he choice ~ - in other
· surrounding human liber;ty, .are simply two ·'
:words, independent 'Of her basic right to choose.' · · · alternative methods of dealing_.w ith unwanted · .,
.:· n is an jssue which ~s,.-in : ~.u~tice Powell ' s
pregnancy."lsitlogicallyilifferent? . - . .
·
In fact, as we· see it, .t he COurt's. dissenters
words, "fraught with judgments; •of policy and
·value over which opinions are sharply divided." ·
would seize upon tht! Fourteenth Amendment as
' It is the second sort qf liberty described .above.
a device for bootlegging personal conceptions of
"
· Taxpayers, the Court holds, ~ay but need not . :.. .~ocial arid economic justice ~ conceptions
subsidize the exercise of the basic right 'by ~di- '· . which incidentally' bav~ a great deal to be said
. gent women. In 'such policy questiqns, "the
m'their favor- into the statutory law, pre' appropriate forum· -· . ·in a democracy is the'
emptinglegislativejudgment. ,:
·
_ legislature." · · ' . ..' . ·' : .· .
- . .
But :we -already know -what ; the legislative This .was the tinexceptioiiable view that -:judgment is. It was embodied ·last year in the - ' . .1
- fortunately- prevailed this week at the Court:
Hyde· Amendment, forbidding the use of Medi-., l
.··.· 'But why, if unexceptionable, did it. prevail only
-caid funds for elective abortion: You may re·I
· at the cost of acrimonious dissents .from Justices
gard that prohibition as unjust, unfair, unkind
Brennan, Marshall ·and Blackmun? For various
and discriminatory against the indigent. But the
1
.. reasoris, the three dissenters merge one·order of
question, as Justice Poweil noted, ·quoting ·a · . 1
, : personal libet:tY into another. They argue··that . previous dictum of the Court, is whether t~e
j
·',. the ftindamerital "right" to choose .abortion is .. ~, .. Constitution '/ pf9vide(s) judicial remedies for · . 'I
:.. meaningles$ for poor women if the money isn't · every social and economic ill." It does not. Sucb ' 1
· · there. Hence; state r~gulations that bar the use
,...'remedies, when they ·are provided, should be
. · · of Medicaid funds for elective abortion, -wrote
legislatively provided, with public consent. '.
'·
.
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,TJ
HE SUPREME COURT'S decisions this week 'put . press s_o that you can · exerCise freedom o.f the
.. . the
issue squarely back into the public : press-:-: : .. ., . .
aborti~n

-~ -~

-~~ ·-<.: :

• .·

- a~ena-wbich

is to say; the U.S. Congress a:nd state :·. -'But we are stunne9, nonetheless; qy the. c~ualness r .
-legislatures.- That may be.the best place tOresolve.it , -:with which the Court ~sed this principle to.justily'its
.-in a· democracy, .for it is an issue· in which religion d~cision that a city or state mliy' close its public bospi--~~d.. emotion and deep personal convjction count for . tals to nont~erapeu~c abortions. The Court did so in
more than a literal and arbitrary reading of the law: · ·an unsigned opinion of -less than' three pages; which
Tttie, th¢ solution is not much ia6'er to legislate than . provided precious little explanation ofits ruling and
if~ tp_adjudicate. But we have some sympathy. witk .· gave no consideration at all to'its implications. What
th'e ~ourt's decision to· hand . back to the legislative . it · has done .in those . communities where pUblicly
pr.C?_cess a problem that legislators, out of their own owned hospitals are the only ones readily available is
~- deSperation, ·bad tried to pass off to the courts. · · to put the ability of all women to exercise their right
:Elected officials, ,in our view, have acquired ·a bad . to an abortion up to the decision of a government of• habit in recent decades ofbucking to the judges the ficial or ·to a popular.vote. It is rare in American judini'ore divisive questions of the day.
· diu history for the Court to subject the exerCise of an
: ~ The Court has left the ·abortion issue in a relatively· acknowledged.right to such vagaries..
. straightforward position with respect to th.!'! ' law. · There is a solution. It is for Congress to face-the abor. What the court is saying is that 1) women have a tion issue squarely-to accept it as a problem that, for
~1~ . constitutional right t~ - terminate :Pr.egancy by better ~r V.•orse, is not going to be entirely resolved in a
abortion, a~ ·least through the first three months; 2) · ·raii and effective manner by the courts. Once that's acgo.vernment cannot st~p th~m from having abortions cepted, the Congress baS no choice, in ·our vie·~:' but to ·
- for any reason that may appeal to them; but .3) the direct that Medicaid funds be made available to pay for
· government 'is -not required .to ·provide either . the· abortions, rather than trying to ,put limitations and
funds or ~he facilities that make abortions ·financially restrictions ·on such operations~: Any. other aCtion will
poss.ible for many women. Left somewbat ambiguous create a class distinction based solely on wealth. ·
l!Y the Court's decisions are whether a government . . The law is now clear: The decision on whether to
can-deny funds and facilities for abortions .t hat a doc- . have an abortion during .. the first ihree montlis of
l!Jr c~rtifies. are medicaily necessary or whether gov- . pregnancy ·reSts. w_ith the women concern.ed. Soine ·
, ernment can define "medically necessary',' so nar- women have the means to make that decision freely, ·
. insofar "as .the cost of the necessary medical care and
rowly as to eliminate almost all abortio:ns. . .'
· ·There is much logic and history -to support the .. .facilities ..is . factor. But those without' the means: . Court;s central determination that the equal-protec- ~'·.· those dependent on government programs. for their
t
.tion ~lause is not abridged .by the refusal of gov_ern- :. medical ne~nnot choose 'freely unless the gov"ment to fund abortions for the poor, although this iS ernment or someone else makes the funds and facilia retreat from some of the language in past decisions. · ties for abortions available. A decision by Congress to
The ruling does, however, create a fundamental- . restrict abortions would write mto American law the
11 and, ill our view, unacceptable-inequity. It'Ieaves· a· ·~majestic equality" about which Anatole France wrote
1 state of affairs i.n, which poor women may be unable so bitterly. It would state, as the policy of the U.S. govto exercise their ·right to 'an abortion while I:ich ernment, thaCwomen in this country have a constituwomen can. Justice Powell's opinion does present a · tional .right, upheld by tl,le Supreme Court, to chobse
convincing argument that the Constitution does not ·. 'for themselves to have an abortion if they want one,
require government to support fi~anciall5' the exer~ , but only if they have the money-:-{lr can beg, ·borro'V
cise of all rights even though it is barred from inter- . or Steal enough to pay for it SuCh policy would not
fering with their· exercise. Government, f9r example, do credit to a natiop that prides itself on tbe iridividis not required to provide a forum from which you ual right of its citizens to live freely and to determine,
ca_n exerci~e the right of free speech or a printing ... to the utmost extent possible, their own destinies.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Tyler Baker

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell,
. Jr.

DATE:

March 7, 1977

Maher
I continue to have difficulty with the structure of
our

opinion. '~

Possibly, this is because of a lack of familiarity

comparable to yours.

Yet, as a comparatively "fresh reader", .

the present structure does not seem to "hang together" in
logical sequence.
'·"
\,

,_

'

'

At Conferemce, those who agreed with the framework in c\
.. _

>

which I discussed the case (and I remember particularly

Stewar~

and Stevens), .viewed it as follows:
Although, as you emphasize, both the District Court and
appellees seem to homogenize substantive due process and

,' ,

equal protection, they find a burdening of ,·a constitutional ·
~-,

l'

f

'i~
1':

t' ..

r;

-~-~
~t'i~~t

'

right requiring application of the compelling . stat~ · interests'
'

standard.

~

;fj")

}

If one agrees with this test, it would perhaps be

difficult to support the vote of the Conference.

:i

be true whether the case be viewed as

This would

implicatirig .,~ substantive

due process rights or as violating equal protection.
· ' ··'

We

concluded that there is no substance to the due process claim,
that the case does present an equal protection claim, and
this must be analyzed under the rational basis test.

2.
I now come to your draft, having the foregoing

~er~

approach in mind.
Part I:
Except for editorial changes - mostly matters of taste this is fine.
Part II:
This is divided into three subparts - A, B and C.

The

first of these states that the "threshold question" is the
standard of review.

After stating that this is the initial

question whether che case be viewed as due process or equal
protection, you move immediately to

~

v. Wade.

Under either

due process or equal protection analysis, you say - correctly that understanding of the "nature and scope of the right
recognized in Roe is critical".
The draft then

discusses~

(pp. 8 and 9).

Subpart B distinguishes, quite effectively, the Texas
law in

~

from the Connecticut regulation.

points out that other

cas~

The draft also

(Danforth) also are different.

On page 13, the draft makes the important point that
there is a basic difference between state interference with
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity, citing Meyer.

The last paragraph on page 15 concludes,

apparently with respect to substantive du e process, that the

3. '
'~'·

compelling state interest test is not appropriate.

Part C commences with the view that "it is equally clear
that strict scrutiny would be inappropriate under equal
protection principles" citing Rodriguez.

You conclude (p. 17)

that the fundamental right analysis of Rodriguez is inapplicable
here.

l':

I would have thought that Part II having commenced (p. 7)
with the question as to the standard of review, would have come
to an end upon concluding that the compelling interest test is
not applicable.

1.<

.~

return to this point below. . But before doing

so, I make these comments about my initial impression of Part
, .• 1'

~;

II.

I find it a little bit confusing to start out by saying
'

t.J

the threshold inquiry is the standard of review.

I think I ·

-

would have commenced by confronting Roe, as the case relied

.

upon by the DC and appellees as establishing the "right to an
&bo~t:ian",

characterizing it as fundamental and ' thereby
·i'

establishing the standard of revie":'l~ ·L Your analysis of th~ '·"·
nature and scope of the right recognized in Roe is excellent.
~ ' ;• w:J, ~·.

When this is shown not to have been enlarged by Danforth and
.:.,

~

';

I·

~·,:

'·

then distinguished- as you do admirably' :. from the Connecticut
regulation, we can then conclude that the review standard of
~ is

~napplicable

of equal protection.
·i

~

:~··

~.'.,

.,.

"'•

whether the case be viewed as due process
'

' ~-

In light of these conunents, do

f:~

~10U

think Part II might

;:1

be refocused just a bit to place the initial emphasis directly

4.

on

~

and its contrast with the Connecticut statute before

concluding that the

~

standard is inapplicable?

Returning now to page 17, as indicated above, I would have
expected you at this point to commence a new part (Part III)
in which we apply the rational basis test to an equal protection
issue.

Before commencing the application of the. test,

should ~

we not make clear that we view this as an equal protection case?
A majority of us at Conference thought the substantive due
process contention is almost frivolous.

'i

~

'-\

"'-.,i'

',_.
!

);.rl

The nonfrivolous is
~~

whether classifying women who wish to terminate pregnancy by
abortion differently from women who wish to terminate it by
childbirth meets the rational basis test?

The answer depends, '

in conventional equal protection terminology, upon whether
the classification is rationally related to one or more
legitimate state interests.

No one knows better than you ~,·: .,
r~~.l

#_

"

'

4~"'

'. ''

J

' the terminology of equal protection, and ~(?w ' it ls applied. ,,,',
c~ Y-

... •'i"

-.-1

Yet, I must say that the present draft does not come through'~·:~ ...
>.'i<~· .·~

1;1,'"

··~

very clearly in this respect.
Without any clear indication that we view this as an equal
protection case ,Z'
(or that we are moving to apply the rational
~ 1. ~·
basis standard, the draft (p. 18) moves first into a discussion
of Dandridge; then (a second subhead C,
Shapiro and Maricopa (p. 19-21).

p.

19), into distinguishing

All three of these are equal

protection cases, and yet I find it confusing to discuss them

5. '

'.
back to back.

Dandridge was straight "rational basis", and

is highly relevant to this case because it involved welfare
provisions 'as you say.

But Shapiro and Maricopa are, in a

sense, equal protection "sports".

Classifications were

involved, and the Court found that the classification of
those who had moved into the state recently constituted an
invidious discrimination against their fundamental right to
travel.

Or, as you correctly put it, the classification

penalized that right.

I am not sure that these two cases

fft in at this particular point in the opinion as well as they
would somewhere else.
After a rather abrupt ending of the discussion of the
three cases above mentioned, the draft moves to Part III
which addresses the District Court's contention that a state
must ,adopt a position of neutrality between abortion and
childbirth.

It seems to me that the "neutrality" point is

one to be mentioned in a section applying the rational basis
~

test to the classification.

If the state interests are
"

legitimate and sufficiently furthered by the means selected,
the state need not remain neutral.

The argument that the

state should remain neutral is simply another way of saying
that pregnant should not be divided into two classes for the
purpose of disposing of the fetus.
I have the impression that the draft does not sufficiently
emphasize, anywhere, the affirmative interest of the state in

..·

,,

6.
protecting the fetus and encouraging mothers to carry it to
term.

You do argue this on page 23, but in the framework of

a neutrality discussion rather than in a section applying the
rational basis test to the classification.

I may say here, ,;

.~

l

that I like your use of

''~·.

~

in emphasizing that even that

opinion recognized the legitimate state interest in the fetus.
Also, in ,.this portion of the opinion, I would repeat that a
• 'L

,,

state c~assification properly may further a policy or value'
choice by the state, so long as it does notRfringe on a
constitutional

right~

, r -,

,

;:

The final two or three pages speak to the point that
funding abortions is a policy decision for the legislature! .
This should be a separate part, and perhaps you and I both
need to do some further work on

l' 'I

'

,,

~

~

4'"

Having worked as", hard as you have on this difficult case,
I.,r"i·>,

•A·

"'

·<\

,,,.]~

I know it ~~s a bit discouraging , to .: have t::hese sort of comments
~(

that will require some revision.

I emphasize that I do not :

have a ' negative feeling about the content, and i t may well" '
be that my own perception as to the organization'· of the opinion
is not as good as yours.

I am inclined, however, to

thin~

I

am right and to believe at least some revisions are worth
attempting.

Possibly a fairly detailed outline might afford

r

a guide, but I leave this entirely to you.
L.F.P.,

sss
',.

l'

.•.

.f

~~ /l1

,:•'

lfp/ss
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Tyler Baker

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 7, 1977

Maher
I continue to have difficulty with the structure of
our opinion.

Possibly, this is because of a lack of familiarity

comparable to yours.

Yet, as a comparatively "fresh reader",

the present structure does not seem to "hang together" in a
logical sequence.
At Conference, those who agreed with the framework in
which I discussed the case (and I remember particularly Stewart
and Stevens), viewed it as follows:
Although, as you emphasize, both the District Court and
appellees seem to homogenize substantive due process and
equal protection, they find a burdening of a constitutional
right requiring application of the compelling state interest
standard.

If one agrees with this test, it would perhaps be

difficult to support the vote of the Conference.

This would

be true whether the case be viewed as implicating substantive
due process rights or as violating equal protection.

We

concluded that there is no substance to the due process claim,
that the case does present an equal protection claim, and
this must be analyzed under the rational basis test.

2. '
I now come to your draft, having the foregoing general
approach in mind.
Part I:
Except for editorial changes - mostly matters of taste this is fine.
Part II:
This is divided into three subparts - A, B and C.

The

first of these states that the "threshold question" is the
standard of review.

After stating that this is the initial

question whether t he case be viewed as due process or equal
protection, you move immediately to Roe v. Wade.

Under either

due process or equal protection analysis, you say - correctly that understanding of the "nature and scope of the right
recognized in Roe is critical".
The draft then discusses Roe (pp. 8 and 9).
Subpart B distinguishes, quite effectively, the Texas
law in Roe from the Connecticut regulation.
points out that other

cas~

(Danforth)

~

The draft also
are different.

On page 13, the draft makes the important point that
there is a basic difference between state interference with
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity, c iting Meyer.

The last paragraph on page 15 concludes,

apparently with respect to substantive due process, that the

3.
compelling state interest test is not appropriate.
Part C commences with the view that "it is equally clear
that strict scrutiny would be inappropriate under equal
protection principles" citing Rodriguez.

You conclude (p. 17)

that the fundamental right analysis of Rodriguez is inapplicable
here.
I would have thought that Part II having commenced (p. 7)
with the question as to the standard of review, would have come
to an end upon concluding that the compelling interest test is
not applicable.

I return to this point below.

But before doing

so, I make these comments about my initial impression of Part
II.

I find it a little bit confusing to start out by saying

the threshold inquiry is the standard of review.

I think I

would have commenced by confronting Roe, as the case relied
upon by the DC and appellees as establishing the "right to an
abortion", characterizing it as fundamental and thereby
establishing the standard of review.

Your analysis of the

nature and scope of the right recognized in Roe is excellent.
When this is shown not to have been enlarged by Danforth and
then distinguished - as you do admirably - from the Connecticut
regulation, we can then conclude that the review standard of
Roe is inapplicable whether the case be viewed as due process
of equal protection.
In light of these comments, do you think Part II might
be refocused just a bit to place the initial emphasis directly

4.
on Roe and its contrast with the Connecticut statute before
concluding that the Roe standard is inapplicable?
Returning now to page 17, as indicated above, I would have
expected you at this point to commence a new part (Part III)
in which we apply the rational basis test to an equal protection
issue.

Before commencing the application of the test, should

we not make clear that we view this as an equal protection case?
A majority of us at Conference thought the substantive due
~t~

process contention is almost frivolous.

The nonfrivolousAis

whether classifying women who wish to terminate pregnancy by
abortion differently from women who wish to terminate it by
childbirth meets the rational basis test?

The answer depends,

in conventional equal protection terminology, upon whether
the classification is rationally related to one or more
legitimate state interests.

No one knows better than you

the terminology of equal protection, and how it is applied.
Yet, I must say that the present draft does not come through
very clearly in this respect.
Without any clear indication that we view this as an equal
protection case, or that we are moving to apply the rational
basis standard, the draft (p. 18) moves first into a discussion
of Dandridge; then (a second subhead C, p. 19), into distinguishing
Shapiro and Maricopa (p. 19-21).

All three of these are equal

protection cases, and yet I find it confusing to discuss them

5.
back to back.

Dandridge was straight "rational basis", and

is highly relevant to this case because it involved welfare
provisions as you say.

But Shapiro and Maricopa are, in a

sense, equal protection "sports".

Classifications were

involved, and the Court found that the classification of
those who had moved into the state recently constituted an
invidious discrimination against their fundamental right to
travel.

Or, as you correctly put it, the classification

penalized that right.

I am not sure that these two cases

fit in at this particular point in the opinion as well as they
would somewhere else.
After a rather abrupt ending of the discussion of the
three cases above mentioned, the draft moves to Part III
which addresses the District Court's contention that a state
must adopt a position of neutrality between abortion and
childbirth.

It seems to me that the "neutrality" point is

one to be mentioned in a section applying the rational basis
test to the classification.

If the state interests are

legitimate and sufficiently furthered by the means selected,
the state need not remain neutral.

The argument that the

state should remain neutral is simply another way of saying
~

that pregnantl\should not be divided into two classes for the
purpose of disposing of the fetus.
I have the impression that the draft does not sufficiently
'

emphasize, anywhere, the affirmative interest of the state in

6.

protecting the fetus and encouraging mothers to carry it to
term.

You do argue this on page 23, but in the framework of

a neutrality discussion rather than in a section applying the
rational basis test to the classification.

I may say here,

that I like your use of Roe in emphasizing that even that
opinion recognized the legitimate state interest in the fetus.
Also, in this portion of the opinion, I would repeat that a
state classification properly may further a policy or value
choice by the state, so long as it does notiocringe on a
constitutional right.
The final two or three pages speak to the point that
funding abortions is a policy decision for the legislature.
This should be a separate part, and perhaps you and I both
need to do some further work on it.

Having worked as hard as you have on this difficult case,
I know it is a bit discouraging to have
that will require some revision.

~Q

we:t of comments

I emphasize that I do not

have a negative feeling about the content, and it may well
be that my own. perception as to the organization of the opinion
is not as good as yours.

I am inclined, however, to think I

am right and to believe at least some revisions are worth
attempting.

Possibly a fairly detailed outline might afford

a guide, but I leave this entirely to you.

L.F.P., Jr.

MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Tyler Baker

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 11, 1977

Maher
I have reviewed with some care your draft of 3/10/77 of
Part IIJ the most critical section of our opinion.

I think

we are making genuine progress with this sensitive opinion, in
which almost every word must be used with care.
I have, as usual, made some personal editorial changes.
These include Rider A, on page 4, which is essentially a
personal choice as to words and phrases.
My

s·

reactio ~ to

substantive.

pages 7-18 of the draft are somewhat more

My primary concern is that perhaps we are

"laboring" the threshold issue of the appropriate standard
of analysis.

With this thought in mind, I have attempted to

condense pages 7-12.

See my Rider A, page 7.

I do not think

I have omitted anything essential to our analysis, but - of
course - would like your checking me on this.
think
I am inclined to/ tha t subpart (4) (p. 12-14) is unnecessary,
certainly as a part of the opinion identifying the appropriate
standard.

I assume you will rely on Dandridge in part III when

discussing the rational basis standard.

In that part, perhaps

a note could dispose of the "wealth classification" issue in
a sentence or two.

2.
For different reasons, I am inclined to think that part
C (p. 14-18) is inappropriate to a discussion of the relevant
it
me to
standard of analysis. At least,/seems to/be misplaced. Possibly it
may be included more appropriately in Part II-A where Roe is
discussed and distinguished.
in using Meyer.

You have an excellent point

At the moment, I am simply uncertain as to

where it best fits into our opinion.

My present thinking is

that Part II ends appropriately and strongly with the disposition
of Shapiro and Maricopa County, and the conclusion that the
compelling state interest test is not applicable.
In any event, I think you have Part II, as I have edited
it, substantially on target.

Perhaps you could reserve final

decision as to where to use Meyer until you have drafted Part
III.

ss

MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Tyler Baker

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 16, 1977

Maher
I have taken a fresh look at the SG's memorandum in
Beal, 75-554.

Although that memo deals with the Pennsylvania

Medicaid program, I believe in relevant respects it is
analogous.
In addition to arguing that there was no incompatibility
with the federal statute, the SG stated:
"A state's determination to offer Medicaid coverage
for abortions only when such treatment is medically
indicated is reasonable and is neither inconsistent
with the objectives of Title 19 nor in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment."
In addressing the "compelling state interest argument", the
SG said:
"Respondents contend, however, that the limitation invidiously discriminates between 'those who
continue their pregnancies to birth and those who
seek to terminate their pregnancies by abortion,'
(Br. in Opp. 6) and thus can be justified, if at
all, only if it promotes 'a compelling state interest'
(ibid.). But the distinction Pennsylvania draws
between abortion and childbirth, by requiring a
certification by the attending physician in the former
case and not in the latter, is not invidious; it merely
reflects the fact that whereas medical treatment at
childbirth is generally considered to be necessary,
in some circumstances a physician might determine
that an abortion would not be an appropriate medical
treatment.

2.
"Presumably it was for this reason that this
Court, in recognizing a qualified right to abortion,
emphasized the critical importance of the attending
physician's role by holding that during the first
trimester 'the abortion decision and its effectuation
must be left to the medical ~udgment of the pregnant
woman's attending physician.
Roe v. Wade, supra,
410 U.S., at 164. See also Doe v. Bol t on, suara,
410 U.S. at 192. Thus, Pennsylvania has acte
responsibly as well as constitutionally by interposing a physician between the medicaid patient and
the decision to abort.
"Moreover, the fact that a woman has a qualified
right to an abortion does not imply a correlative constitutional right to free treatment. Individuals
presumably have a 'right' to undergo many recognized
medical procedures by a licensed physician, but the
Equal Protection Clause does not affirmatively require
a state to cover the costs incurred by indigents in
undergoing such procedures."
While I would not rely, in any primary sense, on the
difference between what is medically necessary and what is
not so necessary, there is merit to the point that "medical
treatment at childbirth is generally considered to be
necessary".

This is at least an argument in support of the

rationality of the state's distinction.

We should make clear,

in using this point, that where medically necessary the abortion

a,/A..o

is funded.
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L.F.P., Jr.
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Let me try on you, Tyler, some "hornbook" type of
simplistic analysis.
In the context of this case, a pregnant woman has two
fundamental rights:

(i) to abort during the first trimester,

or (ii) to carry the fetus to term and childbirth.

But the

fact that these are fundamental rights does not mean that the
state must pay for either or both.

Indeed, a pregnant woman

has no right - fundamental or otherwise - to have the state pay
for an abortion or for childbirth.

Thus, the only ultimate

question in this case is whether if the state elects to pay
for one it also must pay for the other.
Putting this in more conventional equal protection terms,
we have here a classification - solely for the purpose of
receiving welfare benefits - of pregnant women who wish to
abort as contrasted with pregnant women who wish to bear children.
Neither of these classes is "suspect" within the meaning of that
term in any prior decision.

But the fundamental right issue

still lingers, and here we reach the problem that has attracted
so much of our attention to date - as to precisely the nature
of the right recognized in Roe.

2.

1~

v\vO, ~\tl .r

Is it really necessary to engage, as we have, in what

,...0.dJ\:.bJJ '. many will think is semantic analysis for the purpose of

~ ().;' !,..;.
~"V-""l , .,. ~~~

r

identifying the "right"?

What would be the effect if we

accept the shorthand terminology of ''constitutional right to
have an abortion"?

Since even appellees have conceded that

there is no constitutional right to free abortions, all we are
really talking about is whether the classification - by
reflecting a state preference for childbirth - invalidly burdens
the right to an abortion.

Since, as we point out, the state

imposes no burden whatever on that right, why do we worry about
the state's decision to encourage normal childbirth by Medicaid
benefits.
If the state had elected to provide no Medicaid benefits
for abortion

'*'

~ childbirth,

it could be argued- as it was,

in effect, in Rodriguez and other "wealth classification" that the state burdens the constitutional right of indigent
women to abort.

Their right would be no less burdened, as

contrasted with non-indigent women, than it is in this case.
In sum, if this analysis makes sense, we would end up
with a simple social security or welfare type case in which
the question is whether a state had legitimate interests for
favoring one class of beneficiaries over another.

In this

connection, can . we not make greater use of Skinner v. Oklahoma?
I have in mind the quote (your footnote 1-E) as the importance
of- procreation "for the very existence and survival of the race."
'

3.
It is difficult to think of a more compelling state interest,
even i f that test were applicable.*

t__q-f
L. F. P. , Jr.

*Tyler, there was a news story within the past two or three
days pointing out the slackening of the birth rate, indicating
that less than two children per marriage are now being born an obvious threat, if sustained ) to "survival of the race."
Ask the librarr to locate this story for us. It could have
been in Sunday s Washington Post.
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Betty:
Would you please request the Library of Congress to
, prepare a memorandum showing, year-by-year for the last
ten years, the fertility rate (defined, I believe, as the
total number of children borne by each woman aged 15 to
·
44) for the United States and for the state of Qonnecticut • .
See attached story from the Post of February
Sincerely,

Betty Clowers

.
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